The Politics of Educational Decentralisation in Indonesia

A Quest for Legitimacy

Irsyad Zamjani

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Localising the Global Problem

Before the 1980s, most of the countries in the world centralised their education management (see Fig. 1.1). In this sense, the ministry of education, either alone or together with other central ministries, was controlling the education system. Only some countries like the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia are traditionally decentralised. In these countries, education is the responsibility of the state governments. The federal government of Canada even does not have a ministry of education. In Asia, Japan was the first nation that decentralised its education management. The country devolved the responsibility of education management to local authorities in 1948 following the end of World War II when that country came under close US influence. The report issued by the First American Mission on Education recommended that Japan changes its centralised system and imitates the American model of school districts and school management that incorporates larger community participation (Muta, 2000).

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

Fig. 1.1 World education governance before 1980

Since the 1970s, decentralisation has become a major item on the agenda of the global educational reform movement, which came as part of either market reform or democratisation. The trend emerged after the crises of the centralised welfare state in Western societies and the crises of authoritarian regimes in developing nations, which then transformed the fundamentals of state governance, from government to the market and from the central to the local authorities (Jessop, 1999). The goal of educational decentralisation is to break down the management and financial structures of a national education system as well as encouraging more local community participation (Carnoy, 1995; McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Rhoten, 2000; Weiler, 1990). Many nations, from the east, like the Philippines, to the west, like Spain; from the poorest, like Ethiopia, to the more prosperous, like New Zealand; from the ideologically communist, like China, to the most capitalist like Singapore; and from countries lowly ranked by international education testing institutions, like Brazil, to the highly ranked, like Finland, all have engaged in some form of educational decentralisation (see Fig. 1.2).

Indonesia is one of the countries deeply affected by the global decentralisation movement. There had been several efforts by the country's government to cope with such global pressure (Devas, 1997; Malo & Nas, 1991), but none had much effect until the 2001 decentralisation



Fig. 1.2 Worldwide expansion of educational decentralisation (1980s–2000s)

big bang (Bünte, 2004; Fealy & Aspinall, 2003). The post-2001 decentralisation was one of the major institutional reforms that ended the dictatorial Suharto's New Order regime in the late 1990s. Before the reform, Indonesian education was highly centralised and fragmented. The management of education was shared between the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). The MoEC was responsible for the curriculum of all primary and secondary schools and the personnel of secondary schools: the MoHA was responsible for the personnel of primary and junior secondary schools. Both departments had their provincial and district or municipal offices, and this made management highly bureaucratic. The 2001 decentralisation reform dissolved both departments' organisational structures in the regions, which gave the district and municipal governments greater autonomy in running most public service sectors, including education. Adopting common decentralisation practices, some policy reforms were also enacted to give schools a degree of managerial autonomy and to provide the community with a participatory role in policymaking.

Governance fragmentation and inefficiency were the problems that most concerned Indonesian reformers when they firstly discussed and formulated the reform program (Jalal & Supriadi, 2001). By removing

the central government's bureaucratic structure from local bureaucracies, it was expected that education delivery would become more efficient and the district government the only education authority in the regions (World Bank, 1998). However, this has never been the case. On the one hand, decentralisation was welcomed by local élites as a big increase in power and authority. They do become dominant education authorities which control all public schools and teachers in their territories. On the other hand, despite the central government structure's removal, education decentralisation reform did not significantly reduce the MoEC's influence. Two years after decentralisation, in 2003, a new education law was passed and the MoEC was given a new role: that is, setting the national education standards. With these standards, the ministry is authorised to inspect school performance through the school accreditation, student performance through the national examinations and teacher performance through the teacher certification policy. In addition, to ensure those standards were maintained, the central government started to regulate almost all facets of education: from curriculum to school uniforms. There are hundreds of ministerial regulations and trillions of rupiahs allocated from the central government budget to support the implementation of the standards. This makes the structure of Indonesian education governance so contradictory: it is radically decentralised but at the same time highly standardised.

The demands of decentralisation and standardisation have become increasingly stronger from the two competing parties: the local and central governments. The MoEC keeps producing and revising regulations and policy strategies to enforce the standards only to find that they are too often neglected by the local governments. Many of the MoEC's regulations of things like school fees, principals' appointment, teacher management and classroom size were evaded because they were at odds with local interests. This practice has frustrated MoEC officials who frequently express their bitterness. They are helpless to deal with all the local noncompliance because the MoEC no longer has the power to apply political pressure. And, only one decade after decentralisation, the argument for recentralisation is becoming increasingly louder from MoEC officials. In 2011, at a public workshop, the MoEC's Office for Research and Development called for an evaluation of educational decentralisation (Antaranews, 2011; *Kompas*, 2011, 2012; *Republika*, 2011a). However, reinstating central government bureaucracy in the regions is believed by a prominent education professor and former MoEC senior official to be like

'running into a brick wall' (Interview, 13 February 2015). He believed that the local government resistance to educational recentralisation would be strong because teachers make the largest element of local bureaucracy and local elites will not give up their control.

Why Does Legitimacy Matter?

A large body of literature has been produced that gives accounts of the importance and the realisation of education reforms in the second half of the twentieth century and since. Most of the proposed reforms were driven by the logic of the rational market and the crises of the bureaucratic state. This suggests that, because the bureaucracy fails to provide for efficient and effective schooling, it is time to adopt a new style of governance whose objectives are efficiency and achievement (McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Riddell, 1998). This logic has dominated the thinking of most policymakers and policy analysts in their views of education reform and its implementation. From this perspective, the problem of educational decentralisation reform is whether it creates efficient education management. Factors such as personnel capacity, political will, lack of resources and unstable government have become determining variables that account for success and failure of the reforms (e.g. Calvert, 1995; Lubienski, 2003; Robertson & Tang, 1995).

Another dominant perspective of the reform has been that of critical scholars. From the perspective of this group, the problems of educational decentralisation reform stem from its effects on social inequality. Guided by some neo-Marxian perspectives of state and capitalism, they construe the story of reform as the story of hegemony and power relations. More than merely a matter of organisation, education reform is perceived by this group as an ideological issue. Its operation is not controlled by individuals but by the power of global neoliberal ideology. Robertson and Dale (2009) point out that international institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF and UNESCO, are representatives of that neoliberal ideology. They force policymakers all over the world, sometimes using aid as an instrument, to adopt more efficient models of education governance where the private sector and community participation are granted a greater influence. Ball and Youdell (2008) and Burch (2009) perceive that neoliberal education reform works in a more elusive way in its call for privatisation. Apart from its organisational design that replicates market-like structures in terms of school management, competence-based

curriculum or quality assurance, the reform also influences the proliferation of new market institutions manifested in entities like private schools, private tutoring, book publishing, assessment consulting and more. The market tends to serve the élite classes more than others because of the degree of access to resources. In the end, there is evidence that neoliberal reforms all too often lead to increases in inequality (Apple, 2006).

Nevertheless, I argue that questions of inefficiency and inequality are only side effects of decentralisation, and both effects might happen together in one case only. And, despite many criticisms of inefficiency and inequality that have resulted from educational decentralisation, the policy is more extensively adopted still. Neither the problem of inefficiency nor inequality affect the structure of decentralisation adopted by any given nation. They mostly affect the technical strategies used to deliver the policy. This book offers to elaborate another way of understanding the problem of the educational decentralisation policy. Educational decentralisation has been adopted globally because, at first, nations see it as the only legitimate means to govern their education system, regardless of its capacity to develop efficient management and to deal with educational problems including inequality of access. These technical and ideological questions are put aside and separated from the main motivation, that is, of garnering legitimacy. As the legitimacy is obtained by a nation, the process might develop, and the legitimacy might also be questioned. When legitimacy is achieved, then not only the technical strategy but the decentralised structure itself will also be affected.

Hence, this book proposes that the problem of Indonesian educational decentralisation rests in the question of legitimacy. As it was in many other countries, educational decentralisation was embraced in Indonesia—first, not because the central government needed to create an efficient bureaucracy or democratic governance but because it needed to survive. Decentralisation was, at that moment, seen to be the only policy that would ensure the nation's legitimacy to survive in the eyes of the global and local communities. The legitimacy of decentralisation came from its promises of democratisation and efficiency, which were popular discourses at that time. The problem of this legitimacy-motivated policy adoption, however, is the incongruence of the external policy that has been adopted and the internal environment that uses the policy or is addressed by it. In Indonesia's case, educational decentralisation is faced with technically incompetent local government personnel or the inadequate local resources. In this situation, the challenge for the

central government, which has devolved its power, is how to efficiently address the technical problems of education without necessarily losing its legitimacy. A failure to manage this situation would lead to bigger complications where the central government legitimacy is questioned and, to some extent, defied. Differences in local education governance practices are an ideal outcome of decentralisation. But the different practices that emerge from the evasion of central government rules might reflect a situation where the central government's legitimacy is contested.

The Role of the New Institutionalism

I use the approach offered by the new institutional theory to explain the relations between globalisation, educational decentralisation and legitimacy. The institutional theory holds that organisational structures are constructed not for the sake of gaining an efficient management but for garnering legitimacy. There are three key institutional concepts I use in this book to explain how this legitimacy is managed: institutional environment, decoupling and structuration or destructuration.

Institutional Environment

Scott defines the institutional environment as particular arrangements of regulative, normative and cultural cognitive structures that provide coherence, meaning and stability to organisational action (Scott, 2013). The institutional environment emerges from the shared historical processes of socialisation that then become taken for granted and possess rule-like status (Scott, 1987). These processes define what is and what is not an organisation, either by means of individuals' perceptions of how it is supposed to look like (cognitive), their shared values on what are the ideal goals it should achieve (normative), or restrictive rules on what function does each individual have within the structure (regulative). Arnove (2012) argues that nowadays education policy is the product of a global–local dialectic. The global policy is adopted by some nation-states, either through the internalisation of the discourse or through the agency of global actors. The global nature of decentralisation campaigns in the 1980s developed the strong institutional environment that influences its adoption in many countries. As such, strong local aspirations for democratisation would increasingly render obsolete the current centralised structure.

At the heart of this process is the idea of legitimation. From the organisations' perspective, conformity to institutional pressure is critical for their survival. Organisations have to make themselves recognisable by their environment and, in doing so, they have to abide by the pertinent rules within this environment. Once this has been done, organisations will find themselves legitimate to exist and to run their activities (Scott, 2013). The adoption of decentralisation gives the nation-state legitimacy, not only in the eyes of local populations but also in those of the global community. Otherwise, the nation-state would face a severe legitimacy crisis that would threaten its survival. The concept of legitimacy crisis is also used in this study to emphasise the importance of that institutional pressure. Originally coined by Habermas (1973) to describe the crisis of the late state-controlled capitalism, a legitimacy crisis is the condition of a discrepancy between the general interests of the population and established political and economic systems. In Indonesia's case, all the post-1998 reform projects were instigated to deal with the legitimacy crisis of the New Order's authoritarian and centralist state. In this sense, decentralisation was adopted with the purpose of restoring the deteriorating legitimacy of the central state.

Decoupling

The idea that legitimation can be achieved only by conforming to institutional pressure has given to these institutions a status of rationalised myth. Given these myths' powerful function to maintain the stability of the organisational order, organisations adopt them ceremonially and with ritual assertions of confidence and good faith (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, the ceremonial adoption of myths leads to a contradiction, which runs counter to the logic of technical efficiency. It is because the myths can arise from a different environment that they cannot fit into particular organisational settings (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The contradiction between institutional and technical environments is then solved by a mechanism called decoupling. The organisation keeps its institutional legitimacy by making changes in its formal structure but at the same time retaining some strategic practices unchanged. Habermas (1973) terms it the separation of expressive symbols that influences a universal willingness to follow from the instrumental function of administration.

At this stage, the concept of decoupling will be useful in explaining how the institutionalisation of education decentralisation might result in

the restoration of another centrally controlled structure while the decentralisation policy remains in place. For a nation with decades of centralist traditions, moving to a decentralised system is certainly challenging. The decoupling might take place in one of the two ways: the policy–practice decoupling or means–end decoupling (Bromley & Powell, 2012). The former happens when the decentralised structure is established, but the central bureaucracy restores its power through another means of control. This policy–practice decoupling is useful to analyse the phenomenon of 'centralised decentralisation' where the national government keeps its power despite the decentralised structure. Meanwhile, the means–end decoupling happens when the decentralised structure is forming and the central bureaucracy can no longer exercise its influence at the local level, but the goal of the decentralisation itself is not achieved. This type of decoupling is useful in explaining the phenomenon of 'decentralised centralism' where the local government remakes itself as a new power centre despite the implementation of school-based management policy.

Structuration and Destructuration

Organisations interact with each other in an organisational field. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define an organisational field as 'an aggregate of organisations whose interaction constitute a recognised area of institutional life'. The organisational field in the education sector might consist of schools, governments, book publishers, teacher associations and even political parties. The most fundamental basis on which the organisational field works is the relational system. Earlier field theorists like Bourdieu argue that 'to think in terms of field is to think relationally' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 96). The organisational field is patterned through relations among its participants. These organisations interact with each other forming a network of constraints (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In this sense, the pattern of relations is greatly determined by the possession of symbolic capital, that is, 'any property (any form of capital whether physical, economic, cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognise it, to give it value' (Bourdieu et al., 1994: 9). Bourdieu and colleagues (1994) claim that the state is an institution where all of those capitals are concentrated.

Hence, given the degree of symbolic capital, the relations among organisations in the field might lead to either structuration or destructuration (Scott, 2013; Scott et al., 2000). Structuration is the process through which the field becomes more highly structured in terms of increased consensus, dense relational networks and a stable hierarchy. Nevertheless, relations between field participants are not always of mutual agreement, common interests and obligations. Instead, the organisational field also constitutes an area of differentiation in which domination and resistance might take place (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Hence, in addition to structuration, there might also be the process of destructuration, which is when the relational process is leading to 'the breakdown of traditional organisational forms and patterns of behaviour, the dislodging of belief systems and the dismantling of governance structure dominant in earlier periods' (Scott et al., 2000: 27). Both concepts are used to analyse the process where the institutional legitimacy of education governance is contested among the field participants with the most resourceful symbolic capital: the central and local states.

Methods

The book is based on a qualitative research using two stages of case study: one is a single case study (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2003) to analyse the Indonesian experience of decentralisation in the context of global–national and central–local government relations, and the other is a multiple second-level case study (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2003) to analyse the local practices of educational decentralisation in two municipalities: Surabaya and Kupang. Sociologically, the selection of two localities for the second-level case studies was based on differences in the possession of symbolic capital (Bourdieu et al., 1994).

Surabaya, the capital city of East Java Province, has been the largest municipal government in Indonesia, and its economic growth is among the fastest in the country. Following decentralisation, the city has more than 1500 schools, from elementary to secondary. Since 2010, the city has been receiving much attention because of its immensely popular mayor, Tri Rismaharini, whose social reform projects have been recognised with numerous national and international awards. In contrast, Kupang, the capital city of East Nusa Tenggara Province, is a small but growing municipality. Its local government is responsible for fewer than 250

schools. While Surabaya mostly relies on local revenue to fund its educational programs, Kupang relies mostly on central government subsidies. Arguably, the economic capital of Surabaya's government gives it symbolic capital in terms of central–local government relations.

The research employed two data collection techniques: in-depth interviews and document study. The research participants were recruited purposely using theoretical sampling of DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) organisation fields and the key informant technique (Marshall, 1996: 92). I interviewed 38 strategic informants consisting of central and local government officials, national and local parliamentary members, teacher associations, prominent academics, NGO leaders, school supervisors and senior secondary school principals. The interviews took place during my two rounds of fieldwork trip from 2013 up to 2015.

Moreover, as Yin (2003) contends, unless we are studying preliterate societies, documents are an important source for data in every case study research. Because the study deals with policy and organisational behaviour, documents issued by relevant organisations, such as the literature of the previous studies, legislation, government regulations, reports and proceedings, all served as primary sources. Included here were World Bank reports, national legislations, MoEC regulations and local government policy documents. In addition, the study relied on secondary documents, which include newspaper articles, statistical figures and demographic information.

The Logic of the Book

This study analyses the way the institutional legitimacy is obtained, manipulated and contested in the implementation process of educational decentralisation in Indonesia. The institutional legitimacy is obtained through global and local pressures. From the global perspective, educational decentralisation reform represents the effect of the institutionalising of the world model of education governance (Meyer et al., 1997). Indonesia's adoption of decentralisation has certainly come about from this global pressure. Conformity to global rules would make the nation's education system legitimate in the eyes of the global community. This part discusses how the global institutional pressure took place and influenced the adoption of education reform in Indonesia. Despite the importance of external legitimacy, however, the policy must be adopted to recover internal legitimacy as well, that is, legitimacy in the eyes of the general

populace (Habermas, 1986). This is because a greater institutional change must emerge from the internal legitimacy crisis. Hence, this part also discusses the internal legitimacy crisis and how the policy was used to address the crisis.

Furthermore, this work traces the structural transformation that has taken place as a result of this decentralisation reform. Certainly, it was much expected that the reform would alter the nature of education management from highly centralised and state-oriented to more decentralised and non-state-oriented. The central government has to create such a decentralised structure to preserve its institutional legitimacy, but from its perspective it also has to make it work efficiently. Given its nature as an external institutional template, the decentralised structure is not necessarily viable to address effectively the internal educational problems. Hence, in this part of the analysis, the study uses the concept of decoupling to explain the way the central government manipulates the institutional legitimacy to attain what it sees as a more efficient governance.

In the last stage, the book offers a new perspective on analysing the traditional centralisation–decentralisation dilemma (Bray, 1999; Weiler, 1990). Some central governments have made efforts to regain some control, which has left local authorities disempowered (e.g. Hanson, 1989; Hawkins, 2000). In others, the decentralisation was radicalised so that the central state was weakened (e.g. Bodine, 2006; Cerych, 1997). In Indonesia, neither the central government nor local governments were weakened by the decentralisation policy, which makes the relation between the two more dynamic. This makes the two organisations as equally powerful in the organisational field of education and leads to the situation where the institutional legitimacy is contested between them. To show that the contestation for institutional legitimacy leads to either the process of structuration or destructuration, this study employs comparative case analyses involving two Indonesian local governments, those of the cities of Surabaya and Kupang. The two share similar characteristics; that is, both are administrative capitals and metropolitan cities for their respective provinces. However, they are different in terms of the possession of symbolic capital, which can, hypothetically, create differences in their responses to central government pressure.

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CHAPTER 2

Institutional Change and Indonesian Education Governance

Introduction

Since its inception, the organisation of Indonesia's education has been continuously transforming following the changes in its institutional environment. Different environments brought different logics and governance systems, which affect the structure of respective organisational fields. In this sense, the dynamic of global and local institutional environments in influencing the shape of educational arrangements has been present since the very beginning. In Indonesia, the earliest institution for education was religion and it was taught by international travellers from India, China, the Middle East and Europe (Azra, 2004; Penders, 1968; Schmutzer, 1977). As such, the modern education system was introduced through the global trend of colonial expansion from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries when European nations claimed territory in Asia, Africa and the Americas as their colonies. This was the period when state involvement in education was first introduced. During this colonial period, any development that occurred in the mother countries caused pressure for the colony to create its local arrangement. The early colonial era, for instance, was marked by the rise of mercantilist policies so that technical education was promoted to help strengthen mother country's economy. Yet, as the ideas from the French Revolution were spreading and the ideology of liberal-humanism becoming very popular in Europe, some adjustments were also made in colonial policies (Schmutzer, 1977).

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The twentieth century became the age of nation-state expansion, particularly in nations formerly colonised. When European countries had been devastated from the two world wars, many of their former colonies claimed their independence and established new nation-states. For these new nations, education was to help accelerate their nation-building projects. However, there is always a local dynamic in the way these new nations gained their independence, each in a different way. Indonesia was no exception. During this period, there was also a time when the Cold War between capitalist and communist ideological blocs influenced national education policy in Indonesia (Kelabora, 1983; Thomas, 1981).

The establishment of the New Order in 1965 marked the point of the neoliberal capitalist triumph over its communist adversary. During the New Order period, education policies were made to strengthen the fragile state through economic development after years of ideological conflict.

All of these different institutional settings came with different governance system arrangements. All previous periods had their own experience of centralisation and decentralisation, particularly after the state became involved in administering this sector, the education sector. Since the early twentieth century, the Dutch colonial government had initiated decentralisation policies in which local governments were given the responsibility of financing the schools as well as designing the local content of these schools' curricula. The New Order and the previous governments continued these practices, certainly with some variation. However, the problem was not how centralising or decentralising the government was, but rather how structured were the rules and regulations under every governance setting. This chapter discusses how the global and local institutional dynamics influenced the transformation of education in Indonesia and how these arrangements created a more structured policy implementation.

The Religious Construction of Education

As had been the case in other Asian countries, religion was the first institution to facilitate the provision of education in Indonesia. Education was regarded as the main agent for promoting religious values and recruiting proficient preachers. A Chinese traveller, I Tsing, who made a journey to Sumatra in the seventh century, witnessed the prevalence of Buddhist temples with the monks teaching religious values (Lee, 1995; Penders, 1968). Initially, the teaching was addressed to unlimited, large numbers of

the local populations. Then, as religion became more entrenched in social and political life, a more structured system of education called *asrama* developed. Pupils boarded in institutions away from their homes and places of origin (Bradjanagara, 1956). The academic subjects were mostly religious teachings in which pupils were trained 'to cultivate clairvoyance, study the secrets of the cosmos, and prepare himself for death' (Anderson, 1972: 53). In addition, pupils were also given tuition in Indian arts, philosophy and science (Lee, 1995; Penders, 1968; Tsuchiya, 1975).

As the site of moral training, *asrama*s imposed on their students the requirement to live modestly and to withdraw from worldly interests. To maintain this principle strictly, some historians have written that among the typical characteristics of *asrama*s was that most were in isolated places: mountains, forests and caves. Through this, they became self-sufficient and independent from any political order and social intervention (Anderson, 1972). And, eventually, as they reached the stage of renunciation or worldly rejection, they would possess a clear vision and sharp conscience. It would enable them to diagnose societal problems and offer a solution. As Anderson has noted, the *asrama* as spiritual centres even became the source of power in Javanese political culture. The *asrama* teachers or *ajar*s became a reference for rulers to maintain political order. Their ascetic practices were believed to 'give them special insights into the inner state of the world and into the future flow of Power within it' (Anderson, 1972: 53). However, this early religious education exclusively catered for royal family members; the kingdoms needed to strengthen their legitimacy by assigning religious advisors (Lee, 1995; Penders, 1968).

As Islam in turn came to power in the twelfth century, new centres of religious education appeared. There are several theories of the arrival of Islam in Indonesia. Some historians postulate that it was brought by Indian pedlars in the twelfth century, while others thought that it was spread by either Persians or Arabs in the ninth century (Azra, 2004). The Muslim preachers replicated their Hindu–Buddhist predecessors in their Islamic teachings. The religious teachings initially took place in mosques or *langgar*. Here, students were taught basic Islamic doctrine, Koranic recitation and daily ritual practices. Students were loosely bound to the system; their attendance was not regularly recorded. Instruction was given daily but within a short period of time after working hours. Apart from *langgar*, Muslim preachers also adopted the *asrama* system, renaming it *pesantren* or *pondok*. Unlike in *langgar*s, *pesantren* taught

Islamic traditions more rigorously. They resembled the *asrama* boarding school system where students lived and spent most of their time. Langgar and *pesantren* were autonomous organisations run by clerics, who were known as *ulama*s or *kyai*s, who served as legitimate education authorities in their respective localities.

Before the expansion of *pesantren*s in the eighteenth century, Muslim scholars (*ulama*) were part of the state administration. These *ulama*s played a political role as proprietors of religious authority. They were assigned titles like *syaikh al-Islam* (supreme teacher of Islam), *mufti* (legal arbitrator), *qadhi* (judge) and *penghulu* (local religious officer). The affiliations of some *ulama*s within the kingdom raised political competition among them with regard to claims of religious authority. In the fourteenth century, for instance, the Sultan of Aceh supported the prominent *ulama*, Nuruddin Ar-Raniri, to ban the teaching of a sufist metaphysical theory called *wahdat al-wujud* (the unity of existence) introduced by another rising scholar, Hamzah al-Fansuri (Azra, 2004). Consequently, *ulama*s were only allowed to teach official doctrine as the state-sponsored *ulama* community decreed or otherwise would be charged with heresy. As political crises hit major Indonesian kingdoms in the middle of the eighteenth century, many *ulama*s lost their political influence. They relinquished their positions at the centres of power to reclaim their traditional leadership in religious education. They took the path the Hindu–Buddhist priests had followed before: they retreated from the worldly political hustle. Following this period, *pesantren* developed as the most extensive education institutions in the Archipelago.

In the sixteenth century, Portuguese settlers arrived in Maluku. They established colonies and their influence spread to many other eastern islands. It was through these European settlers that Christianity was introduced to Indonesia. Christian education became the transition model from previous religious institutions for education to modern, state-sponsored schooling systems in Indonesia. Although the military rulers facilitated the provision of education, the learning system was organised independently by the Church and in the interests of religious missions (Kroeskamp, 1974). The first Christian school was founded in Ternate, North Maluku, in 1538. The establishment of a Jesuit mission in 1546 by its charismatic leader, Francis Xavier, added much to the effort of school expansion. By 1560, there were 30 schools in Ambon and 26 in the Uliassan islands. But the number is believed to be higher because the Portuguese succeeded with their conversion program over all their

areas of influence: Tidore, Bacan, Halmahera, Saparua, Nusa Laut, North Sulawesi, Borneo, Flores and Timor (Kroeskamp, 1974). During their rule, the Portuguese imposed compulsory education for all native people regardless of social status. Using the Portuguese language as the medium of instruction, the schools taught Christian doctrine, writing, reading and arithmetic. Despite its dependence on the government, the Church had a great degree of freedom in running the schools. No state regulations were produced to control the arrangement of education during the Portuguese period (Penders, 1968).

Education and the Colonial State

The Mercantilist Era

The arrival of the Netherlanders in 1605 completely changed the nature of education governance in Indonesia. Even though the clergy kept their major religious role, they tended to become state servants who worked within a state system. The Dutch initially ruled the archipelago as a trade company in the name of the *Vereenigde Oost-indische Compagnie* (VOC) or the United East India Company. Even though the company was seen as a for-profit business organisation, in the archipelago it manifested itself as the bearer of government functions (Anderson, 1983). The company extended its influence in Indonesia over a much greater territory than did the Portuguese. In addition to its hegemony over former Portuguese areas, it also subjugated local rulers in many other parts of the archipelago, the most important of which were the Javanese kingdoms. The company established its representatives in every locality and the native administrations had to obey their dictates. From 1706, the company held the right to appoint subordinate officers of the regent, positions in practice that were mostly filled by Dutch nominees (Furnivall, 2010).

Under the VOC, the Church remained an important education institution, but now education started to be state-regulated. Schools functioned not only as a medium for religious teaching but also to make stronger connections between the people and the company (Kroeskamp, 1974). The 1617 orders from the State General in The Netherlands to the VOC governors general mentioned that the company was required 'to organize the spread of the Christian religion, the building of good schools and other necessary matters pertaining thereto' (Govaars-Tjia, 2005: 32). The company drew up the regulations, provided the facilities and paid

the teachers, and the Church served as technical organiser. The regulations arranged by the company did not touch upon the pedagogical and were limited to three aspects: the subjects taught, the school hours and the school holidays. The others were left for the clergymen (Kroeskamp, 1974).

With their European ideological assumptions, the initial Dutch religious education preoccupation was to eradicate the influence of the Roman Catholic Church from Indonesian schools. It was easier to do this in Java, which was not affected by European influence to the extent that the eastern islands were, a result of their century-long connection with the Portuguese and Spaniards. In these eastern islands, the Dutch schooling requirements met resistance from local communities and the company had few teachers because of its interdiction of Catholic preachers. A compulsory education system was then enacted with a pound of rice given as compensation for those willing to teach children. The effort to introduce Dutch as instructional language also failed in most islands. The native peoples were accustomed to Portuguese and to Malay, which forced teachers to use the latter language rather than the former (Govaars-Tjia, 2005; Penders, 1968).

Following the departure of the VOC in 1799, The Netherlands kingdom that took over the colonial administration arranged more significant changes. Education was no longer a matter for the religious, and therefore, the leadership role of the Church in education was supplanted. The way education was organised during this colonial period was influenced by the institutional transformation within the state itself. The period of the 1800s was marked by severe economic crises in The Netherlands Indies. Not only did the VOC leave a catastrophic economy behind, but the new government itself was nearly bankrupted because of massive spending for military campaigns against local uprisings, the most important of which were the Java War and the Sumatran rebellion by puritanical Muslims (Carey, 1976; Dobbin, 1977). The government imposed a cultivation system policy (*cultuurstelsel*), causing villagers to spare 20% of their lands for planting exportable, government-mandated commodities. If this requirement was not met, they had to work in a government-owned plantation for 60 days a year. Indonesian historians satirically named this policy as 'forced planting' (*tanam paksa*) (Van Niel et al., 2003).

The vision of this, the nineteenth, century was to create an effective colonial estate where all available resources were to serve the European ascendancy. Hence, apart from supporting the economy, education was

also to sustain social arrangements established by the Dutch. During this colonial period, Indonesian society was divided into three hierarchical layers: the Europeans at the top of the pyramid, the local aristocrats who supported the Dutch administration as civil servants and the indigenous population working in agriculture or other primary production (Kartodirdjo, 1978). Early government primary schools were termed *Europeesche lagere scholen*, which served European families and a limited number of local aristocrats only. In 1848, the colonial government started to open schools exclusively for native Indonesians. They established two types of elementary school: the five-year first-class primary schools (*eerste klasse*) catering for local aristocrat families, and four-year second-class schools (*tweede klasse*) for the general population (Bradjanagara, 1956).

Despite the stratification, both types of schools were to teach technical skills necessary for either government officials or lower administrative employees in European companies. The first-class schools taught a more extensive range of subjects, such as reading, writing, mathematics, drawing, singing, earth sciences, animal sciences, plant sciences, physics and the Javanese and Malay languages. The second-class schools taught more basic subjects: reading, writing and traditional languages. However, all schools, particularly the first-class, had to customise their curricular content so that they matched the broader state agenda. Bradjanegara describes it as follows:

> …. There was a subject that had never been taught even in the Dutch lower school (i.e. ELS), which was the land survey (*landmeten*). The subject was taught to prepare the implementation of government *cultuurstelsel* policy… The drawing subject taught how to draw land maps. The math subject must teach calculations of land tax (*landrente*) and coffee administration. (Bradjanagara, 1956: 58)

The Ethical Policy

The twentieth century, however, sparked a different institutional environment. Since the end of the nineteenth century, the Europeans met internal pressures derived from the radical ideas from the French Revolution, which inspired a liberal revolution in The Netherlands. The result was that in 1848, The Netherlands adopted liberal political reforms through a significant constitutional amendment that replaced the monarchical government with a parliamentary government. The new constitution also

mandated the use of popular elections as a mechanism to establish the lower house of parliament, provincial councils and the municipal councils (Schmutzer, 1977). This liberal movement also effected internal transformations within Dutch Calvinism, which previously opposed the liberal reforms, but then became more moderate and proposed a humanist doctrine in relation to the government's treatment of its colonies. In 1878, the Christian Anti-Revolutionary party issued its 'New Progressive Platform', which made recommendations to educate Indonesians morally; to administer colonial riches in consultation with the people and to the best advantage of their country; to assist the Indonesians to a more independent position in the future; and to promote Christianity in Indonesia (Schmutzer, 1977).

Hence, the colonial vision of a state transformed to respond to the pressure of the environmental change in the mother country. All government policies for indigenous Indonesians during the 1900s made reference to what was then popularly termed the ethical policy (*ethische politiek*). The policy involved a revision of former views of Indonesia as a *wingewest* (region to make a profit), that the government had to work for the welfare of the colony and that a process of civilising must take place. In 1906, the Minister of the Colonies, Dirk Fock, declared 'we have undertaken to rule the people through their own leaders and that implies the training of subordinates in all branches of administration'. The statement was then reflected in the government plan to introduce general compulsory education for all Indonesian people. This education was no longer designed solely to prepare skilled labourers, but also to transfer new values that would civilise the indigenous and unite them as loyal citizens (Penders, 1968).

In 1903, the government established a new three-year system called *volkschool* or *desaschool* (village school) for those in remote areas. By 1914, those who had finished in the village schools were able to continue their education in a newly established two-year *vervolgschool* system. By that same year, the government also reorganised the current first- and second-class schools. The first-class schools were transformed to *Hollandsch inlandsche school* (HIS) with an extended attendance period of seven years. The HIS used Dutch as the medium of instruction. The government also added one more year to the duration of education at second-class schools and upgraded its curricular content to nearly the standard of the first-class schools. A secondary school system was also introduced in 1914, called *Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs* (MULO).

This was three-year junior secondary system for those who had completed ELS and HIS. The government then established *schakelschool* in 1920 for pupils who had finished at the second-class schools and *vervolgschool* as a transition before entering MULO. One year earlier, in 1919, a senior secondary system was introduced for the indigenes, called *algemeene middelbare school* (AMS). Graduates of AMS were equivalent to those of the schools for Dutch families, *hogere burgerschool* (HBS) (Bradjanagara, 1956).

Despite the wide-ranging policy, this state-sponsored school system failed to attain legitimacy. The problem was partly technical but mostly institutional. The technical problem arose from the fact that the government education campaign for natives was not allocated adequate funding. A report in 1898 claimed that although the budgeted amount allocated for each pupil of European descent was 122 guilders, the amount for each native student was only 10 guilders (Djojonegoro, 1996). Another report said that, in 1900, education spending was 4,109,000 guilders and 65% of this was being disbursed to support European schools whose pupils were less than 1% of the population (Zainu'ddin, 1970). However, Schmutzer (1977) claimed that the problem was generally caused by the lack of government funding. In 1907, it was calculated that the cost to educate natives alone would come to 125 million guilders of less than 200 million guilders in total. Therefore, from the 186 new schools in 1909, only ten were acceptably funded (Schmutzer, 1977). After the great depression in the 1920s, the central government had to tighten its budget and some government schools, particularly *volkschools*, had to find their own funding. As a result, parents had to pay more to send their children to government schools, which caused them to opt out of sending their children to school. Those who finished their primary education did not continue to secondary (Suwignyo, 2013).

The greatest challenge to government education, however, came from the nature of its system, which was less popular among the new generation of educated natives, who could see the importance of an independent nation as well as identifying with the local culture. The technical and vocational approach to education just did not fit a long-standing local belief that education as the transmission of meaning rather than of skills. In addition, the discriminative character of the school system also led to a campaign against the colonial government. Rather than unifying the population, the system otherwise promoted the spread of a nationalist spirit of resistance. This challenge resulted in the expansion of

community-supported, private education institutions, which in the early twentieth century had become independent of religious constraints. In addition to traditional *pesantren*s that continued to enrol native Muslim children, a number of private schools were built for the indigenous population. The schools were influenced by the contradiction between the state-promoted Western archetype and the locally developed anti-colonial ideology. Hence, although their organisation was modelled on Western schools, these schools infused a new ideological content into their teaching and education goals. Most were run by one or other of three major organisations: Taman Siswa, Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama, and these schools aspired not only to separate themselves from the government system but also to lead their youth to more cultural awareness as well as encouraging a spirit of national cohesion.

*Pesantren*s, which were affiliated with the traditional Muslim organisation, Nahdhatul Ulama, continued their traditional non-classroom and teacher-centred learning. They taught traditional Islam using textbooks written by mediaeval Islamic scholars or using commentaries of them by more recent scholars (Dhofier, 1980). Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah, a modernist faction of Indonesian Muslim organisations, developed their schools based on more pragmatic and practical ideas of Islam. They adopted Western methods to teach secular subjects and Islamic morality at the same time (Federspiel, 1970; Nakamura, 1983). Apart from these two was Taman Siswa (literally, Garden of Pupils), which introduced a combination of a Western schooling system and the old Javanese *asrama* system. Ki Hajar Dewantara, the founder of Taman Siswa, always highlighted the importance of cultivating first children's own cultural values before taking on external ideas (Radcliffe, 1971). Following the post-World War I economic recession in 1920s, the colonial government's cutting of its education budget made government schools even more expensive, and these independent schools became the most favoured education destination for Indonesian parents. By the end of the 1930s, there were no fewer than 2200 private schools in Indonesia with almost 142,000 native students enrolled (Zainu'ddin, 1970).

This development had led to two policy responses from the colonial government. First, the adaptation of Western education systems for the needs of indigenous pupils (indigenisation) and the major strategies for doing this were to replace many European teachers with Indonesians; to devolve budget and management for schools to provincial and municipal governments; to reorganise second-class schools; and to reform

the curriculum by using local content and enriching context (Suwignyo, 2013). This policy appeared to be motivated by the central government's drive for budget efficiency rather than a broader cultural strategy. The colonial government was indeed successful in reducing its education expenditure in that period. Replacing European teachers with Indonesian teachers reduced operational spending mostly because of the disparities in salary between Europeans and Indonesians. As such, the decentralisation strategy transferred the financial burden to already suffering local governments and even village administrations (Suwignyo, 2013). Those policies were certainly clinched by the aggressive politico-cultural movement of the private schools.

This then led to the second policy response, the restriction of private school expansion. At least two regulations had been issued by the colonial government for this purpose: the 1923 regulation 136 on the supervision of private schools and the 1932 regulation 494 or what the government contemptuously called the 'Wild School Ordinance' (*Wildeschoolen Ordonantie*). The first regulation mandated all non-subsidised schools to register themselves with the government and their teachers to report all of their teaching materials. It also gave authority to the government to suspend a teacher or close a school if their actions were seen to violate public order. Meanwhile, the second regulation moved further to oblige all private schools to seek a licence from the provincial government license before they could operate. The second regulation provoked massive resistance from nationalist activists, among them were the Taman Siswa founder, Ki Hajar Dewantara, in Java, and Muhammadiyah leader, Abdul Karim Amrullah, in Sumatera. The massive protest against the regulation led to its abolition only five months after its enactment (Sugiharta, 2014; Zainu'ddin, 1970).

The Dutch failure to consolidate the education system led to the destructuration of the organisational field. The colonial state lost its legitimation as a single education system reference. Apart from the state education system controlled by the colonial government, many private school systems were embracing the new nationalist vision. They continued to do so until the Japanese invasion in 1942. Similar to the Dutch, the Japanese made an effort to control the system. In March 1942, they abolished all European schools in the country. Using their repressive military power, they were to some extent successful in consolidating the system into a single institutional framework. They altered schools to become centres for Japanese cultural indoctrination and military training.

Students and teachers were obliged to do physical exercises and take part in the saluting ceremony for the Japanese Emperor every morning before school activities began (Suwignyo, 2012). The Japanese government also managed to convince prominent nationalist leaders to cooperate under Japanese command. However, during the three years of Japanese occupation, 1942–1945, schooling declined. Primary school enrolment plunged by 30%, and secondary school numbers fell by nearly 90% (Bjork, 2005). All the people's energies were forced to support Japanese military campaigns. Thousands of youth were sent to join informal training in a number of Japan-sponsored organisations, the most important of which was PETA or *Pembela Tanah Air* (the Nation's Defenders), which provided military training (Tilaar, 1995).

When Indonesia gained its independence in 1945, the new government inherited this institutional complexity: there was the unconsolidated but institutionalised Dutch education legacy on the one hand, and a more consolidated but short-lived and fragile Japanese system on the other. As the nationalist leaders came to hold power, they made their hard-fought nationalist ideals into the archetype of a new state-sponsored education. Yet this had never been a simple one-night success. The raging nationalist faction always wanted to break from the past nation-denigrating colonial model, but no adequate blueprint was available to develop a new system.

Education and Nation-State Building

The Organisational Arrangement of Education Governance

Some scholars have been known to support a theory that education is the most effective medium to spread nationalism. Early institutional analyses held to the theory of education and the nation-state; that is, since the eighteenth century, the motivation to build a nation-state accounted for the expansion of mass schooling (Ramirez & Boli, 1987). Globally, 1945 was a year of nation-state formation (Meyer et al., 1997). World War II had just concluded and new nations were coming into being from former colonial territories as they gained autonomy from their previous administrations. Education was made to serve this new political project in Indonesia. Lee (1995) describes the first policy measure the Education Minister of the new independent republic initiated during his service.

> Earlier, the Republican government had taken some steps to assume control of education. On 29 September 1945, Dewantoro, as Education Minister, issued an interim guide to all educational leaders, school principals, and teachers in Java advising a number of changes to be adopted immediately. The guidelines were brief and intended more to signal the beginning of a new political era rather than to launch any major programmes. Schools were urged to instil the spirit of nationalism especially through daily singing of the national anthem and rising of the Republican flag. All school regulations promulgated by the Japanese were revoked. Only bahasa Indonesia was allowed with English and German included in the secondary schools. (Lee, 1995: 32)

Indeed, up to five years after the 1945 independence proclamation, no important technical policy was forthcoming because there were two administrative systems claiming control over the archipelago: the nationalist republican and the previous Dutch administration that returned after the war. In 1948, the Dutch took control over most territories. During that period, the bloody nationalist war took place to oust the Europeans from the land. Many schools were closed because their teachers joined the war effort. During this five-year period, education was organised under each state or province and the Dutch school system continued to operate in many areas. In this sense, the role of the ministry of education was not so very influential in guiding the education system. It was not until the Round Table Conference in The Hague in 1949 that the Indonesian government regained full sovereignty.

Following the integration motion in 1950, the Department of Education, Instruction and Culture (DEIC) regained power. In this formation period, the nationalist influence was real. The portfolios of the Education Minister were mostly occupied by the Yogyakarta circle, or those who had an affiliation before independence with the Taman Siswa nationalist movement (Kelabora, 1983). Ki Hajar Dewantara, the Taman Siswa founder and central figure, served as the first Education Minister of the Republic. Other Taman Siswa activists, for instance, Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro, Teuku Mohammad Hasan and Sarino Mangunpranoto, also served the portfolio successively.

The first Education Act was ratified in 1950 and outlined how national education should play a role in the larger context of nation building. The goal of education was defined as 'creating moral and capable human beings as well as democratic citizens with a sense of responsibility towards the prosperity of society and country' (article 3). Adopting Taman Siswa's

idea, the law also stated that the education process should run based on Indonesians' own culture. The commentary part of the act further elaborated the cultural foundation of the Indonesian education system as follows:

> That the foundation must be totally different from that of education and instruction during the Dutch era, and (this is out of the question), no need to be elaborated. (That is firstly) because the instruction during the Dutch period was not deeply rooted in Indonesian society, our people did not feel that those schools were their own. Despite any arguments, those schools remained alien properties for Indonesian people. The second reason is that the Dutch schools admitted only a small portion of Indonesian people, predominantly the elites. Ordinary people generally did not get any chances to obtain education and instruction in those schools. (GoI, 1950)

The burning desire to break free from the colonial past was manifested in the government school reorganisation policy in June 1950. The government abolished the current six types of primary school and seven types of secondary school established by the Dutch, which were still using Dutch nomenclature and being run on the basis of social class. These organisations were merged to form a universal, age-based school categorisation: *sekolah rakyat* (elementary school), *sekolah menengah pertama* (junior high school) and *sekolah menengah atas* (senior high school). In addition, there were other secondary vocational and technical schools. The government controlled the curricula in all schools and the Indonesian language as the medium of instruction was made compulsory. All private schools, including those that catered for foreigners, had to have the Indonesian language as one of their course subjects. The teaching of Dutch was totally dropped from Indonesian public schools in 1950. Dutch teachers who wanted to continue working in Indonesian schools were selected according to stringent criteria and had to teach in Indonesian (Suwignyo, 2013).

Despite its success in gaining legitimacy in the anti-colonial campaign, the nationalist education effort to embrace and define its own identity became more complicated. Indonesia is a nation with over 400 hundred ethnic languages (Nababan, 1985) and a great variety of belief systems (McVey, 1993). To accommodate such differences, President Soekarno had earlier formulated the Pancasila, which literally means five principles, and this was approved as the state ideology. These five principles

are a belief in God, humanitarianism, nationalism, representative democracy and social justice. Yet, there was still no consensus among politicians on how this Pancasila should help in guiding the nation. From the 1940s to the 1960s, the country had witnessed many separatist and political revolts, which almost caused its disintegration. It also saw 24 governments in succession, each a coalition government. For the education portfolio alone, Indonesia had 15 different ministers from different political and ideological backgrounds during this period.

The ratification of the Education Act (Law 4 of 1950) showed how such a political environment worked. The Act was drafted when the education department's leadership was under an Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) politician, Ali Sastroamidjojo (1947–1949), and later was ratified when another PNI politician, Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro (1949–1950), was in office. The part most debated was related to religious teaching in schools. In the name of Pancasila, the Act discreetly asserted the state's neutral position. Article 20 [1] stated that 'in public schools religious subject will be given; parents are to decide whether their children are taking the course or not' (GoI, 1950). Yet, the official commentary of this article was rather strong.

a. Whether a certain school is to provide the religious subject would depend on students' age and intelligence.
b. Adult students may decide independently whether to take a religious course or not.
c. The nature of religious teaching and its hours will be regulated within a Law regarding its school type.
d. The religious subject does not influence a student's promotion.

The Act also allowed private schools to match the type of religion being taught in their schools with their respective institutional foundation. This meant, for example, that Muslim children in Catholic schools would possibly receive Christian rather than Islamic instruction. Before being ratified in 1950, the Act had caused massive protests across the country. In early 1949, Masyumi, the biggest Islamic party, walked out during the parliamentary session when the Bill was passed. In Sumatra, Mohammad Sjafei, former Education Minister and respected politician, submitted a statement called the Sumatra Memorandum to Minister Sastroamidjojo urging the annulment of the Act (Suwignyo, 2013). On 16 October

1949, Daud Beureuh, the military governor of Aceh, issued his own statement called the Aceh Memorandum. The memorandum demanded the government to make religious teaching a compulsory subject in schools; to acknowledge the education in religious schools equal to the training in government schools; to convert the status of religious schools to government-run schools; and to regulate the mixing of male and female students so that local Islamic practices in Sumatera not be violated (Tilaar, 1995).

Soekarno showed a reluctance to ratify the Bill given such massive controversy, but the acting president, Asaat, authorised the Act in April 1950. After it had been ratified, two prominent Islamist factions, Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) and Partai Masyumi, moved refusal motions in the parliament. The PSII labelled the regulation an 'educational system which humiliates mankind' (Suwignyo, 2013). Masyumi also refused to comply with the Act and demanded the government make religious instruction compulsory in school. The factions argued that 'by not making religious lessons a compulsory subject for schoolchildren, the government is jeopardising the future life of the Indonesian people, in particular, Muslims. The government has made a policy which diverges from the first principle of the state ideology, the Pancasila' (Suwignyo, 2013).

In September 1950, Masyumi took over the coalition government and Prime Minister Natsir soon assigned an independent professional, Bahder Djohan, as the new Education Minister. Because of the change of state arrangement from a federal to a unitary system, the Act lost its legitimacy to integrate a national system. In 1954, another PNI government was formed under the leadership of a former Education Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, and the Act (Law No. 4 of 1950) was then declared effective (GoI, 1954).

Despite the education system being centralised, the law provided the room for a more decentralised administration. One year after the Education Act was passed, in 1951, the government issued a regulation on this decentralisation scheme. The regulation devolved the control of basic education to the provincial governments. Such responsibility covered administrative aspects such as school finance, school personnel, school licences, student admissions and resource distribution. Other technical matters such as curriculum content, the choice of textbooks, school inspections, school holidays and international school affairs remained under central government control (GoI, 1951). The decentralisation was

then followed by the transfer of physical resources and personnel to the provincial authorities. The provinces now had the authority to hire and fire public school teachers.

In 1953, the Education Ministry announced that secondary schooling would be gradually devolved to the provincial governments and when this had been done the control of primary education would be shifted to the district governments. In the late 1950s, the provinces did have additional responsibilities, such as setting up public libraries, managing literacy campaigns and organising emergency teacher training courses (Lee, 1995). By 1959, the administration of formal teachers' training schools, SGA and SGB, was entirely handed over to the provincial governments. They were also assigned responsibility to control the special schools for Indonesian Chinese (Lee, 1995).

Following decentralisation, the organisational arrangement of education authorities was also adjusted. The provincial governments established their own education departments, called Dinas PPK or Provincial Education and Culture Departments, which were independent of the central ministry and directly responsible to the governor. Whereas politicians were enthusiastic with the decentralisation arrangement, it did not satisfy the education professionals. PGRI, the largest Indonesian teacher association, was unhappy with the policy, arguing that less capable and inexperienced bureaucrats were running the Dinas PPK. These bureaucrats were accused of having no concern with education matters and no understanding of what teachers and schools really needed. Therefore, the association demanded that the decentralisation policy should be revoked and control centralised and should expand into the administrative realm as well (Lee, 1995).

In response to this, by 1957, the central education department established the *Kantor Perwakilan PPK* or the Office of the Representative for Education and Culture. This office was the provincial branch of the central education department and its head served as the minister's representative on all education matters in the region. No further responsibility was attached to this office other than it coordinate a number of ministerial inspectorates in the province that were to conduct regular school inspections. Their role seemed to be more ceremonial than technical. In many provinces, the role of Perwakilan PPK and Dinas PPK overlapped because of some technical problems. The distance from Jakarta hindered coordination and the appointment of local people as the Perwakilan PPK office

heads had made the offices more inclined to local than to central government's interests and they would make independent decisions without consulting Jakarta. Also, it frequently happened that the same person became head of *perwakilan* and of *dinas* offices because of limited local resources (Lee, 1995).

However, the strong liberal democratic approach to building the nation-state neither integrated the nation nor strengthened the state. Ideological and political confrontations were the striking feature of Indonesian politics in the 1950s. The result was a highly unstable government. In one decade, 1950–1959, the country had seven governments in succession, all coalition governments. Education department leadership shifted from one political party to another, each with their different political agendas. Secessionist movements were also widespread in a number of regions, which led to massive military campaigns. In July 1959, President Soekarno declared the abolition of parliamentary democracy by launching his own presidential cabinet. Naming his version 'guided democracy' (*demokrasi terpimpin*), he also dismissed the elected constitution-making body called Konstituante. In 1960, he also banned two major political parties, the social democratic *Partai Sosialis Indonesia* (PSI) and the Islamist *Masyumi*, which were widely associated with the Indonesian Revolutionary Government (*Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*/PRRI) rebellion a couple of years earlier.

Localising the Global Ideological Confrontation

The move from liberal to guided democracy could be linked to the localisation of the global developments of the Cold War, that is, the ideological confrontation of US capitalism with Soviet communism (Bunnell, 1966). Soekarno himself had frequently criticised parliamentary democracy as an imported Western democracy and marked his guided democracy government with many confrontational campaigns against what he called NEKOLIM or neo-colonialism and imperialism, which in most cases were associated with US allies (Lev, 1966). In 1957, Soekarno imposed his radical anti-Western strategy by taking over a great deal of Dutch-owned property. Following this, the state controlled almost all productive plantations, more than 50% of export trade companies that were previously under foreign control, 250 factories and several banks and mining companies (Berger, 1997). On 19 December 1961, he launched the Trikora military operation to claim West Papua from the US-supported Dutch

hegemony. One year later, he established another military campaign to combat the establishment of the British-supported Malaysia Federation. In January 1965, the president even declared Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN as his protest against this Malaysian development.

At the same time, however, the president built closer relations with the Eastern bloc countries. He was known to have good connections with communist leaders in Moscow and Beijing. Some analysts argue that Soekarno's idea of guided democracy itself was very much influenced by the communist system (Liu, 1997). In 1956, Soekarno himself said that he was more impressed with what he found during his visits to socialist than to capitalist countries. He was impressed by the way one-party systems in China and the Soviet Union organised a more integrated society without internecine strife among the people (Ghoshal, 1982). Internally, he then included communism as part of his new ideological project called NASAKOM, which stands for Nasionalisme (nationalism), Agama (religion) and Komunisme (communism). In his address on the Independence Day commemoration on 17 August 1959, he introduced MANIPOL–USDEK as additional to the state ideology of Pancasila, which reflected the transposition of global ideological conflicts into an Indonesian context. MANIPOL–USDEK is an acronym for Manifesto Politik (political manifesto) of UUD 1945 (the 1945 constitution), Sosialisme Indonesia (Indonesian socialism), Demokrasi Terpimpin (guided democracy), Ekonomi Terpimpin (guided economy) and Kepribadian Indonesia (Indonesian character).

These developments certainly affected the arrangement of national governance. Since the mid-1950s, Soekarno had turned to become the Indonesian Communist Party's unofficial patron. Always the backbone of all presidential policies during the guided democracy period, the PKI enjoyed greater political influence than it ever had before. Against opposition, the president took unpopular political stands by advocating communist involvement in the government. He assigned a number of PKI associates to cabinet portfolios, among which was education. From 1957, the PKI politicians took control of the education department from the Taman Siswa member and PNI politician, Sarino Mangunpranoto. The communist-sponsored minister, Prijono, survived for the whole period of Soekarno's presidency and became the longest serving Education Minister in Indonesia's history, from 1957 to 1966. Prijono was never a formal member of PKI, but was known as a strong supporter. He was awarded

Stalin's Prize for Peace in 1954 and his son was granted a university scholarship in Moscow in the 1960s (Kelabora, 1983; Thomas, 1981).

The appointment of Prijono soon became the new source of ideological conflict. Prijono was held responsible for moving the Indonesian education system to the left (Kelabora, 1983; Thomas, 1981). Prijono engaged in some political manoeuvres soon after he assumed office. He sacked the ministry's allegedly pro-American Secretary General, Marnixius Hutasoit, replacing him with another communist advocate, Supardo. The pair replaced many bureaucrats in the department as well as headmasters and teachers in government schools to enable the introduction of communist programs. In 1964, he was involved in an open confrontation with 27 anti-communist officials in the department, which led to his removal from office. However, Soekarno moved him to another position, as Coordinating Minister of Education, a portfolio with no technical authority (Suwignyo, 2012).

Under Prijono, the influence of communism in education became apparent. In 1960, he announced an education reform manifesto called Pancawardhana. Pancawardhana meant five improvements in pupils' respect for national and international morality and religious belief; intellectual capacity; emotional and artistic lives; manual works; and physical training. After its launch in 1960, a number of books were published to develop a public understanding of the program. In 1961, the book, *Memperkenalkan Sistem Pendidikan Indonesia 'Pancawardhana'* (Introducing the Indonesian education system of Pancawardhana), written by Atmaprawira, explained that the system was a tool to create 'socialist human beings of Indonesia'. Another author, Sutarto, proposed that as part of the implementation of Pancawardhana, once a year schools need to arrange an extra-curricular activity called 'labor camp' (Tilaar, 1995).

As with Pancawardhana, it provoked a massive challenge from Muslim politicians who accused it of running counter to the state ideology of Pancasila. The fact that it did not mention the belief in one God was regarded as near enough to saying that it was a communist program. The controversy was aggravated by a later development; Prijono combined Pancawardhana with Pancacinta, the principles introduced by a PKI subsidiary organisation, Lembaga Pendidikan Nasional (LPN) or National Education Institute. Prijono himself denied such an indictment, claiming that Pancawardhana was a version of Pancasila that could be implemented. He was given support from Soekarno, who said that Prijono's Pancawardhana had his blessing (Thomas, 1981).

However, because of escalating ideological debates and conflict, in September 1964, President Soekarno established a state commission to evaluate and advise on improvements to the Pancawardhana education system. By 1965, the commission recommended the creation of a new system, the Pancasila National Education System (PNES) whose operation would be administered and supervised by the National Education Council. The council was then established as a vanguard to accommodate all ideological and interest groups. Some non-partisan educators were also coopted to the council to give it the appearance of professionalism and neutrality. Despite the accommodation of many views, however, the council failed to gain consensus because each ideological group refused to compromise (Kelabora, 1983).

On 25 August 1965, the official PNES was launched through a Presidential Decree 19 of 1965. In contrast to the previous 1950 Act that was more technical, this new 24-article regulation was more concerned with the promotion of political points of view than with the technicalities of regulating education. For example, it contended that education should be based on Pancasila and the MANIPOL–USDEK. It contained one particular article that dealt with 'the politics of national education', which was defined as the resistance against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, feudalism and capitalism. The regulation confused the Education Ministry's curriculum developers because of its opacity. In designing the subject-matter content, for instance, the developers failed to break through the ideological boundaries (Kelabora, 1983).

The ideological competition had a huge effect not only on the higher-level institutional order but also at the lower-level organisational arrangement. The energy for education was dissipated in a nation-wide ideological split. Education organisations experienced massive politicisation and the central government's education department was controlled by the PKI and many public school teachers became communist followers. After 1965, it was estimated that 32,000 school teachers were alleged to have a communist link (Thomas, 1981). On the other hand, many private schools, mostly those owned by Muslim organisations, organised themselves to oppose the communist influence. The PKI was known to be strongly opposed to *pesantren* and the described leaders of the *pesantren*s, the *kyai*s, as one of the seven devils (Hefner, 1987). In this state of curricular anarchy, ideological groups also formed and propagated their own version of the curriculum in schools. The PKI, for instance, issued teaching guides and persuaded teachers to follow them. Quoting from

one of the PKI's pamphlets for teachers of English, Thomas recorded the following:

> For teaching English, instructors are urged to secure material from progressive magazines… In addition, the teacher can edit material from Eckersly's text (a locally popular British English-language book) to make it more appropriate to Indonesian conditions. For example, among the exercises, the sentence 'John went to Liverpool yesterday' can be changed to 'the workers went on strike yesterday'. (Thomas, 1981: 375)

The most important effect of this ideological conflict was its decoupling from technical arrangements in schools. The glorious national programs and agendas did not meet and did not help with the besetting problem of Indonesia education: a shortage of everything. In 1955, it was reported that schools had to exclude around 4.5 million children; there were not enough places for the children. In 1967, in the Republic's capital, Jakarta, it was estimated that nearly 250,000 school-aged children could not be accommodated (Zainu'ddin, 1970). The nation had also lost many skilled and experienced European teachers because of nationalist ideological restrictions. Many Indonesian teachers themselves had left school during the war either to join the armed forces or to pursue a career in government institutions that were in need of more educated employees. In 1951, it was estimated that the new teaching labour force needed to be recruited to fill as many as 140,000 positions. The government also had to retrain around 50,000 active teachers for them to adapt to the new system (Bjork, 2005).

The effect of these technical problems was a massive destructuration. Because of poor organisation, shortages of buildings, facilities and staff, many teaching programs in government schools ended up being performed as crash courses and emergency trainings. The number of private schools increased much faster than government schools but without any close inspection. Teacher standards also went down from what had been internationally benchmarked during the colonial time. The desire to infuse nationalist ideology, combined with the lack of experienced teacher trainers, caused teacher training to concentrate more on content than on teaching skills (Bjork, 2005). In those emergency classes, for example, the government was only concerned with teaching materials: schools might recruit their teachers from occupations ranging from civil servants to shopkeepers (Zainu'ddin, 1970).

Education and the Neoliberal Bureaucratic State

The 30 September 1965 crisis was the turning point for the Soekarno government. Six senior anti-PKI military generals were murdered, but the motive for the killings has been the subject of many historical interpretations since. The official, New Order-sponsored history textbooks described this as a communist revolution, but later, after the collapse of the regime in 1998, some historians revisited the accounts of the events of that time and noted it simply as a military coup. Despite the theories, many political and social events that followed this revolt have never been a mystery. The anti-communist movement, with massive military support, destroyed the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of those who had, or were accused of having, communist links. The country was in chaos and Soekarno was deposed in 1967. General Suharto, who held the real power since 1966, was sworn in as the new president in 1968. He named his new government the New Order and labelled Soekarno's era as the Old Order.

The change from Soekarno to Suharto also marked an ideological transition from the left to the right. Because of the Cold War, this left-to-right transition allowed political and other influences to flow from the West rather than the East. In his memoir, former US ambassador to Indonesia, Howard Jones, acknowledged that, since the late 1950s, Washington was actively involved in Indonesian politics by 'placing our best bets squarely on the Indonesian army… to preserve the pro-American, anti-Communist loyalties of the top officer group in the army' (as quoted in Anderson, 1983: 487). This US support of the New Order regime was also indicated by the silence of the US government over the genocide performed and facilitated by the military after 30 September 1965 (Jones, 2002). The most evident result of this ideological change, however, was in Suharto's policies. He prohibited the propagation of communist ideology and adopted more policies that encouraged foreign investment and promoted a liberal economy.

The New Order's embrace of more active economic development was to escape the legitimacy crisis that arose from the national political and economic catastrophes caused by unmediated ideological conflict and unstable government. In 1965, inflation climbed more than 500% and the rice price skyrocketed by more than 900%. The country's export revenues fell to USD450 million from USD750 million in 1961. In fact, the country badly needed to import as much as USD650 million product

value. The debt was calculated to reach USD2175 million and would have been due to be repaid between 1966 and 1974. In 1966 alone, there was a USD530 million commitment that needed to be settled, whereas the foreign exchange trade generated not more than USD430 million (Kelabora, 1983). The situation forced the New Order to embrace an institutional shift from politics to the economy and from nation building to bureaucratic consolidation.

Suharto recruited pro-Western Indonesian economists, graduates from US universities, for his economic team. The most influential set in Suharto's economics circle was known as the Berkeley Mafia because most of its members were graduates of the University of California's Berkeley campus. Economists were the most prominent of Suharto's advisors and to whom the president owed his policy of five-yearly development plans (Repelita). Suharto styled his government as the development government and his government's program as Repelita, which stands for *rencana pembangunan lima tahun* or five-year development plan. Suharto coupled his liberal economic vision with the doctrine of order and stability. He deemed previous ideological conflict and uncontrolled political rivalry to have been unhealthy and had consumed the nation's potential for the future. Later, after the first election in 1971, he reduced the number of political parties to three and, after prohibiting communist and Marxist ideology, imposed the Pancasila as the only legitimate ideology for all organisations. There were some initial protests, particularly from Muslim politicians but, using intelligence and military operations, he effectively silenced the dissenters. He strictly controlled mass gatherings, intimidated his critics, detained protesters and had some radical activists killed. As the president had succeeded in eliminating factionalism in the defence forces, his military campaigns to defeat the remaining separatist movements always went unchallenged.

During the New Order, Indonesia enjoyed the most stable government since its independence (Anderson, 1983). The essential scaffolding that supported this strong state was the bureaucracy. Because the Suharto regime had marginalised political parties from the centre of the political stage, the Indonesian New Order became a bureaucratic polity. The bureaucracy formulated, administered and supervised the government's policies; the role of the parliament was ceremonial (Jackson, 1978). Unlike previous administrations, the New Order bureaucracy was free of ideological competition. To maintain a single loyalty, Suharto obliged all public servants to affiliate with his party, Golkar. He centralised power

under his hand: all governors and local government leaders could only be appointed with his approval. To ensure stability, he adopted the Nasution doctrine of a dual function for the military (Dwifungsi ABRI), which allowed the defence force to act as 'military' and 'social political' forces. As the latter, the military was permitted to take part in almost all civilian activities, including government bureaucracy and social organisations (Crouch, 2007). During the New Order, many active military officials were posted as ministers, members of parliament, local government leaders, executive managers in state-owned enterprises, public university rectors and even chairmen of sport organisations.

Education was very much influenced by this environment. In a speech at the PGRI conference in November 1967, the New Order's minister of education, Sanusi Hardjadinata, said that the focus of education would move from 'divisive mental issues' to the support of the government's economic development program (Elder, 1987: 144). Mashuri, Hardjadinata's successor, later, in May 1968, added that the unachieved social welfare under Soekarno's guided democracy was simply because education's function was not run in parallel with the realisation of 'society's needs', which was economic growth (Elder, 1987: 145). The first Pelita was launched in 1969 with the focus on agricultural development. In 1968, a new curriculum was prepared by the government to replace the 1964 Pancawardhana-inspired curriculum, a curriculum that emphasised the intensification of vocational training at the secondary level. A particular reform on teaching agriculture was proposed, though ended being kept on as a long-term project. In return, the government generated extensive training of agricultural agents to assist 12 million small-holding families in food production (Kelabora, 1983).

In addition, a campaign was organised to remove unapproved ideological content from work performed by the education bureaucracy. Suharto discharged all Prijono's men because they were allegedly associated either with the PKI or Marxist ideology. During his presidency, he appointed two military officials as education ministers: Syarif Thayeb and Nugroho Notosusanto. The government obliged all public servants to be trained in the ideological comprehension of Pancasila. In 1971, Suharto established a government civil servant association, the Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (KORPRI): all civil servants, including teachers, throughout the country were automatically registered as members. The organisation helped the regime to ensure the loyalty of its public service workers (MacDougall, 1982). In 1978, Minister of Education and Culture, Daoed

Joesoef, imposed a policy restricting the political activity of university students, which was known as *normalisasi kehidupan kampus* (NKK) (Normalisation of Campus Life) and established a campus-based agency called *Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan* (BKK) (Coordinating Body for Student Affairs). The policy outlawed the previously autonomous student councils and gave the university rector full authority to appoint and remove leaders of student organisations (Saunders, 1998).

In 1973, the Indonesian government was blessed with a large oil financial bonanza and at the end of that year announced a school building program: SD INPRES or the Presidential Instruction Primary Schools. The program caused 31,000 primary schools to be built and 196,000 new teachers to be hired. In four years, school enrolment increased by 32%, from 13.1 million to 17.3 million pupils in 1977. There were similar improvements in secondary school enrolments. The government had constructed 950 new junior and senior secondary schools, rehabilitated 2000 others, built 2000 school laboratories and distributed 35 million textbooks and nearly 4 million library books. In addition, the government built 63 technical high schools, five technical training centres and 367 new vocational-school classrooms. Around 24,000 and 2300 new teachers had also been employed for junior secondary and senior secondary schools, respectively: these developments helped to increase student enrolments. In 1977, junior secondary schools enrolled 2.34 million students, 66% more than in 1971 when only 1.41 million students were registered. Senior secondary school enrolments recorded a 68% increase from 654,000 in 1971 to 1.1 million pupils in 1977 (Heneveld, 1979).

Those impressive numbers were not matched with improved quality of education because dropout rates remained high and the quality of teaching was still poor (Heneveld, 1979). But these improvements did provide the New Order government with an important source of legitimation for its developmentalist doctrine. The New Order continued to gain huge popularity and, with the help of its military and bureaucratic support, won five consecutive elections. When the 1970s revolution ran on the legacy of old education governance template, the later period was the time for more bureaucratic consolidation. In the forty years since 1951, the authority for education had been divided between the central and regional governments, resulting in a complexity of management. The education department itself became the most dispersed institution with 27 provincial offices (Kanwil), 302 district and municipal offices

(Kandep) and 3500 sub-district (Kancam) offices (King, 1998). These offices worked hand in hand with the already established local education *dinas* in the provinces (Dinas Tingkat I), in districts and municipalities (Dinas Tingkat II) and in sub-districts (Dinas Ranting) (King, 1998; Tilaar, 1995).

For the New Order, this complex bureaucracy helped the regime to keep control because both sets of government officials were fully under Jakarta's command. Although the local offices of the Education Ministry belonged to that ministry, the provincial and district governments that ran their local education offices were supervised by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). The Local Government Act 5 of 1974 stated that whereas provincial governors are elected through consultation involving provincial parliament and the MoHA, the district and municipal government heads were elected through consultative sessions at which the local parliament and the governor reached agreement. In much the same way that the president had authority to select a provincial governor from a list of gubernatorial candidates, the MoHA was authorised to select a regent or a mayor from a similar set of candidates. In practice, however, such processes were ceremonial only: the successful candidates were nominated from Jakarta. Suharto appointed many active military officials to become governors or district and municipal heads (Malo & Nas, 1991).

As Jackson argues, the New Order bureaucratic polity became the strong backbone of Suharto's leadership because it was ideologically regimented and politically unified with no divergent loyalty (Jackson, 1978). Nonetheless, the bureaucracy was internally pluralist and, because ideology no longer mattered, the competition became politically and financially resource driven (Emmerson, 1983). In 1985, the MoEC released the plan to extend compulsory education from six to nine years over the next ten years. The department saw that the managerial duplication had thwarted its effort to enforce a more standardised and integrated governance. The decentralisation had allowed the regional governments to mishandle their authority. The department claimed that regional governments often reallocated the central government's school subsidy to cover the *dinas*' overhead cost so that many schools lacked adequate operational funds. In 1995, the head of the national civil servant council reported, in a parliamentary session in Jakarta, that many teachers were transferred by their local governments to administrative positions in unrelated portfolios, such as being appointed village heads and members of local parliaments while retaining their teaching salary (King, 1995).

In 1989, the new National Education System Act 2 of 1989 was ratified, which met the MoEC's desire to take full control of primary education, which had been traditionally administered by regional governments. The Act stated that the whole education system should be the minister of education's responsibility (GoI, 1989). It removed provisions related to any involvement by subsidiary government administrations as had been previously arranged under (education) law 4 of 1950. In the following year, to implement the new Act's mandate, the MoEC released the government regulations 28 of 1990 on Basic Education and 29 of 1990 on Secondary Education. Ordinance 28 of 1990 revoked all responsibilities previously attached to regional governments leaving only their ownership of land and buildings (GoI, 1990a). In one sense, the MoEC added to its established technical responsibilities all other administrative arrangements from teacher transfers to the practicalities of distributing school grants. Both ordinances also arranged for ministerial authority to extend to the school level. The ordinances proclaimed public school principals to be responsible to the minister on education management, school administration, personnel development and infrastructure utilisation (GoI, 1990a, 1990b). The result was that regional government offices of education (*Dinas Pendidikan*) lost their function because most of their responsibilities were transferred to the local offices of the central government's ministerial representatives.

Nevertheless, the MoEC's effort to recentralise met internal challenge, not from the regional governments, but rather from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) to whom all regional government heads paid loyalty. The issue became the source of tension between the two departments with no conclusive solution. The MoHA objected to the policy and claimed it was a setback to the government's attempts to promote more extensive decentralisation to the districts and municipalities. They also argued that the retraction of responsibility would make local governments indifferent to the progress of education in their respective territories, which, in turn, would affect teachers' welfare (King, 1995). The MoHA's insistence was understandable; the department stood to lose one of its most important financial *raisons d'être*. The regional governments only contributed 0.23% of the total primary education budget; the major amount came from the central government disbursed through the MoHA (King, 1995). The MoHA would also lose its control over 1.41 million primary school teachers whose salaries were also distributed through the department (Tilaar, 1995).

The central government also had to defer to the global pressure for decentralisation, which the World Bank described as a 'make or break issue' for the nation (Bjork, 2005). In 1994, this concession to decentralisation was released in the name of the local content curriculum (LCC). It was a revised version of the 1987 policy that had failed. Funded partly by loans from the Asian Development Bank and formulated under the leadership of an international consultant from the University of the Philippines, Evelina Vicencio, the 1994 policy version allowed a 20% portion of the school curricula to be developed locally. In addition, the LCC would need to be relevant to the needs of the local community and the local labour market, and had to be developed under the supervision of the regional offices of the MoEC (Bjork, 2005). As King (1998) argues, this turned out to be a symbolic concession; the MoEC officials retained their decisive role in accepting what was to be acceptable local content. Similarly, Bjork (2005) contends that the policy did not cause any change to the institutional culture of bureaucratic dependency among school personnel.

In 1998, Suharto's New Order regime collapsed after a series of economic and political crises. In response to extensive criticism of the over-centralised New Order regime, the new government, in 1999, launched a new decentralisation policy that extended autonomy to district and municipal governments. Following this, the MoEC reorganised its structure and abolished all its provincial, district and sub-district representative offices. Schools were also given a degree of autonomy through a school-based management formula. In this sense, the MoEC retained its role in technical matters only and the MoHA was completely removed from any involvement in education administration. The latter institution only conducted supervision to general local government administrations with no more responsibility for leadership appointments. In 2005, local governments were given more autonomy when the system for electing local government heads was moved from parliament to the people. All of this reform effort brought significant changes to educational arrangements and the next chapter will discuss whether this reform has had an effect on larger institutional change.

Conclusion

Educational decentralisation has been present in Indonesia throughout its history. However, the degree and characteristics of decentralisation have changed over time. If decentralisation can be broadly defined as

autonomy in terms of freedom from control by the central state, then we can consider early religious education as one type of decentralisation. This was the form of radical decentralisation; the state was hardly involved in education. The mercantilist period in Indonesian history was a time of transition to state intervention as education started to be regulated, though the churches remained autonomous organisers. State involvement was limited because the state itself was not in the form of an official public institution but rather was represented in the form of a private organisation with economic and repressive military powers, the VOC. As the official state institution appeared in the form of The Netherlands Kingdom, education started to be state-regulated and the legitimacy of the religious authority was replaced. The state at this time was represented by the central administrative government in Batavia with the purpose of binding its people into one citizenship. But the first modern state for Indonesia had a race-based social structure, and education was made to support and maintain that structure. The administration was centralised in Batavia and paralleled the centralised model used in The Netherlands. Thanks to the late nineteenth-century European liberal revolution, the colonial state of Indonesia adjusted accordingly by introducing a more humanist approach. The colonial government set out to make education available for all natives in all regions and the local administrations were involved in the arrangement. However, the government failed to gain internal legitimacy for its education policies and practices because of the increasing nationalist sentiment among the natives.

Pressed by the post-war global spirit of nation building and local aspirations of a multicultural nation, the new independent republican government resumed the decentralisation policy. The regional governments were authorised to manage the administrative matters of basic education, while the central kept the control over technical arrangements in addition to the control of higher education. To perform its technical function, the central government established representative offices at all subsidiary administrative levels. Hence, there was the duality of authority at the regional level, the representative offices of the central ministry and the local government-affiliated education offices. This became more complicated and bureaucratic as their coordination overlapped. The Cold War influenced national ideological and political conflicts in the 1950s and 1960s, which added to the complications and destructuration of education governance. The New Order government brought back the centralisation idea into practice in the late 1980s and strengthened the

role of local representative offices of the MoEC. Along with the consolidated bureaucracy and a liberal economic approach, the New Order was successful in restructuring education. Tens of thousands of schools were built and student enrolment steadily increased. The New Order regime lasted more than three decades until 1998 when its legitimacy crumbled from the pressure of a new institutional environment: the wave of democratisation. This gave decentralisation a new setting.

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CHAPTER 3

Why Legitimacy Matters: The Institutional Perspective of Educational Decentralisation

Introduction

Educational decentralisation has been a buzzword for the past three decades. The term arose for one of the central themes of education reform movements spreading around the world. Nowadays, not only have such decentralisation movements become more strongly entrenched in traditionally decentralised education systems, such as the USA and Australia, but they also have transformed the giant centralised systems of China and some Latin American countries (Arnove et al., 2012; Mok, 2003; Winkler & Gershberg, 2000). Many scholars have proposed that globalisation is responsible for this diffusion of educational decentralisation. Globalisation theorists believe that as the world is increasingly tending to become borderless, and as time and space are gradually compressed, the convergence and integration of world culture is inevitable (Luhmann, 1997; Meyer, 2000). Among the profound manifestations of this convergence has been the integration of global economic systems and the increasing trend to political unilateralism. These factors have affected education systems quite extensively.

McGinn (1997), for instance, suggests that the proposal of educational decentralisation has been propounded since the late 1950s by the World Bank as a model for global education governance reform. The efforts to decentralise education was in line with the greater transformation in economic modes of production from being centralised (Fordism) to more

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decentralised, localised and flexible (post-Fordism). However, McGinn concludes that the adjustment to this global pressure has been overemphasised so that decentralisation reform has had a little effect only to improve education in practice. Carnoy (2000) also highlights that the result of educational reform campaigns by international institutions like the World Bank is not consistent with the claimed benefits. After billion dollars of loan, poorer countries are still not able to avoid inequality of opportunity nor the debt trap, and education reforms founded on market competition create greater school stratification and allow education inequality for children from different social backgrounds (Carnoy, 2000).

However, such political and economic determinism misses the point that most policies are designed with many ambitious objectives and programs in a response to what policymakers define as problems; the education sector is no exception. It may be true that the massive neoliberal programs of economic reform that are promoted by the World Bank and the IMF have contributed to the expansion of decentralisation, but this is not necessarily the only reason why nations decentralise their administrative systems. As well as that global market theory, it has also been theorised, for example, that educational decentralisation might be justified to give local teachers more autonomy in decision-making away from bureaucratic intervention. This is to counter the effects of poor bureaucratic performance and at the same time rejuvenate teachers' professional identity (Murillo, 1999; Sachs, 2001; Wong, 2006). In addition, it has been proposed that educational decentralisation is a way to involve local communities and parents in education policymaking. This is not only to give parents their right to have information and to contribute to their children's education, but also to reinforce the prevailing ideals of democracy (Gandin & Apple, 2002; Hanson, 1995; Plank & Boyd, 1994).

Hence, what matters in this context is beyond globalisation and its deterministic political and economic effects. What makes decentralisation legitimate in global and local contexts is the most important matter. In the Indonesian case, the reform to decentralisation was preceded not only by pressure from global economic institutions but, more importantly, by the internal aspirations for democracy and the crisis of state legitimacy. These have resulted in a more ambitious reform program covering a wide range of ideals: market competitiveness and efficiency, democratic participation and professional autonomy. From the Indonesian policymakers' point of

view, the accommodation of these ideals not only reflects the coverage of current education problems, but also gives the reform a much stronger legitimacy. Sociological theorists who study organisational behaviour have been long concerned with 'a mechanism by which organisational structures, policies, and practices acquire social legitimacy and ultimately become taken-for-granted as normatively appropriate in the population' (Davies & Guppy, 1997). The mechanism is usually referred to as institutionalisation. The institutional theorists believe that shared practices, as in educational decentralisation, are constructed through one or more institutional pressures. Different sources of pressure lead to different practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Friedland & Alford, 1991).

I follow this institutional perspective in seeing how an ambitious program of educational decentralisation has been carried out in Indonesia. To some extent, the political and economic perspective of globalisation does explain the case in the way that the educational decentralisation was initiated following the influence of the World Bank and the IMF. However, either the principles elaborated in the policy or the routine implementation reflects that the educational decentralisation program is constructed on the basis of more contradictory institutional pressures. In this sense, educational decentralisation takes its legitimation not only from the global economic pressure, but also from the local dynamics of democracy, the ascendancy of professional values, and, finally, the remaining interests of the state's significant role.

This chapter is organised as follows. Initially, it presents the theoretical debate on educational decentralisation and how this is treated in Indonesian academic literature. This is followed by an explication of institutional theory and some conceptual disputes within the theory. Lastly, I return to the discourse of educational decentralisation by showing how some conceptual constructs of the institutional theory are applied to assess the problem of decentralisation in global, national and local contexts.

Decentralisation and Educational Decentralisation

Decentralisation is much debated. The debates range from extreme denial of centralism to the elusive language of centralisation and from the territorial transfer of authority from the central to subsidiary government organisations and schools, to the functional movement from deferring to the state's authority to that of market forces. To accommodate such

variation, a number of scholars have suggested particular categories to distinguish one perspective from another. Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) propose classical categories of de-concentration, delegation, devolution, privatisation and de-bureaucratisation. Smith (1985) adds other categories: deregulation and autonomy. All these categories reflect the continuum of authority from central to local; from centre to periphery; from highly bureaucratised to less or non-bureaucratised; and from strictly regulated to loosely controlled. We can argue from Rondinelli's classic classification that while absolute centralisation concentrates all or most decision-making authority in the hands of parallel central government organisations; de-concentration is the distribution of responsibilities and administrative authority to subordinate organisations within central government ministries or agencies. In contrast, delegation is the transfer of responsibility to more autonomous sub-national or local government organisations away from central control although still accountable to it. Here, the degree of autonomy is higher than that of the de-concentration. Meanwhile, devolution provides much greater autonomy to those local government organisations because they enjoy full authority and power over the mandated policy. Finally, privatisation works beyond territorial classification, which can be defined as the handing over of some functions to other non-government organisations, usually to avoid a complex bureaucratic burden. To this extent, decentralisation might also be associated with de-bureaucratisation (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983).

The remaining question with this continuum is whether the range from centralisation to decentralisation does reflect the gradual reduction of authority from the central state on the one hand and the corresponding increase in the authority of local or other organisations on the other. Most scholars propose the 'yes' answer. Oates (1993), for instance, suggests that decentralisation will reduce government size in that its intervention, in particular decentralised fields, would be restricted. Yarrow and colleagues show that the UK's massive privatisation program during the 1980s reduced government involvement in enterprise decision-making (Yarrow et al., 1986). However, the question is that when governments or states know that decentralisation will reduce their power and authority, why then do they continue? To discuss the question, we have to know why states seek to decentralise.

Conyers observes that the objectives of decentralisation have been trapped in three contradictions: managerial versus political, top-down versus bottom-up and explicit versus implicit. It is always evident that the

managerial aspect becomes part of the explicitly stated objectives, whereas the political objectives are almost always unstated (Conyers, 1984). What is explicated in the policy documents with respect to the objectives of decentralisation are improved administrative efficiency, increased system effectiveness and increased local participation (McGinn & Street, 1986). Yet, more political motives, such as power distribution among government hierarchies and among particular interest groups, are commonly unstated (Conyers, 1984). However, noting those explicit motives, McGinn and Street argue that the first two motives, which are moved by the over-complicated bureaucracy and the failure of central planning, do indicate a demand to recover and maintain the competence of the central state rather than distributing the power. In this respect, increased local participation is only instrumental for the first two motives. Local participation helps the central government increase its effectiveness and efficiency (McGinn & Street, 1986).

In this sense, McGinn and Street offer another perspective to decentralisation, seeing it as not the distribution of power but the shift of the locus of power. Against the perception of seeing government as a monolithic political system standing apart from other non-governmental groups or individual interests, they contend that the government is instead 'a complex system of competing groups or factions whose members are both within the government and external to it' (McGinn & Street, 1986: 473). Hence, decentralisation is the way the government reconsolidates itself among the competing group interests. Depending on the context, this consolidation might be achieved by shifting power from central to local governments, from one central institution to another or even from government to the private sector. Therefore, when decentralisation is expected to increase participation, it does not mean participation of all individuals but of particular individuals or groups (McGinn & Street, 1986). This analysis helps us to understand why some decentralisation reforms fail and why some established powers within government are not resistant to the change. The reforms fail not because they are not implemented but mostly because they are resisted internally. As long as powerful groups see that decentralisation does not seek to change the balance of power so that their established status is not undermined, there will be no resistance.

Educational decentralisation follows the logic of this wider debate on decentralisation. Despite the high expectations of decentralisation, many scholars have demonstrated that at least the continuum has never worked

in one way, that is, from centralisation to decentralisation. Weiler's study has proven that there is always a tension between decentralisation efforts and the need for central control (Weiler, 1990). Rarely does decentralisation policy produce a decentralised system. Rather, many decentralisation attempts are instead absorbed into existing centralised and semi-centralised structures of education governance. He contends that the argument of power redistribution for decentralisation is incompatible with the interests of the modern state in maintaining effective control. As such, the argument of improving efficiency seems irrational considering that the reform would generate a costly expansion of resources, particularly for local government. Weiler then offers a fascinating thesis of compensatory legitimation as the motive behind educational decentralisation. Decentralisation is a strategy to camouflage the state's effort to repair its eroded legitimation because of its distance from the basis of the political system, its inefficient bureaucracy and its structural inability to attend to variations of social, cultural, geographical and economic background of the society. Thus, decentralisation is not about giving authority to the local or non-governmental actors but about 'appearing to be committed to decentralisation and thus reaping the benefits in legitimation to be derived from that appearance' (Weiler, 1990: 442).

Consistent with Weiler's view is Karlsen's conception of 'decentralized centralism' (Karlsen, 2000). Karlsen analyses the dynamics between centralisation and decentralisation in education policy reform in four areas: initiative, content, level and simultaneity. However, all of these dynamics are anchored in the idea of central control. Considering the area of initiative, Karlsen suggests that although some decentralisation reforms resulted from the bargaining between central and local institutions, they eventually serve central interests. The decentralisation of power to local institutions is also making these institutions responsible for implementing central goals. As such, the dynamic of content shows that giving freedom of curriculum design to the local authority would legitimate greater efforts of standardisation by the central authority. However, Karlsen's analysis of the dynamic of levels and simultaneity leads to a more interesting question about the possibility of multiple centres and how to deal with the contradiction that arises. He suggests that in educational decentralisation, either central or local government can perform the role of the centre in relation to schools. On the other hand, local government and schools can be on the periphery from the central government's perspective. The problem arises when these various centres come

with different or contradictory regulations. This is what he calls the dynamic of simultaneity, which is when 'centralisation' and 'decentralisation' clash. He found this dilemma in the case of the Norway and British Columbia decentralisation reforms when the central policy of management by objective (MbO), which allows the central government's control over school management, meets the new independent school Act, an Act that enables local schools to be run independently. To this problem, Karlsen suggests that the stronger authority of the central government will promote accommodation to both interests (Karlsen, 2000).

Nevertheless, the problem of multiple centralities lies not only in how the conflict between these centres is settled, but also in the way these powerful institutions, whether in conflict or collaboration, overcome local interests. Thus, what is to be expected from decentralisation is not the distribution of authority to a different level of government but the expansion of state ideas and practices into the decentralised units. In Indonesia, the possibility for that kind of decentralisation is large because of the nature of political decentralisation as the mother of the decentralisation policy in general, and educational decentralisation in particular. The following part of this chapter will discuss this issue in greater depth.

Educational Decentralisation in Indonesian Literature

Indonesian educational decentralisation can hardly stand alone as an exclusive reform. It is strongly linked to wider political reform and, in particular, to political decentralisation. Major studies saw this political decentralisation as one of the greatest achievements of the reforms after the collapse of the New Order's authoritarian and centralised regime in the late 1990s. In this sense, decentralisation is the antithesis of the previous governance style. The more the central state decreases its power, the further the new government moves from its predecessor. Many studies have paid much attention to political decentralisation; little has been paid to educational decentralisation. Although studies of political decentralisation have expanded their discourse from merely technical issues to further theoretical debates (e.g. Hadiz, 2004; Sidel, 2011; Ufen, 2008), major writing on Indonesian educational decentralisation falls into policy assessment or pedagogical concerns (e.g. Bandur, 2009; Bjork, 2005; Jalal et al., 2009; Kristiansen & Pratikno, 2006; Sumintono, 2006). Most of these assessments claim that, even though the institutional arrangement of

democratic and autonomous governance has been set up, the substantial goals of this arrangement are still far away. In other words, the discrepancy between policy intention and implementation remains an essential concern. There are a number of empirical studies worth reviewing in this book.

Bjork's anthropological study of the responses of school communities to the implementation of the local content curriculum policy constitutes one of the most important and influential sources for Indonesian educational decentralisation study (Bjork, 2005, 2006a). Based on ethnographic studies in several junior secondary schools in East Java and interviews with central government officials, the study suggests that decentralisation has not gone very far in schools because the local stakeholders, that is, teachers and parents, keep to the old cultural mindset of bureaucratic dependency. Many teachers tend to become obedient civil servants rather than innovative and autonomous professionals, most parents interpret 'participation' as making a financial contribution rather than sharing opinions, knowledge and skills. This is exacerbated by the fact that despite its decentralisation initiative, central bureaucracy is not willing to move on from its centralist culture (Bjork, 2005, 2006a). However, this centralist culture is plausible because the study was conducted during the New Order's reign when the central government structure vastly expanded and was still powerful.

Another study is by Sumintono (2006), who particularly analyses the practice of Indonesian school-based management policy (SBM) two years after its official enactment. Using the cases of several state secondary schools in Mataram city, the study concludes that the policy failed to be locally sensitive. Its tendency to impose a uniform model of SBM regardless of the variety of Indonesian schools in term of size, location, type of community and public–private distinction has to some extent put itself out of context (Sumintono, 2006). In the case of private schools, Bangay's study (2005) asserts that the government concept of SBM could not be applied to private schools because their principals usually have very little to do with school finances and long-term planning. This kind of authority normally belongs to the patron organisation, called *yayasan* (Bangay, 2005). A recent nationwide policy study by Chen (2011), which involves around 400 public primary schools in Indonesia, has, to a small extent, confirmed the inertia thesis. He found that after a decade of reform, parental participation is still in limited administrative areas, such as with school facilities, financial contributions and community relations. In

addition, despite the promotion of more professional control of schools in the hands of principals and teachers, the system cannot move from typical governmental top-down supervision and monitoring (Chen, 2011).

Nevertheless, at the local government level, some studies have shown that the inertia is not absolute. The study by Kristiansen and Pratikno (2006) concludes that corruption and accountability remain the crucial issues at the local government level. However, they argue that some local governments have initiated their own education policies, although in a trivial manner. The Kutai Kartanegara district, for instance, has what they call a 'bottom-up' program. The program allocates IDR2 billion per village per year (approximately USD200,000), 30% of which is supposed to be used for improving local human resources, for example, by awarding scholarships for university study. The Bantul district is another case. The government has introduced what they call the *Babonisasi* program. Through the program, every child is given a chicken (*babon*) to take care of. The children benefit by eating the eggs. Their nutrition improves and so too does their ability to concentrate in school (Kristiansen & Pratikno, 2006). Furthermore, what concerns many scholars about local government dynamics is that political decentralisation has gone beyond the issue of educational decentralisation. Adopting Karlsen's terminology, Sumintono (2006) labels this tendency as a decentralised centralism. It means that the lack of institutional capacity at the school level has led local governments to become the new centres. As result, education arrangements at the schools are highly sensitive to government intervention and its political dynamics (Sumintono, 2006). Bandur's study in East Nusa Tenggara found strong intervention from the district government in the provision of school textbooks (Bandur, 2009). As such, Amirrachman and colleagues show how the ongoing factional politics that segregates governmental institutions in the Bintang district has influenced the politics at school level (Amirrachman et al., 2008).

School and government level analyses equally suggest the substantial inertia of Indonesian educational decentralisation. There have been many other studies of technical policy that critically examine the implementation of this program through more specific variables (e.g. by the World Bank, USAID, UNESCO). Despite their importance, what can be argued of these studies is twofold. First, all changes need process, and different entities possess a different capacity to go with the process. Over time, the Indonesian government has been continuously improving its policy to adjust to current dynamics. To cope with teacher problems, as Bjork

has noted above, in 2007 the government launched a teacher professionalisation program, which enabled teachers to have a better income and thus improve their performance (Chang et al., 2013). Hence, while overlooking the natural process of change, these technical policy studies fall into what might be classed as micro-events analysis and fail to identify the broader pattern of change. A much more recent study by Rosser and Sulistiyanto (2013) helps to fill this gap. Drawing upon the case of a universal, free, basic education policy, they show how a local education policy becomes, potentially, a more politicised matter. In this sense, banal education programs are used to buy popular support for the sake of local incumbent politicians (Rosser & Sulistiyanto, 2013). However, the study lacks an analysis of the underlying forces constituting such patterns.

Second, most studies are too deeply concerned with the technical problems of educational decentralisation or greater political decentralisation and fail to recognise the contribution of any external pressure. Because the Indonesian education system is nationally integrated and globally influenced, the way the educational decentralisation policy is adopted should follow particularly established external references. Numerous studies on Indonesian democratisation exemplify how this gap could be filled. Hadiz (2004), for instance, proposes the influence of global neoliberal institutions and local predatory elites in the making of decentralisation policy and directing its course. Aspinall (2013) traces the origin of Indonesian political fragmentation back to the pervasiveness of a patronage culture and the country's gradual engagement with broader neoliberal models of economic, social and cultural life. Although this kind of institutional analysis has also been replicated in educational policy studies globally, it is almost negligible in the Indonesian case. Studies of education policy in Indonesia, particularly for the K–12 school sector, have been long dominated by pedagogical and administrative discourses.

This book embarks on the idea that education policy is socially constructed. There should be a number of external forces that shape and drive its course. Those pressures might take the form of entities like government policy, political contestation, economic development or exemplary individuals and organisations. Likewise, they might also emerge as a particular mental conduct that possesses regulative, normative or cognitive capacities to govern social action. Those pressures will inevitably give particular values and affect the way a specific policy is carried out. In this sense, although the dynamics of political reform and regional autonomy have been implied as being important material pressure for

educational decentralisation, it seems that symbolic institutions are absent from analysis or at least not clearly elaborated. In another part of this chapter, I will discuss how institutional analysis could be used to deal with this problem. As a combination of material and symbolic entities, it is argued that institutions serve as external pressure to influence social action at individual, organisational or societal levels. The problem of Indonesian educational decentralisation could be analysed in this manner.

Assessing Theoretical Arguments on Globalisation and Its Relevance to the Worldwide Expansion of Educational Decentralisation

Globalisation is a fuzzy, never-endingly contested concept. Theoretical debates over time have shifted across the boundaries of many disciplines and have varied in diverse ways. The structuralists see globalisation as either the extensiveness or compression of the material world across national borders, disembedding people from their localities and making them interconnected with each other (Giddens, 2002). Systems theorists perceive globalisation as a system that creates a great distinction between powerful centres and powerless peripherals or as the medium of a networked society facilitated by hegemonic capitalist institutions (Castells, 2000; Wallerstein, 2004). In the meantime, cultural arguments treat globalisation as 'glocalisation', that is, the duality of the global and the local, between the objective process of material world compression and the subjective process of consciousness intensification (Robertson, 1995). Globalisation might affect education in terms of how national education adjusts to global education models; a distinction between globally standardised and other education systems; or a dialectic between local and global influences on education governance (Popkewitz, 2000; Rhoten, 2000).

In our discussion of educational decentralisation, the most fundamental question to ask is what drives global educational decentralisation and how does it work. The answer to such questions has been prevalent: the trend of education reform is commonly grounded on economic matters. All education policy documents, produced by international or by national bodies, cite economic reasons as the major argument for educational reform. It is the economic forces or economic demands that motivate policymakers and parents to educate their children. It is argued

that national policymakers see the need to ensure that their country is strong economically by investing in education for their people. Parents are motivated to educate their children to assure their social wellbeing. Such liberal arguments have dominated the discourse of education over time. Currently, as Peter Drucker (2011) says, we are living in post-capitalist society. 'The basic economic resource … is no longer capital, nor natural resources … nor labour. It is and will be knowledge' (Drucker, 2011: 7). Economic organisation has also been transformed, adopting the new post-Fordist mechanism in which the service economy has replaced the old economy based on manufacturing industries. It means that low-skilled workers will increasingly have fewer opportunities for employment, leaving places only for educated, high-skilled professionals. The fluid characteristic of this new economy makes it easily to disperse and to affect the system and structure of the global economy (Amin, 2011; Brown & Lauder, 1992; Carter, 1997).

These facts, therefore, challenge the education system to change, not only its curriculum, but also its goals and organisational structure. In this sense, the mutual goals of economics and of education are equity and efficiency. This suggests that the development of education should be directed to the market ends (McNamara, 2007). More realistically, McNamara (2007) stresses that there are two structural realities that education policy must face: world market integration and the strong role of international institutions. These two realities have led education policy to a global similarity. The economic and financial effects that globalisation, supported by those two structural realities, will further weaken central governments. On the one hand, supranational organisations might reduce national sovereignty; on the other, however, a shift to market-based decision-making will strengthen local groups. It has become more difficult for governments to find the funds for social programs (Welsh & McGinn, 1999). In this regard, for all public sectors, including education, the decentralisation of decision-making authority would be the only effective governance model that fits such a world economic reality. Decentralisation might be conducive to incentive, competition and increased quality in education. In addition, through decentralised management, the democratic participation of NGOs and local communities would emerge and the accountable governance could be maintained (Jones, 2007).

Against all liberal arguments, critical educational theorists argue that the economic globalisation, along with its consequences for education, is

more ideological rather than theoretical. Historically, they argue, neoliberal economic projects emerged in the initial period of neoconservative ascendancy, particularly in USA politics in the 1980s. It was in the early years of the Reagan administration that the IMF–World Bank structural adjustment program was first launched to encourage the global market ideology into the state governance of developing countries (Torres, 2009). The program was a loan package to assist countries with debt problems. Institutional reforms, including those in the education sector, became a major condition for financial help along with public spending reduction, price control elimination, domestic to world price adjustment and social service privatisation. The program was intended to adjust developing countries to external shocks, to mobilise the resources needed to develop under new world economic conditions and to allocate resources more efficiently. However, as some research has confirmed, the program has been identified with increased poverty, greater inequality of income and slow economic growth (Carnoy et al., 1999). In addition, critical theorists claim that the global NGO boom since the 1990s has not been continued by deliberate local initiatives or other voluntary activities. It was rather a donor-driven expansion or the pragmatic response to foreign-aid overflow in many developing nations (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).

Another advocate of the critical perspective, Michael Apple (2006), proposes that such inequality is rooted in the nature of the market economy itself. With privatisation, education is transformed to be considered in the same way as commercial goods and commodities whose purchase is subject to individual economic power. This commercialisation will also affect how the idea of democracy is realised. Neoliberalism has altered democracy from its 'thick' version suited to inclusive communities to a 'thin' version, in a way analogous to the exclusive shopping malls that are open to the public (Apple, 2006), meaning that real participation in democratic governance can take place in those exclusive spaces only, preventing common people from taking part. In this sense, educational decentralisation is regarded as the new managerialism, that is, the incursion of business models into the organisation of education. It provides new opportunities for state bureaucrats to be high-salaried, middle-class professionals (Apple, 2006). In this model of governance, so-called community participation is much more motivated by individual customer interests than the fulfilment of shared community goals.

It might be true that the market economy has become the engine of globalisation in all sectors and poses some big challenges to the tasks

of national governments. However, in the real world, such an influence does not have effects as dramatic as has been imagined. In our daily life, the nation-states are legitimate organisations and governments still run their prescribed courses. In the most prosperous nations or in the poorest, organisations of government survive and show mostly similar structures. They have their own economic and education systems that may be different but share particular trends. More important, those nations do possess different social and cultural traditions, but particular internalised and shared mechanisms have made them able to communicate and understand each other in a world society. Even before the rise of neoliberal projects in the 1980s, mass education across the globe had shown similarity in terms of enrolment trends, centralised control by the ministries of education as the authoritative bodies, particular curricular content and age-based class systems. The shared recognition of rationality as modern norms has led to the emergence of the rationalised institution or standardised models to which all modern organisations would refer. This kind of argument can be traced to the works of American sociologists like John W. Meyer, Francisco Ramirez, John Boli, W. Richard Scott and others who claim to be institutional theorists (Baker & LeTendre, 2005; Meyer, 2000; Ramirez & Boli, 1987).

Hence, in shaping the global expansion of educational decentralisation, economic globalisation must combine with another process called institutional globalisation, that is, 'the convergence of formal institutions within and across nations toward similar goals and operating structures' (Astiz et al., 2002: 67). Educational decentralisation transforms to become a worldwide legitimate institutional model, shaping the similarity of global educational governance. It is adopted by a good number of countries, regardless of their political and economic systems and their social and cultural settings. The following part will discuss what the new institutional theory has offered to analyse the problem of educational decentralisation both as a global movement and as a local practice.

The Institutional Perspective of Educational Decentralisation

Drawing on Berger and Luckman's constructivist sociology, institutional theory has its central thesis that social order is fundamentally based on a shared social reality, which is constructed through social interaction, called institutionalisation. Such a process has three stages: when

we and others take action (externalisation), then translate such action into categories that make us able to respond in a similar fashion so that it becomes an external reality separate from ourselves (objectivation) and internalise the objectivated world to determine the subjective structure of our consciousness (internalisation) (Berger & Luckmann, 1991; Scott, 1987). This process implies that there are particular institutions that reconstitute and frame human actions because of their function as legitimating rules. Subsequently, the reference to those institutional rules would lead to some similarities and patterns of action. Institutions are not instantaneously constructed, yet they spring up through the course of shared historical experiences (Berger & Luckmann, 1991).

Rising in the 1970s as a critique of the rational choice and resource dependency theories, the sociological institutional theory adopted the constructivist perspective in analysing organisational behaviour. For the institutionalists, organisational structures do not reflect the exchange rationality of its individual actor interests nor do they depend on the resources available within organisations. Rather, they are constructed from their external environment by dominating institutional pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987). These institutions are cognitive, normative and regulative, carried out through the interaction of cultures, structures and routines (Scott, 2008). They emanate from the shared historical process of socialisation that then becomes taken-for-granted and rule-like entities. They define what is and what is not an organisation either by means of individuals' perceived logic of how is it supposed to look (cognitive), their shared values on what are the ideal goals it should achieve (normative), or restrictive rules on what function each one makes within the structure (regulative).

At the heart of this process is the idea of legitimation. Suchman (1995) differentiates the strategic from institutional legitimacy. The former serves as *an operational resource*, the organisation takes selectively from its cultural environment and employs it in the pursuit of its goals, the latter serves as *a set of constitutive beliefs* that 'construct and penetrate the organisation in every aspect' (Suchman, 1995: 576). So, rather than adopting it selectively, this external institution defines how the organisation is built, run, understood and even evaluated. From an organisation's perspective, the conformity to its external environment is critical for its survival. It has to make itself recognisable by the general population and in doing so it has to abide by the rules held by this population. Once

undertaken, organisations will have the legitimacy to run their activities. Hence, 'legitimacy and institutionalisation are virtually synonymous' (Suchman, 1995: 576). It means that the whole process of institutionalisation is the process of dancing with legitimacy. The question now is how this institutional legitimacy is obtained, preserved and socialised in organisational life. There are three key concepts that have been developed within the tradition of institutional theory to elaborate this process: isomorphic pressure, decoupling and structuration-destructuration.

Isomorphic Pressure

As stated earlier, to garner legitimacy, an organisation must conform to its external institutional environment. Because of its legitimating power, the pressure of the institutional environment would lead to similar practices among the organisational population, which is called as isomorphic pressure. This latter concept has been popularly used in a wide array of analyses, including in analysing globalisation. Meyer and colleagues use the concept to develop a world culture theory contending that the modern world-system would reach a point of convergence and build a world model by internalising particular shared rationalised myths (Meyer, 2010; Meyer et al., 1997), that is, a shared truth whose foundation is built on the 'rationalised and impersonal prescriptions' as well as 'taken for granted norms' (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Their arguments originate from a Weberian concept of rationalisation (particularly in the institutional form of bureaucracy and the modern nation-state), which continuously shapes the way the modern societies organise and interact with each other.

They use the theory to explain the global expansion of mass education and the similarity of global education governance. They argue that such an expansion is unrelated to the political or economic development of each nation-state (Meyer et al., 1977, 1992), but rather with the institutionalised myth of the nation-state and education as the means to produce rational individuals, which legitimate their full membership in the new nation-state (Boli et al., 1985; Ramirez & Boli, 1987). This expansion had also come with the isomorphic revolution that affected the configuration of educational governance. It drove global nations to share similar governing characteristics, ranging from legislation for compulsory education, the establishment of the ministry of education as a national education authority, the acceptance of age-based schooling as a single model of state education (Boli et al., 1985; Meyer et al., 1992;

Ramirez & Boli, 1987) and even the adoption of particular subjects in school curricula (Benavot & Kamens, 1989).

Using a similar line of argument, the new generation of institutional theorists, for instance, Baker, Wiseman, Astiz and LeTendre also explain the global expansion of educational decentralisation. According to them, world education governance has undergone 'a devolution revolution' because of the combined pressure of economic and institutional globalisation. Economic globalisation is characterised by the intensification of the global market system that forces nation-state education systems to adopt more efficient governance. Meanwhile, institutional globalisation is a result of global rationalisation, which leads the world-system towards a uniform model of polity (Astiz et al., 2002; Baker et al., 2005). This duality of the economic and institutional is supported by global 'isomorphic actors' that create standardised models and recipes, and such actors are the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and UNESCO so that nation-states around the globe follow (Astiz et al., 2002; Meyer & Jepperson, 2000). To this extent, decentralisation has become a new rationalised myth. Its goals, such as to lessen financial burdens, create organisational effectiveness, improve pedagogical performance and promote democracy, have been rationalised as the policy ideals and it is believed that any nation decentralising its education governance would arrive at such positions (Derqui, 2001; Hentic & Bernier, 1999; Rondinelli, 1980; World Bank, 2000).

Some case studies of the education reform movement have been developed that rely on this line of argument. The education reform movement is seen as the change of the institutional environment in which the nation-state is no longer the dominant institutional actor. Davies and Guppy (1997) propose that the institutional convergence of economic globalisation and global rationalisation has driven isomorphic characteristics of education reform in Anglo–American nations: Canada, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Similarly, drawing from the case of the Michigan public school reform, Lubienski (2005) highlights the globalisation of marketised environments as the condition for the emergence of competitive-oriented reform at the local arena. The marketised environment argument is also found in De Boer and colleagues' analysis of the transformation of Dutch higher education organisations. They argue that its institutional pressure has changed the organisations from being state institutions to become 'corporate actors' (De Boer et al., 2007).

Nevertheless, institutional analysis has been widely criticised for its lack of agency. Some of its theorists argue that the agency or actorhood of the theory is embedded in the way the institutional environment leads to any consequential action (DiMaggio, 1988; Meyer, 2010). Nevertheless, the problem of agency within the theory can be relatively mediated through the DiMaggio and Powell (1983) classification of three pressure mechanisms, as well as Scott and colleagues (2000) classification of three components of the institutional environment. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose three mechanisms through which the institutional pressure drives the isomorphic change: coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercive isomorphism takes place as organisations get formal and informal pressure from more dominant organisations on which they are dependent. Coercive pressure also results from cultural expectations within the societal context in which those organisations exist. Mimetic isomorphism usually emerges in a situation of uncertainty so that modelling, using other organisations' examples, becomes the most strategic option. A best practice experienced by an organisation may become an institutional pressure for others to adopt. The democratic governance that has been successfully adopted in Western countries may hold powerful legitimation to influence other countries to adopt it. In addition to the two, the isomorphic pressure may arise from normative discourses offered by professional communities.

Meanwhile, Scott and colleagues introduce three components of institutional environments: institutional logics, institutional actors and the governance system (Scott et al., 2000). Institutional logics are the socially constructed historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organise time and space and provide meaning to their social reality (Thornton et al., 2012). Although DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have introduced the state and the profession as two legitimating institutions, Friedland and Alford (1991) propose entities like the state, the market or capitalism, religion, democracy and family as important institutional logics in modern society. They elaborate:

> The institutional logic of capitalism is accumulation and the commodification of human activity. That of the state is rationalisation and the regulation of human activity by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies. That of democracy is participation and the extension of legal and popular control over human activity. That of family is community and the motivation of human

> activity by unconditional loyalty to its members and their reproductive needs. (p. 248)

Furthermore, institutional actors are either organisations or individuals that create, carry and promote the institutional logics: universities (profession), government (state) and the private sector (market). However, in highly complex modern society, one institutional actor can carry multiple institutional logics. Private Catholic schools, for instance, can be associated with the carriers of market and religion institutions (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Moreover, governance systems are 'those arrangements which support the regularised control—whether by regimes created by mutual agreement, by legitimate hierarchical authority or by non-legitimate coercive means—of the actions of one set of actors by another' (Scott et al., 2000: 21).

The pressures for countries to adopt the reform strategies might play along with the combination of mode and component scenarios. First, education reform might embark on the support of global multilateral agencies as its institutional actors, like the World Bank and IMF, as part of financial aid conditions (coercive). This has been particularly the case with reform in many developing nations, and it was evident that from 1992 to 1997, around 12% of the World Bank's total budget was allotted for education reform (Bjork, 2006b; Jones, 2007). The institutional logics introduced by these institutional actors can be market and democracy. As Rhoten (2000) argues, the approach the World Bank has been adopting in their sponsorship of educational decentralisation reform in the developing countries has shifted from neoliberal, market-based reform since the 1970s to democratisation since the late 1990s. In addition, state regulations or interest group expectations might also become the source of coercive pressure for the implementation of educational decentralisation. Many education reforms in South American countries were preceded by greater political movement to democracy and a market economy (Hall, 2003; Torres, 2002). Carolan's (2007) study of the New York City's Department of Education reform reveals the role of coercive pressure from the local elite business community.

Second, the source of isomorphic pressure is also likely to come from the justification of professional academic discourses (normative). The discourses are disseminated by academic institutions and research centres through publications, conferences and media opinions. By the 1990s, education reform gained worldwide prominence as an academic discourse,

and thousands of papers have been published that justify the idea. Third, the education reform strategy might also arise as the country saw the ideal model being the one that has been implemented by the other (mimetic). The US education reform proposal document, 'A Nation at Risk: the Imperative for Education Reform' (The National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983), for instance, often referred to other industrialised countries to describe the practices of excellence that the Americans had missed. To cite one of its examples:

> In England and other industrialised countries, it is not unusual for academic high school students to spend 8 hours a day at school, 220 days per year. In the United States, by contrast, the typical school day lasts 6 hours and the school year is 180 days. (The National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983: 23)

Nevertheless, all types of isomorphic pressure may work interdependently to reinforce each other (Carolan, 2007). Multilateral agencies, like UNESCO, the World Bank, OECD and the Asian Development Bank sponsored numerous academic researchers in many fields to support their reform projects in many countries (Jones, 1990, 2007). Those studies justified the problems the countries have suffered from, so that the policy must be reformed. Ogawa's study (1994) proposes that school-based management became a popular reform strategy in the USA during the 1980s because of coercive and normative institutional pressures. The strong networking between the government (coercive) and academic professional (normative) actors has given the reform much stronger legitimating power (Ogawa, 1994). In addition, organisations with a plan to adopt the reform often invite professional consultants (normative) from any external organisations that have a reputation for success in applying the adopted policy (mimetic) (Table 3.1).

The Duality of External and Internal Pressures

Despite the concept of external isomorphic pressure being a powerful tool to explain and to analyse the process of policy convergence in the global arena and the pressure on the nation-state to ceremonially adopt it, it has been criticised as not being adequate for analysing profound organisational changes. For instance, Kraatz and Zajac (1996), who examined some institutional propositions against the change behaviour of American

Table 3.1 Models of institutional pressure to the adoption of educational decentralisation

Modes/components	*Actor*	*Logic*	*Governance system*	*Basis of attention*
Coercive	Multilateral agencies State	Market Democracy	Management Participation	Efficiency Accountability
		Bureaucratic-state	Control	Equity
	Interest groups	Relative	Relative	Relative
Normative	Academic institution Professional association	Profession	Expertise	Quality
Mimetic	Similar organisation	Relative	Relative	Relative

private liberal arts colleges between 1971 and 1986, found that organisational changes during that period could not be said to have resulted from the process of institutional isomorphism. Rather than becoming more similar over time, the liberal arts colleges had increasingly been showing heterogeneity. Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 1023) also argue that because of its weakness in analysing the internal dynamic of organisational change, 'the theory is silent on why some organisations adopt radical change whereas others do not, despite experiencing the same institutional pressures'.

With regard to discussion on educational decentralisation, we can pose a similar question: why is it that France, a country with an advanced education system, has remained centralised, despite the great pressures for decentralisation from such prominent institutional actors as the OECD, the European Union and even UNESCO, whose headquarters are in Paris. For this particular question, Baker et al. have an answer.

> The French case of minor decentralization amid a growing trend is a clear example of the action of the two factors. Historical choices created a highly centralized system, which certain groups (both administrators and teachers) wish to maintain. The structure has strong social legitimacy because it satisfies certain expectations widely held within the local culture. (Baker et al., 2005: 145)

Hence, external legitimacy is not the only reason why a nation engages with educational decentralisation reform. The internal pressure for legitimacy also plays an important role for an organisation to adapt or resist the demand for change from its environment. The organisation will resist change if it has a strong constellation of internal legitimacy, as the case of French education has shown. This implies that the external pressure would easily lead to the change where the organisation's internal legitimacy is suffering a crisis. This means that the structure does no longer represent the popular will and, if a change is not made, the crisis of legitimacy will threaten the organisation's survival. Here, the internal crisis of legitimacy refers to Habermas' depiction of the crisis of state-led capitalism as follows.

> After all, the state apparatus does not just see itself in the role of the supreme capitalist facing the conflicting interests of the various capital factions. It also has to consider the generalizable interests of the population as far as necessary to retain mass loyalty and prevent a conflict-ridden withdrawal of legitimation. (Habermas, 1973: 643–667)

The German-American education theorist, Hans Weiler (1990), was the scholar who early analysed the relation between educational decentralisation and the need for legitimacy. His concept of 'compensatory legitimation' clearly indicates the role of 'the generalizable interests of the population' as the source of the pressure. For him, compensatory legitimation means that the national government uses decentralisation as a strategy to camouflage its effort to repair its eroded legitimation because of its distance from the basis of the political system, its inefficient bureaucracy and its structural inability to attend to variations in the social, cultural, geographical and economic background of the society (Weiler, 1990).

Thus, more than isomorphism, the duality of external and internal pressure for legitimacy can promote isomorphism and variation in three ways. First, the strong constellation of internal legitimacy might create organisational resistance to adapt to the external isomorphic pressure so that the organisational structure becomes 'an exception rather than the norm' (Baker et al., 2005). The case of the French education system, as illustrated above, is the best example of this. Second, the internal crisis of legitimacy might ease the influence of external environmental pressure, and the organisation undergoes structural change and becomes

part of the isomorphic reality. The experience of Latin America's educational decentralisation reform can illustrate this. The external isomorphic pressure of decentralisation during the 1980s suited the internal problems of economic crisis, political instability and authoritarian ideologies (Derqui, 2001). Third, the institutional templates of structural change originating from external and internal pressures might be different from each other but the organisation adopts all of them ceremonially to obtain external and internal legitimacies but, as a consequence, the organisation will face an institutional contradiction. This contradiction is manifested with the emergence of two or more dominant institutional logics that guide organisational action (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012).

The institutional contradiction is solved either through maintaining mutual coexistence or through amalgamation of institutions to generate a new logic. Competition and contradiction among institutions exist not only as they are, but sometimes are politicised to produce new logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Many recent studies have tried to see the productive aspect of this institutional contradiction. In this sense, two mechanisms are elaborated: either redirecting the conflict away from single institution domination (Reay & Hinings, 2009) or producing a new logic as a result of a dialectical process of contradiction (Seo & Creed, 2002). The study by Reay and Hinnings, for instance, shows how two contradictory institutional logics, medical professionalism and business market, can coexist in the governance of public health in Alberta province. In this sense, medical professionalism still widely operates and legitimates medical practices even after the government's introduction of a market-based health-care system. Both logics share the field domination through some collaborative mechanism (Reay & Hinings, 2009). In the meantime, the study by Saito (2010) shows how the institutional contradiction has resulted in the rise of a new institutional logic that merges the values of competing institutions. After long-run interchanging domination in the post-war Japanese education system, nationalist and cosmopolitan logics equally inspired the formulation of Japanese education reform in 2000. Saito names this new logic as cosmopolitan nationalism (Saito, 2010).

Decoupling

The idea that legitimation can be achieved only by conforming to institutional pressure has made such institutions a rationalised myth. Given

its powerful function to maintain the stability of an organisation, organisations adopt these myths ceremonially and with rituals of confidence and good faith (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, the symbolic adoption of myths leads to problematic contradiction. This symbolism runs counter to the logic of technical efficiency. It is because the myths may arise from different parts of the environment so that they cannot fit into particular organisational settings (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The contradiction between institutional and technical environments is then solved by a mechanism called decoupling. Habermas (1973) terms it the separation of expressive symbols that influence a universal willingness to follow from the instrumental function of administration. The organisation protects the legitimation of its institutionalised policy from external evaluation by buffering its technical implementation. As result, an organisation may have its practices unchanged but keep its institutional legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Decoupling helps organisations avoid close inspection, hides the quality under symbolic attributes, protects ritual classification schemes from uncertainties arising in the technical core and adjusts to inconsistent and conflicting institutional rules (Meyer & Rowan, 1978).

Earlier institutional theorists used decoupling to characterise the nature of modern social organisation as organised anarchy, which is associated with problematic preference, unclear technology and fluid participation (Cohen et al., 1972). Schools are a good example of the organised anarchy. In contrast to business firms, which have measurable goals (e.g. making more profit), tangible technologies (e.g. production machines) and relatively fixed beneficiaries (owners, workers and customers), schools act differently. They have an endless and, sometimes, conflicting lists of goals; adopt various and, sometimes, personalised teaching methods; and incorporate a wider and, mostly boundless, set of participants, ranging from people who are daily working within schools' physical boundaries (teachers and principals) up to those who are not (parents, unions, teacher associations, the government and even political parties). This condition of uncertainty leads those diverse participants to exert their influences in defining the goals, the standards of excellence and the best teaching methods the schools must adopt (Hanson, 2001). Schools build a structure with ritual categories whose practices are not necessarily connected to one another. The structure encompasses categories such as administrators, teachers, students and curriculum with their respective roles. As long as such ritual categories exist, schools can retain their

legitimacy as educational institutions. And as long as the roles within each category function, they are separated from questions of goals and outcomes. Decoupling helps organisations avoid close inspection, hides the quality under symbolic attributes, protects ritual classification schemes from uncertainties arising in the technical core and adjusts to inconsistent and conflicting institutionalised rules (Meyer & Rowan, 1978).

Recent theorists employ the concept for the cross-organisational context as part of world culture analysis. Meyer et al., for instance, use decoupling to describe the inconsistencies between the adopted world culture models and the practices at the national level (Meyer et al., 1997). They believe that decoupling is a way to reconcile the externally modelled organisations and their different internal settings. The perspective has inspired subsequent uses by scholars such as Astiz et al. (2002) and Baker and LeTendre (2005) in analysing the translated national differences of global similarities in education policy, because of the nature of cultural, social and political distinctiveness of each nation-state. As we can see, even though most educational decentralisation policies in Latin America, Africa and Asian countries were virtually stemming from similar World Bank structural adjustment recommendations, still they are different in practice and outcome. This analysis goes beyond liberal and critical perspectives that always place the policy gaps in the discourse of 'success and failure'.

In the decentralisation context, decoupling has also been used to analyse the decentralisation-centralisation dynamic as a result of local adaptation to the institutionalised policy. As many studies have revealed, when it comes to the policy adaptation, nation-states tend to make the border between centralisation and decentralisation more blurred rather than clearer. There has been a continuous dialectic between the two poles (Bray, 1999; Dussel et al., 2000; Hawkins, 2006; Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2004). In their study on Mongolian education reform, Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe (2004) argue that this problem emerges from the clash between international programs and national culture. The long influence of the socialist culture of the 'central value system' has established some perceptions among government officials that schools are state rather than public properties, and that the centralist structure is the most efficient and effective for managing internationally funded projects. These perceptions run counter to the international funding aspiration of more autonomous localities (Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2004). The reason is similar to the case of China's decentralisation, which is caught between a centralist, corporatist ideology of Leninism on the one hand and an

economic market movement to decentralisation on the other (Hawkins, 2006). In this sense, the decoupling can be found not only in the context of policy–practice discrepancy but also in terms of policy contradiction.

Furthermore, Bromley and Powell (2012) and Bromley et al. (2013) introduce a more clinical concept of decoupling. They regard decoupling as a symbolic practice working in one of two ways: symbolic adoption (policy-practice decoupling) and symbolic implementation (means-ends decoupling). The former occurs when the formal structure is ceremonially adopted but violated and not implemented in practice; the latter takes place when the formal policy is applied but the outcomes do not reflect the original intent of the policy. The policy-practice decoupling stems from the legitimacy motivated adoption, a weak capacity to implement policies, and the conflicts between adopted policies and the interests, beliefs and current identities and practices of internal parties. This type of decoupling is, for instance, implied in Astiz's study (2004) on the implementation of educational decentralisation policy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. She argues that the unique characteristic of state–society relations and the interests of political elites would determine the way the institutionally scripted policy would be adopted and adapted at national and local levels. In the Buenos Aires case, it is evident that the drive to democracy and wider public engagement as being universally believed through decentralisation is tainted by conflict among the local political elites (Astiz, 2004). Another study by Komatsu (2013) employs decoupling to explain local governments' resistance to the implementation of school-based management reform policies in post-conflict Bosnia. Although major local political parties are not opposing this nationally mandated policy, they can make it less effective in the implementation stage either by politicising its adoption into local bylaws or by controlling the appointment of school directors which should be independently arranged by the respective school boards (Komatsu, 2013).

As technologies for inspection advance, ceremonial adoption is no longer a common practice. Now organisations are audited regularly as a warrant that their daily activities are consistent with the institutional policies they adopt. However, a situation arises when those activities are institutionalised and become routine so that the main organisation's concern is to make sure that such activities are implemented with a degree of accuracy that is formally measured. If that is so, organisations risk overlooking the original goals. As a result, policy implementation tends to defer to ceremonial practices. The means-end decoupling is commonly

adopted in the market-based, neo-managerial education reforms in which, for the sake of efficiency, the bureaucracy of the central or the local government withdraws from direct school intervention and provides a school-based management run by school managers and professional teachers. However, the government then imposes standardised frameworks according to which school personnel play their roles and on the basis of which their performances are strictly assessed. Hence, rather than professional self-governing, the managerial reforms result in a managed governance, and rather than decentralisation they turn out to be centralisation. Managerialism is also held to promote the decrease of professional values and the intensification of work over organisational goals (Rees & Rodley, 1995). McInerney's study on Australia's school-based management policy concludes that the managerialist education decentralisation has paved the way for schools to enter 'a dangerous territory' because it 'devalues the pedagogical attributes of school leadership and reinforces a growing divide between teachers and administrators' (McInerney, 2003: 57). As such, Wong's study in seven schools in Guangdong Province, China, has also shown how decentralisation creates massive deskilling for teachers because of an overwhelming government control over curriculum and testing in a competitive schooling environment, and increased administrative workloads being imposed (Wong, 2006).

This book aims at the restoration of the basic idea of decoupling as a mechanism to preserve institutional legitimacy but at the same time to protect the new policies that run counter to legitimacy. The emerging discourses of 'efficiency' and 'confidence' are employed by powerful actors within the organisation as their justification. So, rather than seeing decoupling as simply as inevitable in which the institutional-technical environment or policy-practice-goal discrepancies are justified, the book is rather perceiving the concept as an intended strategy of manipulating the formal structure. Formal structure is the official structure of a hierarchy and functions on the basis of which any external parties can assess the degree of isomorphic pressure received by an organisation. In the decentralisation context, the adoption of a legitimate formal structure can be assessed by the extent to which the officially adopted structure reflects the regular decentralisation templates, such as the withdrawal of the central bureaucratic structure from local education management, the implementation of school-based management, the presence of school-board organisations and more. For me, the policy-practice and means-end decoupling represent the use of different instruments of power to divert

the current governing system from the adopted formal structure: one is empirical, the other symbolic.

The policy-practice decoupling occurs when the authority uses its empirical means of power—such as the hierarchy and bureaucracy—to impose a contrary practice that does not reflect the formal structure. In the decentralisation context, the decentralised structure is present in the form of local government control or of school-based management, but this new structure is dysfunctional because the central authority retains its former hierarchy to control the education governance. Meanwhile, the means-end decoupling occurs when the authority uses symbolic means of power—such as professional judgement and standardised procedures—to endorse contrary practices. In the context of educational decentralisation, the means-end decoupling occurs when the structure of decentralisation is present and the central hierarchy is dissolved, but the way the decentralised structure delivers is defined by highly standardised procedures of performance control.

Organisational Fields: Structuration and Destructuration

The extent to which a particular national policy environment affects local practice would be heavily reliant on the dynamic of local organisational fields. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define an organisational field as an aggregate of organisations whose interactions constitute a recognised area of institutional life. Organisational fields in the education sector may comprise schools, governments (central and local), book publishers, teacher associations and even political parties. The most fundamental basis on which the organisational field works is the one of relational systems. Earlier field theorists like Bourdieu perceive that 'to think in terms of field is to think relationally' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 96). The organisational field is patterned through relations among its participants. These organisations interact with each other forming a network of constraints (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Textbooks are written to accommodate school curricula whose standards are set by a government agency, after consulting professional organisations like universities and teacher associations, and book publishers provide more efficient ways of printing and distribution and so forth.

The relational system among field participants involves the process of structuration, which refers to Gidden's original concept that echoes the duality of structure, that patterns human behaviour and action, which

reproduces and modifies structure (Giddens, 1984). Adapted to organisational analysis, structuration reflects an organisation that is operating within a structural context but at the same time its behaviour creates and modifies the context (Scott et al., 2000). In the context of education reform policy, the constraining structure manifests in the form of imposed national policies whose purpose is to shape the local environment accordingly. Meanwhile, the action manifests in the agency of local organisations established by and interacting within that environmental context and, through intensive relations, might modify that context. The process of structuration makes the field more highly structured in terms of more increased consensus, dense relational networks and stable hierarchy.

Nevertheless, the dynamic relation among field participants is not always effecting mutuality in the form of agreement and contract. Instead, an organisational field also constitutes the area of differentiation and fragmentation in which domination and resistance might take place (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Friedland & Alford, 1991). In the case where organisational fields end up with disagreement among participants, this would lead to the process of destructuration. Destructuration involves 'the breakdown of traditional organisational forms and patterns of behavior, the dislodging of belief systems and the dismantling of governance structure dominant in earlier period' (Scott et al., 2000: 27). The destructuration is normally followed by the process of restructuration through which new organisational players, new logics and new governance systems are introduced. If the highly structured fields offer stability and solid guidance, the processes of destructuration and restructuration in contrast lead to an unstable field in which rules and models are contested by its participants (Scott et al., 2000).

Moreover, the extent to which structuration, destructuration or restructuration might take place is very much determined by the possession of capital, the most important of which is symbolic capital, that is 'any property (any form of capital whether physical, economic, cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognise it, to give it value' (Bourdieu et al., 1994: 9). Even though the authors add that the state is the most potential site where symbolic capital is concentrated (Bourdieu et al., 1994), it remains context dependent. The symbolic capital creates legitimacy for organisations or institutional actors to promote the integration of organisational fields and the field integration is essential for its survival (Scott et al., 2000).

The policy environment built by upper-layer institutional actors is a determinant in defining the type of symbolic capital being relevant in the field. In the market-based reform environment, efficiency and performance are the most valuable constituents of symbolic capital, which is usually concentrated in private enterprises. In her analysis of the effect of the US No Child Left Behind (NCLB) policy, Burch (2010) highlights the prevalence of private organisations in education governance. Schools and pupils are now relying on a number of private organisations to provide supplementary learning services, assessment consulting, management quality certification, textbook publication and even food catering. In contrast, in his study of Polish educational decentralisation reform, Bodine (2006) signifies the presence of a weak, post-socialist, Polish state that lacks legitimacy from shared cultural meaning and symbols that has led the reform to the destructuration of education. The destructuration is characterised in two ways: the diminished legitimacy for state schools and the fragmentation of education governance (Bodine, 2006).

In the past, the strong agency of Indonesia's central government authoritarian state could enforce direct field structuration because the state controlled the symbolic capital. No single organisation was allowed to dissent so that government policies went unchallenged. Now, the political decentralisation has buffered local structure from direct central intervention. All central government policies cannot always be virtually translated into a local context in spite of all the pressure. As the case of Poland has shown, Indonesian education reform might also facilitate the fragmentation of education governance even though the context is different. Unlike Poland, where the destructuration is caused by an illegitimate, weak state, the Indonesian experience of destructuration might emerge from the contest between equally strong central and local states for legitimacy to control.

Nevertheless, structuration and destructuration scenarios are also defined through the dynamic of relations among local actors or organisations. This is particularly so because Indonesian decentralisation is considered to be part of democratic reform (Hadiz, 2004). Driven by a massive democratic environment, decentralisation has transformed Indonesian localities into new democratic fields where participatory governance has expanded. Democratisation has created local organisational fields that involve a multiple array of organisations as their participants: local governments, political parties, education councils, NGOs, public schools, private

schools and school committees. Although these organisations are established in almost all localities in response to the 'structure' of national policy environment, however, the roles that define the relations among participants do not always manifest themselves as scripted. The relations among these participants would redefine and modify the scripted policy.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed some relevant studies on educational decentralisation and offered some theoretical considerations to address the research questions as elaborated in Chapter 1. Most studies of educational decentralisation are concerned with the problem of technical efficiency and the ideological debates of privatisation and neoliberalism; few studies have considered the question of legitimacy. This theoretical review offers a framework to elaborate that legitimacy issue. The framework can be summarised as follows.

First, the concept of institutional environment addresses the first research question: 'how did the global and local contexts provide the institutional legitimacy for the implementation of the educational decentralisation policy in Indonesia?' In this sense, there must be some global and local developments that make the central government falling into legitimacy crisis, and the adoption of educational decentralisation is seen as the only way to resolve. The concept of global institutionalisation is also included into this first framework to assess the process of educational decentralisation being a powerful global institution and the constant pressure it gave to the centralist governments like Indonesia over the long period of time. In addition, Weiler's concept of compensatory legitimacy is also included in this first framework to illuminate the process of internal pressure from the local population who feel that the existing governance model is running counter to their interests and aspiration. In this sense, adopting the formal structure of decentralisation compensates the loss of legitimacy.

Second, the concept of decoupling is used to address the second research question: 'how did the central government preserve its legitimacy while devolving powers to the local governments, but also retaining significant powers of its own?' Despite giving legitimacy, the adopted formal structure of decentralisation is not necessarily compatible with actual educational problems and organisational resources. Therefore, the decoupling mechanism is offered to justify the separation of technical

strategies from the formal structure of decentralisation to address the real educational problems with the available resources. The decoupling is justified by the logics of technical efficiency and professional confidence. Through this process, the return of central control in the decentralised structure is explained.

Third, the concepts of structuration and destructuration are used to address the third research question: 'how is the institutional legitimacy of the educational decentralisation policy contested at the local level?' The extent to which the decoupling strategy is effective should be examined in the local field in which the role of local governments become central. When the decoupling strategy creates agreement in the field, in the sense that the local government follows central rules in managing local education, the expected stable governance can be achieved (structuration). However, when the strategy incites disagreement in the field, in the sense that central rules are neglected or violated, the fragmented governance and the breakdown of hierarchy might take place (destructuration). The scenarios of structuration and destructuration can happen simultaneously and, therefore, a comparative analysis of local practices of education governance is important to see different responses of the educational decentralisation policy at the local level.

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CHAPTER 4

Managing Global and Local Institutional Pressures: Decentralisation and the Legitimacy Project in Indonesia

> [School] autonomy and decentralisation were a global domain at that time … a global fever (demam dunia). The World Bank came as the forefront to offer the idea … in Latin America, Africa, etc. … But the idea was pretty grounded on us, so we did not only receive; we also examined what's relevant and what's not – Former MoEC Vice-Minister. (Interview, 29 January 2015)

Introduction

Under the **New Order** regime (1966–1998), Indonesia became one of the most centralised nations in the world. During that period, particularly since the late 1970s, a number of political and economic transformations had altered the style of education governance in many countries to one that was more decentralised. However, the centralist New Order government survived. Indonesia's resilient economy and powerful military control had been successful in securing political stability and (real or perceived) mass loyalty in spite of the increasing external demands for change. However, the economic crisis and political democratisation in the late 1990s caused the regime's loss of confidence from international and local communities. Decentralisation was then embraced to accommodate the external pressure of global institutionalisation as well as to compensate for the internal crisis of legitimacy.

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The main objective of this chapter is to analyse how the global and local contexts provide the institutional legitimacy for the implementation of the educational decentralisation policy in Indonesia. To explore the problem thoroughly, this chapter first places educational decentralisation in the global context. Seeing globalisation as global institutionalisation (Astiz et al., 2002; Baker et al., 2005), this chapter analyses the institutional mechanisms that make decentralisation effect the convergence of global education governance. Using this framework, this chapter also looks at how this process of global institutionalisation operates at the national government level, in this case, in Indonesia. This chapter identifies key institutional actors, the mechanisms of institutional pressure associated with these actors and the national government responses to such pressures.

Furthermore, this chapter also discusses the significance of internal pressure for decentralisation because the external isomorphic pressure of global institutionalisation drives effective change at the national level when the existing national structure is challenged by an internal legitimation crisis. This rule also works the other way around. Even the global expansion of educational decentralisation has its origins in the national or regional legitimacy crisis of centralist governance. In other words, the global expansion of decentralisation works in parallel with the global delegitimation of centralist regimes. The discussion of this will come in the early part of this chapter.

Educational Decentralisation and the Duality of Local and Global Pressures

The Legitimacy Crisis: From Local to Global Delegitimation of the Centralist Governance

Before the 1970s, the global community was a faithful believer in big government and central planning, including for education. Most countries centralised their education management. In this sense, ministries of education, either alone or together with other central government ministries, controlled the education systems. Some countries, like the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia, were traditionally decentralised. In these countries, education is the responsibility of state governments. Even today, the federal government of Canada does not have a ministry of education. In Asia, Japan was the earliest nation that decentralised its

education management. Since 1948, after World War II, that country devolved education management to the local authorities when Japan was under close US scrutiny. A report, issued by the First American Mission on Education, recommended that Japan changes its centralised system by imitating the American model of school districts and school management that involves greater community participation (Muta, 2000).

Since the 1970s, decentralisation has become a major item on the agenda of the global educational reform movement. The trend emerged after the crisis of the centralised welfare state in Western societies, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the crises of authoritarian regimes in Asian and African nations, which transformed the fundamentals of state governance from governments to the market, and from central to local authority (Jessop, 1999). In Western societies, as Habermas contended, the welfare state crisis stemmed from 'the excessive legal regulation and bureaucratisation … and the over concentration of "trained professional" and "scientific approaches" in the social services' (Habermas, 1986: 9). These centralised welfare regimes in Europe had failed to reconcile the high cost of democratic legitimacy procedures with the rise of efficiency-oriented capital that permeated the world economy in the 1970s.

The effect of such crises, Habermas noted, was the rise of neo-conservatism, which was characterised by three elements. The first element was policies oriented to capital accumulation through the restriction of welfare services. In addition, secondly, neo-conservatism was also characterised by the reduced political costs of the legitimating institutions, such as a bureaucracy and state-sponsored democratic organisations, by the activities of non-state actors, such as business organisations, labour unions and NGOs. And, thirdly, the ideology was also epitomised by the promotion of banal cultural policies by discrediting intellectuals as members of a non-productive social class and nurturing traditional cultural values, such as patriotism, religious morality and folk culture, to compensate individuals' sacrifices for their submission to the pressures of a competitive society and accelerated modernism (Habermas, 1986).

In the 1970s, neo-conservatism found its *modus operandi* in the rise of neoliberal regimes in the UK under Thatcher and in the USA under Reagan (Apple, 2006; Whitaker, 1987). In these traditionally decentralised nations, the neoliberal reforms manifested themselves as the privatisation of public goods. The neoliberal logic is that involving the

private sector would make education services more competitive and efficient. In education, this philosophy was the foundation for a number of policy shifts, such as individual subsidies, voucher systems for schools and service contracting (Gordon & Whitty, 1997; Hill, 2010; Hursh, 2007).

A large number of traditionally centralised countries in Europe, such as the Scandinavian countries, Spain, the Netherlands, Greece and Portugal were flocking to engage with these reforms. Besides the privatisation policies, they started to adopt UK and US traditional models of decentralisation, which means leaving the education sector to be managed by regional or local governments. However, in countries like Spain, Italy and Belgium, the devolution of education to regional governments was also a response to their internal problems with secessionist movement (Sorens, 2009).

The 1970s also witnessed political and economic crises in Latin American countries, like Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, as well as Eastern European countries, like Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. After several reforms, those countries also engaged with decentralisation. In these regions, the decentralisation policy came as part of the movement to democracy (Przeworski, 1991). In the 1980s, the decentralisation reform also spread to Asia and the Pacific with China, New Zealand, South Korea and the Philippines as the major cases. In Africa, the movement to decentralisation was intensified during the 1990s and 2000s with the emergence of new democracies: South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda and Tanzania (Gershberg & Winkler, 2003). The global movement to decentralisation continued until the 2000s, with the likes of Pakistan and Indonesia, which became known for their radical decentralisation. In the mid-2000s, the world has witnessed the convergence of an education governance model. In these countries, central ministries are no longer the single dominant players. They have to share—or even completely devolve—managerial responsibility to lower-level authorities, to schools, private institutions and local communities.

Isomorphic Pressures: Global Institutionalisation and Its Actors

New institutional theorists, for example, Baker, Wiseman, Astiz and LeTendre argue that world education governance has undergone ‘a devolution revolution’ because of the combined processes of economic and institutional globalisation. Economic globalisation is characterised by the intensification of global market systems that force nation-state education

systems to adopt more efficient governance models. Meanwhile, institutional globalisation has resulted from global rationalisation, which leads the world's systems to a uniform model of polity (Astiz et al., 2002; Baker et al., 2005). Following the global delegitimation of centralism, the neoliberal reforms that demanded a much lesser role for the state and were first initiated by neo-conservative governments in the UK and the USA, then came to the fore and were rationalised as a global institutional model. The global decentralisation reforms generally imitate the institutional templates of the perceived best practices of the US and UK education governance systems, such as local education authorities, school boards, school districts and locally managed schools. The question now is how this global institutionalisation process takes place and what institutional actors are involved in it.

In this context, I adopt DiMaggio and Powell's three mechanisms of isomorphic pressures (coercive, normative and mimetic) and Scott's three components of institutional environment (institutional logic, institutional actors and governance systems). The pressures for countries to adopt the reform strategies played along with the combination of mode and of component scenarios. First, educational decentralisation has become a global norm through coercive pressure from a number of global institutional actors: the World Bank, the OECD, the European Union and UNESCO (Moutsios, 2009; Mundy, 1999). From the 1960s to the late 1970s, UNESCO dominated the global education governance, but its role was later overshadowed by the rise of two actors, the World Bank and the OECD, when the global economic architecture forced education to be an integrated part of the global economy (Mundy, 1999). The OECD plays the dominant role in rich countries; the World Bank is more concerned with developing nations (Mundy, 1999). However, the World Bank is the biggest player in this reform movement. A World Bank report published in 1990 concludes:

> The World Bank plays a singularly important role in international lending for education. Since the 1970s, it has been the largest single provider of external funding for educational development, providing approximately 15 percent of all official external aid to education. Since bilateral aid is largely for technical assistance, the Bank is by far the larger lender for capital investments. In many countries, the Bank is the major source of educational policy advice, and other agencies increasingly follow the Bank's lead in such policy and lending. Therefore, its experiences and the policy

> implications of those experiences carry particularly significant weight in how educational development and lending proceeds worldwide. (Haddad, 1990: 37)

Since the early 1980s, the Bank has included decentralised governance reform in its financial loan conditions (Heyneman, 2003; Jones, 2007). The World Bank's enormous role is evident by the fact that from 1962 to 2005, no fewer than 129 countries had borrowed from the World Bank for education projects, which were valued at USD36.6 billion (Jones, 2007). During the 1990s, the amount of World Bank loans for education increased from the earlier period to be 27% of global external funding on education and 40% of the total aid provided for education by international organisations (Moutsios, 2009). Those projects were mostly combined with IMF loan programs, such as Structural Adjustment Facilities, Sector Adjustment Loans, Extended Fund Facilities and Structural Adjustment Loans. Both organisations even followed the path of DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) coercive mechanism because of the governance reform conditions attached to almost all of these financial deals (Moutsios, 2009; Nelson, 1996; Woods, 2006) (Table 4.1).

Beck (2005) and Moutsios (2010) call these institutional actors the 'midwives of the global market' for their roles in causing nation-states and societies to be the instruments of capital flows and production–consumption cycles (Moutsios, 2010: 128). Meanwhile, Woods names, in particular, the World Bank and the IMF as 'globalizers' because 'they have integrated a large number of countries into the world economy by requiring governments to open up to global trade, investment, and

Table 4.1 World Bank financing of education (USD million)

Regions	*1990–1995*	*1996–2000*	*2001–2005*
Africa	1,662	1,108	1,838
East Asia and the Pacific	2,395	1,972	722
Europe and Central Asia	421	836	969
Latin America and the Caribbean	3,458	1,933	2,773
Middle East and North Africa	632	582	543
South Asia	1,947	1,362	1,619

Source Compiled from (Jones, 2007)

capital' (Woods, 2006: 2–3). Market-based reforms and economic efficiency had been the general approach that the global institutional actors adopted, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Nancy Alexander, a former consultant to the New Rules of Global Finance Coalition, a Washington DC NGO that advocates financial governance reform within the IMF, explains the forms of market-based governance systems that the IMF and the World Bank impose on their client countries as follows:

> To improve resource utilization, the borrowing government should: decentralize by establishing school-based management; offer families a choice of schools; involve the private sector in financing and service delivery; increase class size; provide incentives for teacher achievement; and monitor educational outcomes and achievement. (Alexander, 2001: 306)

However, since the 1990s, the approach the World Bank and other international donors adopted in their sponsorship of decentralisation reform in developing countries shifted from neoliberal, market-based reform to democratisation and from economic to political outcomes (Rhoten, 2000; Silver, 2003). Former World Bank official, Steve Berkman, wrote that before the 1990s, international donors were good friends of many authoritarian regimes in Africa, Latin America and Asia and were mostly silent about their corrupt practices. It was only from the mid-1990s that the World Bank and other donor communities became more concerned with undemocratic practices (Berkman, 2008). In the education sector, as Rhoten (2000: 603) argues, although the drive for efficiency remained, the post-1990s global decentralisation agenda was characterised by the calling for 'a transfer of political power for decision making to citizens or their elected representatives'. In addition, the increase in parent and community involvement in education was also oriented to 'offset the power of vested interests'.

In short, the market and democracy serve as the dominant institutional logics introduced by these global institutions. Stephen Heyneman, former senior World Bank official, states his impression of the Bank's development aid during the period 1980–1996 as follows:

> From my experience, this second period was the birthing ground for other assumptions: the virtues of decentralization, private education, private provision and financing, targeting public expenditures to the poor, programs for student loans … Perhaps nothing more profound

> occurred in my experience during this second era than the collapse of the party/state and the introduction into the World Bank of 27 members with new constitutions, new assumptions about democracy, economics, freedom of information, travel, trade and nation-building. (Heyneman, 1999: 187–188)

Second, the source of isomorphic pressure also came from the justification of professional academic discourses (normative). During the period from 1970 to 2009, there had been thousands of academic papers produced, and through them, the discourse of educational decentralisation possesses strong normative legitimacy. I compare the hit counts recorded using the Web of Science, EBSCHOHOST and Google Scholar (academic search engines) to show the development of academic discourse on educational decentralisation over that period.[1] There had been many academic publications on this theme during the 1970s and 1980s, but this certainly does not reflect the full number because of the development of technological record-keeping. During the 1990s, the number of papers increased significantly. EBSCOHOST recorded nearly one thousand peer-reviewed scholarly journal papers produced during the 1990s. In the 2000s, helped by the growth of online publications, the number of academic publications on the theme increased rapidly (Fig. 4.1).

Nevertheless, the normative pressure has also been orchestrated by coercive agencies: the World Bank, the OECD and UNESCO. In addition to their loans and aid programs that influence technical policymaking processes in their client countries, these organisations also dispense information about decentralisation through academic forums: seminars, research and scholarly publications. They hire professional consultants from some universities and fund a large number of policy research projects to incorporate the decentralisation and other education reform projects into the realm of academic discourse. They publish annual statistics

[1] To retrieve the hit counts, I use common keywords associated with educational decentralisation: 'educational decentralization', 'school decentralization', 'school autonomy', 'school-based management', 'school choice' and 'charter school'. I have to acknowledge the different searching methods these three engines have, which affected the method I used to retrieve the hit counts. The Web of Science and Ebscohost are equipped with one-time multiple searching and filters to elimate the repetition, whereas the Google Scholar does not. Hence, for Google Scholar, the retrieval only used two keywords: 'education decentralization' and its British spelling 'education decentralisation' and 'educational decentralization' along with its British spelling 'educational decentralisation'.



Fig. 4.1 Scholarly publications that include the term 'educational decentralisation'

and indicators, seminar proceedings, project reports, policy analyses and research findings. Although their statistics and indicators have become the references for many countries to review their national education policies (Rubenson, 2008), their giant information databases have become the reference tool for academic communities to conduct many inquiries. Of the three organisations, the World Bank appears to be the most comprehensive in this kind of knowledge dissemination (Fig. 4.2).

Third, education reform strategies are adopted because nation-states believe the ideal model is the one that has been implemented by others so that they introduce this model into their systems (mimetic). The decentralisation models in countries, such as the USA and the UK, have been adopted by newly decentralising nations. The models include such practices as, for example, the establishment of school district system, local education authorities, education vouchers for schools and locally managed schools or school-based management (Green, 1999; Heyneman, 2009; McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Steiner-Khamsi, 2002). However, because of the multilateral nature of global education governance, this mimetic pressure does not necessarily come through direct imitation, where a newly decentralised country borrows the traditionally decentralised country's policy model. This is what Japan did when it first decentralised its education system in the late 1940s through the assistance of the



Fig. 4.2 Scholarly publications by international agencies, 1970–2015 that include the term 'educational decentralisation' Source: Compiled from: documents.worldbank.org; oecd-ilibrary.org and unesco.org

First American Mission on Education. Now, those 'best practices' have been institutionalised as part of the policy recipe offered by international organisations.

The Duality of Pressure in Indonesian Educational Decentralisation Reform

The Global Pressure: From Normative to Coercive

Indonesia has been intensely engaged with the pressure from global institutions since the early years of the New Order, when the country started its massive economic development. During the first five-year development plan (1968–1973), which focussed on agricultural development, the World Bank disbursed its first loan for the rehabilitation of irrigation systems in Java and Sumatera (World Bank, 1968). As for education, the first project to be supported by the World Bank's money was the construction and equipment of new vocational schools in 1970. However, the World Bank played only a minor role because during the 1970s, the country's economy was boosted with the influx of oil money. It is this oil revenue, which contributed 70% of total national revenue that improved the economy from the post-1965 catastrophe. This oil bonanza also fuelled the New Order's popularity because the revenue was deployed for

massive social welfare projects, including thousands of education infrastructure projects. Thanks to this support for development, economic growth reached the average rate of 7% during the 1970s (Resosudarmo & Kuncoro, 2006).

The fall of oil prices and the decrease of state investment pressed the country to make more radical economic reforms in the mid-1980s, the core of which were liberalisation and greater integration with the world economy. These reforms were done by increasing competitive exports and encouraging massive private capital inflows. In this period, external debt and international institutions played increasingly important roles in the country's economic policies. World Bank consultants were said to be among the most important advocates of the new economic policies (Robison, 1988). Indonesian debt before the 1997 crisis was mostly accumulated during the 1980s (Hill, 2000). In 1988, the country deregulated the stock market and this was successful in encouraging a massive inflow of foreign capital (Hill, 2000). The result of this structural adjustment was impressive: during the period 1987 to 1996, the country enjoyed remarkably rapid growth (Booth, 2000; Manning, 1997). From 1987 to 1993, the economy grew by 6.7%, higher than the period from 1983 to 1987, for which it was only 5% (Manning, 1997). In the following years, it grew even faster, by 7%, which was considered to be among the highest in Asia (Resosudarmo & Kuncoro, 2006).

As part of this liberalisation, during the 1980s, the international community started its call for governance decentralisation and the importance of privatisation. However, because of the resilient economy and political stability, the nature of institutional pressures for the decentralisation reform was more normative than coercive. In the early 1980s, an extensive study, titled *Management Development*, was made under the sponsorship of multiple international agencies such as: the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Labour Organisation Overseas Development Administration (UK), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Ford Foundation and the French ministry of external relations. The study found that, despite some administrative reforms made in the 1970s, 'the central [Indonesian] bureaucracy has retained fairly tight control over regional government units' (Hanna & Johnson, 1985: 9).

From the late 1980s, the management of education came under more serious scrutiny. In 1989, the World Bank published another extensive study on basic education, which, among other things, highlighted the

dual administration of primary education by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). Against the government's claim that this dual administration was the manifestation of decentralisation, the report instead argued that 'it is not, nor should it be, decentralization' (World Bank, 1989: 11). It argued that the MoEC and the MoHA essentially represent central government and its bureaucratic culture. The local education offices were regarded as 'little more than post-boxes for channelling data and reports up and down the bureaucratic ladder' (World Bank, 1989: 64). The report blamed this dual administration for inefficient governance and poor-quality schools. The report recommended the rationalisation of primary education management by 'giving individual schools greater autonomy in designing and carrying out their own educational programs' (World Bank, 1989: 99).

As for secondary education, on 25 January 1990, the Bank approved a USD154.2 million loan for secondary education management development projects. This loan funded numerous programs: sponsoring the ministry's personnel to earn higher academic qualification, providing in-service teachers with upgrading training, strengthening the capacity of district education office personnel and introducing curriculum development in some particular subjects. One of this project's objectives was to call for 'institutional reform through greater decentralization' (World Bank, 1998b: 9). However, this program was mostly used for junior secondary schools rather than the senior secondary. Since the extension of compulsory education from six to nine years in 1989, junior secondary schools were incorporated with the basic education regime.

The Bank had little to say on the decentralisation issue when it came to senior secondary education. However, the demand for institutional reform at the senior secondary level was mostly related to its integration with the market economy rather than the administrative aspect. Reviews of senior secondary schools had been made earlier in 1983 and 1984, and management was not the main issue. The 1983 report was about the senior secondary school leavers' performance in the labour market and the 1984 report concerned the general audit of secondary education, which emphasised quality. These reports were concerned about the loose connection between school teaching and the competitive industrial demand (Clark, 1983; World Bank, 1984). To increase the competitiveness of senior secondary education, the 1984 report offered some recommendations, such as increasing the teaching of English into science and mathematics teachers' training programs. In addition, it also

suggested expanding the provision of science laboratories and libraries in schools, and developing a national examination system for schools that could become a reference for selecting candidates for further education and for monitoring school performance (World Bank, 1984).

The New Order government did respond to such external pressures. Just as in the economic sector, where the New Order garnered institutional legitimacy by introducing a number of liberal economic policies, so did it in education. Since 1986, the central government has initiated some pilot projects dealing with the local content curriculum policy, which granted primary and junior secondary schools some degree of autonomy to design their own curriculum. The policy was nationally implemented in 1994 and the government allocated 20% of total instructional hours to locally developed subject matter (Bjork, 2005). In 1993, the MoEC also started the 'link and match' policy for senior secondary and higher education. This policy was more closely related to the pressures of the global market because it allowed the direct involvement of the private sector into school policymaking. For senior secondary schools, the policy required cooperation between vocational schools and business, industry and various professional associations at the planning, implementation and evaluation stages of the curriculum. In 1995, no fewer than 5000 corporations were involved in this system by becoming training centres, offering apprenticeship and providing assistance in curriculum development (Djojonegoro, 1996).

However, neither economic liberalisation nor school decentralisation did alter the centralised political decision-making structure. The New Order decoupled the liberal and decentralisation policies from the political structure to retain the regime's domination. As Robison (1988) notes, rather than creating a competitive market environment, the neoliberal economic reforms resulted in extending the practice of patronage capitalism, or crony capitalism, where bureaucrats became patrons for their capitalist clients who sought government business licences. Despite some initial efforts for decentralisation, in 1989, the New Order issued the new law of the national education system through which the MoEC regained almost all responsibilities that previously rested in the (MoHA-controlled) local bureaucracies. In his study on local responses to the Local Content Curriculum (LCC) policy, Bjork contends that the deeply institutionalised 'civil service culture' on the schoolteachers' side and the entrenched centralist mentality on the central officials' side were some of the contributing factors to the policy's ineffectiveness (Bjork, 2005). To

this, I can add that both factors emerged from the unchanged centralised structure itself.

Despite some resistance, the adoption of LCC and the link and match policies shows that global pressure did have an effect on changing some centralist practices in education governance. That these reforms happened during the 1990s were closely related to the changing political environment during that period. Some internal developments, particularly regarding issues of democracy and human rights, which put the New Order regime under criticism from its own supporters, gradually tarnished its image in the eyes of global communities as well. I shall describe these developments later in this chapter, but here I shall show that, in this period, the global pressure for decentralisation became more coercive than normative. The decrease in the regime's internal popularity had otherwise strengthened the 'coercive stand' of the global isomorphic actors. We can see this when assessing two of the World Bank's documents on the textbook project loans and the report on the Indonesian education crisis.

Like many developing countries, textbook production in Indonesia used to be highly centralised (Heyneman et al., 1981). Leigh (1991) argues that the centralised control over school textbooks in Indonesia was essential for the New Order because it helped the regime promote national unity and legitimise its rule. The MoEC controlled textbook production from design to distribution. The Jakarta-based government printing and publishing office, Balai Pustaka, handled alone the massive volume of book printing. Private sector firms were involved in developing and publishing non-core course curricular materials only after they won a contract through the government bidding scheme and met the assessment criteria (Theisen et al., 1990). This centralisation had created problems: a textbook could take four years until it was published, and there were production inefficiencies and ineffective distribution, particularly for remote and isolated areas (Theisen, et al., 1990; World Bank, 1995). The Bank, with UNESCO assistance, launched three textbook projects in 1973, 1982 and 1995 and had encouraged the involvement of private sector printers and publishers in the production of school textbooks. However, it was the latest loan-proposal appraisal report that the pressure for private involvement became stronger:

> In recent years, the private book industry has become more competent and aggressive in their marketing strategies, but the school book market

> is still hampered by time-consuming and, thus, costly Government policies and procedures … The private book industry **must be** allowed to play a major role in the production and provision of schoolbooks. Eventually, all textbooks and other school books **should be** published and distributed by private firms. (World Bank, 1995: 1–3, bolds added)

This project was planned to end in 2001 but in 1997, textbook production was successfully privatised. Since then, private companies play the central role in the school textbook business (Table 4.2).

In August 1997, Indonesia, whose economy was believed to be resilient, despite the monetary crises that affected other Asian countries (Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan), eventually succumbed to the economic crisis. The 1997 crisis was much more dire than the crisis of the 1980s. After struggling for some two months, in October 1997, the New Order government officially called on international institutions to help with its economic problem. The World Bank and its twin organisation, the IMF, and a regional partner, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), were the organisations early involved in this attempt at economic recovery. This left the New Order government no choice but to follow all these international institutions' coercive measures. The IMF, for instance, forced the government to accept a number of policies as conditions of their financial assistance, conditions such as the adoption of tighter fiscal measures,

Table 4.2 Textbook production policy before and after 1997

Activities	*Before*			*After*		
	G	*P*	*S*	*G*	*P*	*S*
Draft preparation	✓				✓	
Draft assessment	✓			✓		
Publication and printing	✓	✓			✓	
Marketing					✓	
Book selection						✓
Book purchase						✓
Distribution to schools		✓			✓	
Book use			✓			✓
Supervision	✓			✓		
Funding	✓			✓	✓	✓

G = Government, P = Private publishers, S = Schools
Source (Sitepu, 2005)

the abolition of state monopolies in agricultural products, tariff reduction and the liquidation of under-performing banks (Robison & Rosser, 1998). The number of international donors then proliferated and, as Edi and Setianingtias (2007) recorded, in the period from 2000 to 2005, there were twenty-two international donors involved in the Indonesian governance reforms: eight multilaterals, eleven bilateral organisations and three NGOs.

In the education sector, internationally accepted measures for deregulation mostly came from the World Bank. The Bank was particularly concerned to mitigate the crisis' effects on school enrolments. The Bank sponsored the government's social safety-net programs, among which were those that provided scholarships and block grants. As Jones and Hagul (2001) recounted, the enrolment rates before and after the crisis did show some falls, but they were easily remedied, thanks to this World Bank program (see Table 4.3).

In September 1998, the World Bank published its report, *Education in Indonesia: from crisis to recovery*. The report was the revised version of the earlier report, *Indonesia: suggested priorities for education*, which was published in August 1997, the same month as the country was first affected by the Asian monetary crisis. This report was the most important source of pressure for the implementation of Indonesia's educational decentralisation. It showed that the structure of Indonesian education governance was no longer reliable to run the education system and it therefore lost its legitimacy. The structural problem of basic education (primary and junior secondary schools), the Bank believed, stemmed from its highly convoluted bureaucracy. This bureaucracy was characterised by four elements: first, the complexity of organisational structure (more than one government department had authority over education matters for primary schools); second, the overly centralised administration of junior secondary schools, where every issue needed approval from Jakarta; third, the strict and fragmented budgeting mechanism where planning and funding allocations were made in stages that involved strict bureaucratic structures; and fourth, less effective school management because very limited autonomy was given to public school principals (World Bank, 1998a). As with senior secondary education, the Bank contended that the lack of response to market demand was its crucial problem. This problem was exacerbated by inefficient investment and inflexible management (World Bank, 1998a).

Table 4.3 Age-specific enrolment rates by expenditure Quintile before the crisis (1996–1997), During the first year of crisis (1997–1998), and after the social safety net intervention (1998–1999)(per cent)

Age and quintile	*School years*		
	1996–1997	*1997–1998*	*1998–1999*
5–6 years	22.5	22.2	21.2
Poorest	16.7	16.0	16.4
Second	20.4	20.9	19.2
Third	23.1	22.4	20.9
Fourth	25.8	25.5	24.6
Richest	31.0	31.1	28.6
7–12 years	95.3	95.0	95.3
Poorest	91.9	91.5	92.1
Second	95.2	94.8	94.8
Third	96.1	96.0	96.1
Fourth	97.2	96.7	97.4
Richest	97.8	97.9	98.0
13–15 years	77.5	77.1	79.0
Poorest	65.6	66.3	68.7
Second	74.7	74.0	76.7
Third	79.7	79.2	80.5
Fourth	83.4	82.6	85.0
Richest	87.5	87.1	87.6
16–18 years	48.6	49.2	51.1
Poorest	32.2	31.5	34.9
Second	42.6	42.1	45.2
Third	49.4	49.9	52.9
Fourth	56.3	57.9	58.9
Richest	62.4	68.7	64.2

Source (Jones & Hagul, 2001: 217)

The Bank had suggestions for addressing these governance problems. For the basic education problems, the Bank called its recommendation an 'institutional arrangement and decentralisation in basic education'. It is at this basic educational level that decentralisation terminology is extensively employed. The recommendation was that the MoEC should limit its authority to curriculum and assessment, and the other responsibilities go to local district governments. In addition, school principals should be given a degree of autonomy, and parents and the community should be involved in education management. The recommendations are summarised in Table 4.4.

However, the term 'decentralisation' was never used in discussing post-basic education. Even though it suggested increasing school autonomy,

the Bank tended to put senior secondary schools under central government control. If the decentralisation solution was to be attached to the senior secondary school issue, so it must be related to privatisation. According to the Bank, the business of post-basic education should be greatly devolved to the private sector. The government had to put more focus and investment on the achievement of universal basic education and

Table 4.4 Summary of the World Bank recommendations on institutional arrangements and decentralisation in basic education

Policy changes	*Implementation steps*
A. Redefining responsibilities over the long term	
Reassign functions so that responsibilities at the junior secondary level would be the same as at the primary level, so the structure of basic education would be streamlined	• Consolidate and shift responsibility for basic education to local government. Virtually all functions would be carried out by the dinas (local education office), school, or school cluster: all reporting to the bupati (district head) • MoEC to continue its responsibility for curriculum, testing, and assessment and evaluation
B. Building institutional capacity	
	• Facilitate the secondment of qualified MoEC staff to fill key roles in local agencies. Develop detailed arrangements and incentives to encourage such secondment and clarify career paths and re-entry/promotion criteria • Strengthen capacity of line ministries (MoEC and MoRA) to carry out quality control and monitoring and evaluation of programs implemented by local government
C. Fostering greater autonomy with accountability in school management	
• Institute improved mechanisms for selecting principals and for rewarding good ones and replacing weak ones • Develop modular training programs for principals where specific deficiencies in management skills exist in light of their new responsibilities and increased autonomy in a decentralised structure	• Grant greater autonomy to school principals in deciding on resource use and developing school-based strategies in line with local conditions
D. Introducing funding mechanisms that promote equity and efficiency	

(continued)

Table 4.4 (continued)

Policy changes	*Implementation steps*
• Develop funding mechanisms that promote efficiency and equity and that balance autonomy and accountability • Over time, as local administrators gain experience working with performance-based grants, introduce a funding mechanism of unrestricted grants to kabupaten based on number of students enrolled • Over time, as schools, communities and administrators gain experience with use of block grants, channel more funds directly to schools on a matching basis	• Implement performance-based grants to districts and/or schools • Increase the role of the community and parents in diagnosing education problems, following models already developed in Indonesia such as COPLANER

Source (World Bank, 1998a: xx)

reduce its spending as much as possible on senior secondary and higher education. The more that private institutions were involved, the more efficient would be the government's budget. In addition, the involvement of the private sector would more easily facilitate the instituting of a strong alliance between education, the labour market and industry, so that a curriculum more responsive to economic and commercial needs could be developed (World Bank, 1998a).

From the National Crisis of Legitimacy to International Delegitimation

Barker (1991: 11) defines state legitimacy as 'the belief in the rightfulness of a state in its authority to issue commands, so that the commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed to have moral authority'. The New Order state and its practices had been institutionalised, and for three decades, it was known for its centralist and authoritarian character. However, the social and political changes developing in the 1990s progressively corroded the regime's legitimacy. The 1990s was a period when external and internal pressures to the centralised regime came to a head. Democratisation movements that swept up neighbouring regions, such as the Philippines,

South Korea and Taiwan in the late 1980s, added new external pressure to the centralist authoritarian regime. Since then, discourses on *demokrasi* (democracy), *keterbukaan* (openness) and *hak asasi manusia* (human rights) had become standard themes of the regime's critics (Aspinall, 1996). People were becoming aware that the state was not organised ideally. To all of these developments, the New Order responded with repression. During that period, the regime closed 16 mass media organisations and arrested and detained many pro-democracy activists.

The other critical challenge to the New Order's legitimacy was the massive discontent in the provinces, which was generally caused by the regional discrepancies. The major reason for these discrepancies dated back to the regime's centralised economic policy that made the island of Java, where the national capital of Jakarta is located, the pivot of major economic activities. It was reported that, from a total of 4696 investment projects during the period 1968 to 1982, 3113 (66.3%) were in Java and the rest were in the other islands. Most of the investment projects in the other areas were related to natural resource exploitation, such as mining, logging and plantations, but projects in Java were mostly related to infrastructure development and the production of import substitution goods (Ramli, 2005). The organisation of natural resource exploitation was by the Jakarta-based ministry (law 11 of 1967), and the regions often felt that they only served Jakarta as 'dairy cattle' with only small benefits in return (Trajano, 2010). The centralised development policies forced massive migration to Java, leaving the outer islands with a population loss. All of these created the vast developmental disparity between Java and other islands (see Table 4.5).

The central–regional development differential had led to the formation of several regional anti-Jakarta movements. Aceh, Papua and East Timor were areas where separatist movements were strongest. Aceh and Papua were two of four prominent provinces with the largest mining industries. Later, in the late 1990s, separatist aspirations also appeared in other 'mining' regions, such as Riau, East Kalimantan and South Maluku. Some separatist movements, particularly those of Aceh, East Timor and Papua, had started in the 1960s and 1970s, but the regime's repressive treatment of them drew more international attention in the 1990s. In 1993, Amnesty International reported that 2000 to 10,000 people had been killed in Aceh during the military operations from 1990 to 1992 (Ross, 2005). The New Order regime was also in the international spotlight when two East Timorese separatist leaders, José Ramos-Horta and the

Table 4.5 Regional distribution of GDP and population (%), 1996

Region	*GDP*	*Population*
Jakarta	16.0	4.7
Java–Bali	45.5	55.4
Mining four[a]	14.1	6.3
Sumatera	13.7	17.1
Kalimantan	4.1	4.2
Sulawesi	4.3	7.1
Eastern islands[b]	2.3	5.2
Indonesia	100	100

Source (Booth, 2000)
[a]Provinces of Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan and Papua
[b]Provinces of West and East Nusa Tenggara, East Timor and Maluku

Roman Catholic bishop, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996.

All these developments were a severe challenge to the New Order's legitimacy and when the unforeseen 1997 Asian financial crisis shook the regime's economic structure, the deinstitutionalisation process of the New Order centralist regime was accomplished. The state was seen to be technically dysfunctional because it failed to control its economy. The local currency, the rupiah, was continuously depreciating against the US dollar, from around 2000 rising to 16,000 to the dollar. Repayments of billions of dollars of external debts were overdue with very little foreign exchange reserves available. Inflation skyrocketed and prices rose beyond people's reach. The social distrust of the regime and its institutional order was widespread. Demonstrations took place all over the country, the demonstrators chanting only one word, *reformasi* (reform). A number of ethnic conflicts broke out followed by widespread destruction of property. The culmination of social unrest was the 12 to 15 May riots in Jakarta in which thousands of people flooded the city and took part in uncontrolled destruction. The rioters plundered Chinese businesses and attacked their owners.

Eventually, the regime lost its political legitimacy, and its supporters were routed. On 20 May 1998, fourteen of Suharto's ministers resigned: this left no choice but for the president to resign, which he did the following day. As quoted by one of his loyalists, Fuad Bawazier, the president made the decision because, as he said, 'I felt the public no longer trusted me and some of my ministers no longer wanted to help me' (CNN Indonesia, 2015).

Decentralisation and the Central Government Response to the Pressure

Decentralisation as a Compensatory Legitimation

The fall of Suharto facilitated the arrival of a new era, the era of *Reformasi*, when all institutions were co-opted to restore legitimacy. Indeed, the environmental setting for *Reformasi* was anything but the New Order's centralist and authoritarian structure. Thousands of narratives from mass demonstrations, public seminars, academic publications, mass media op-eds, even casual conversations in cafes, were dominated by one theme: democracy (Schwarz, 1999). Millions of dollars of foreign funds went to local NGOs for the democratisation campaign (Hadiwinata, 2003). International loans to help the government restructure the economy also encouraged conditions for the government to enable democratic and transparent governance (Grenville, 2004).

The situation left no choice for the new government but to conform to the new political environment. Suharto's successor, his former loyalist and vice-president, BJ Habibie, soon showed his government's commitment to change by issuing a number of strategic policies to promote democratic institutions. Habibie needed to prove that his government was not intending to prolong his former political patron's regime. In early 1999, he issued three fundamental regulations: on political parties (law 2 of 1999), on elections (law 3 of 1999) and on parliamentary arrangements (law 5 of 1999). These regulations enabled the establishment of political parties, assured transparent elections and empowered the parliament. Habibie also made himself transitional president and reduced his presidential term from the remaining four years to a year and a half, that is, until the next election. The campaign for democracy resumed. In October 1999, the parliament started more fundamental constitutional amendments, which were completed in 2002. In 2000, a parliamentary joint session (MPR) enacted laws to separate the administration of the police force from the army and to reduce the political roles of both organisations. The complete abolition of military representation in the parliament came later, in 2004.

With democracy being offered to replace the previous authoritarian practices, a more fundamental question arose: how would the new democracy deal with the threat of secession? Bertrand (2004) argues that another fundamental problem following the institutional transformation

in Indonesia was the renegotiation of the previously established national model. Thus, soon after the reform, this involved such questions as the role of Islam in political institutions, the relative importance of the central and the regional governments, the access to and representation of ethnic groups in the state's institutions and the rights to local resources (Bertrand, 2004). The challenge for the new democratic arrangement was how to ensure these aspirations would not lead to another crisis of legitimacy.

Indonesia was unfortunate because, in addition to the continuing separatist aspirations in East Timor, Papua and Aceh, such renegotiations had to contend with the deadly ethnic conflicts in the eastern regions of the country: Maluku, Central Sulawesi and in East and Central Kalimantan. These conflicts centred on competition for resources between the natives of the regions and immigrants. Those conflicts were unresolved for more than a decade. They revealed a state weakened after the dismantling of military power in the new democratic arrangement. Unlike Suharto's repressive but effective model, the supply of civilian security units from Jakarta was not adequate to affect a resolution. The reduced authority of the state was also shown when, in May 1999, President Habibie arranged for a referendum to determine the status of East Timor. The voting took place on 30 August 1999; only 21.5% of the votes were for accepting the Indonesian government's proposal of special autonomy. This result initiated the separation of East Timor from Indonesia (Schulze, 2001).

Hence, all these regional developments increased the urgency to be rid of the aims, methods and ambitions of the New Order's centralist policies. In May 1999, President Habibie enacted two decentralisation laws that gave autonomy to provincial, district and municipal governments with greater autonomy for the latter two: law 22 of 1999 on local governance and law 25 of 1999 on central–local government fiscal balance. The significant degree of district and municipal autonomy reflects the way that the law 22 of 1999 provided more liberty for local parliaments to select regents and mayors, requiring neither provincial nor central government approval. But the selection of provincial governors is different; the provincial legislatures still must consult the president (GoI, 1999b). Another decentralisation law, dealing with central–regional finances, rearranged the allocation of local revenue, particularly taking into account the availability of local natural resources. Except for oil and gas, local governments are allowed a 60–80% share from the benefits of their natural resource

exploitation (GoI, 1999a). This is different from the previous arrangement in which the central government took a greater share of the revenue from the exploitation of natural resources in all regions.

The laws, however, had drawn criticism from those NGOs and political parties that preferred federalism or advocated that more autonomy be devolved to the provinces. Prominent politicians, like Amien Rais and Yusril Ihza Mahendra, indicated their preference for provincial autonomy. However, the dominant Golkar party and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan [PDI-P]) were reluctant to accept the idea, they claimed that it was counter to the nature of the unitary system of the state (Ferrazzi, 2000). The pressure for federalism escalated when Habibie was succeeded by Abdurrahman Wahid. Early in Wahid's term, the East Kalimantan legislature sent their official lobbyists to the national parliament to promote federalism. Legislators from South Sulawesi also issued a proposal for federalism to negotiate with local student demonstrators in their demands for independence. The same proposal also came from Riau province. Nevertheless, those supporting either district or provincial autonomy were arguing that their respective ideas be adopted to prevent separatist aspirations and to protect national unity. Prominent social activist, Romo Mangunwijaya, claimed that federalism was favoured by Mohammad Hatta, Soekarno's partner in declaring independence and was needed to discourage civil unrest. Ryaas Rasyid, the main drafter of the decentralisation law, argued that giving the provinces greater autonomy would make it easier for them to consolidate and organise separatism, something that the districts could not possibly do (Ferrazzi, 2000).

The decentralisation policy had proven to be successful in blocking separatist efforts. Until recently, East Timor was the only province to split from the Indonesian Republic. Special treatment, however, was given to two other provinces with historic separatist aspirations: Aceh and Papua. In 2001, the national legislature passed, and the central government promulgated two different laws on special autonomy: one for Papua, the other for Aceh. Unlike other provinces, Aceh and Papua were granted provincial autonomy. The law was amended in 2006 for Aceh after the Helsinki agreement, and in 2008 for Papua, after the establishment of the new province of West Papua.

The Task Force for Education Reform

The World Bank report and the promulgation of the decentralisation law became an institutional pressure for the education sector's governance arrangement. The inclusion of education management as part of the authority transferred to the local district government was in line with the World Bank's recommendation. However, there was no exact understanding of how this school management would look like in the new decentralised structure. The law itself would be effectively implemented in 2001, so there were still two years to prepare. A few months after the publication of the 1998 World Bank report, the central government commissioned what they called *Kelompok Kerja untuk Reformasi Pendidikan* (Task Force for Education Reform [TFER]). The task force comprised a great many professionals: university academics, education specialists and high-ranking policymakers. The Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of National Planning became its sponsoring organisations.[2] However, all task force activities were jointly funded by the Indonesian government, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The TFER was expected to develop more comprehensive recommendations for Indonesia's education reform (Jalal & Supriadi, 2001). In 1999 and 2000, the TFER held two national conferences to garner more inputs from larger professional communities and then followed with several meetings to formulate recommendations. The first conference, 'Indonesian Education: Overcoming the Crisis, Calling to the Reform' was in February 1999; the second, 'Education Reform in the Context of Local Autonomy', was one year later, in July 2000.

If we look at the TFER documents compiled by Jalal and Supriadi (2001), it appears that all the TFER activities were to respond officially

[2] As education came to be decentralised, in 1999, the Wahid government changed the department's name from the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) to the Ministry of National Education (MoNE). This was to differentiate the central education department from the regional education offices. Another reason for the change was President Wahid's own philosophical position; he understood that culture is too universal to be technically administered by a particular bureaucratic organisation. After this change, the Directorate General of Culture was then removed from the Ministry of Education and, later, under the Megawati government, was subsumed under the Ministry of Tourism. However, in 2011, President Yudhoyono restored the Directorate General of Culture to be part of the central Education Department and the Ministry was officially renamed its old label: the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC). The book uses MoEC in all contexts because the study was conducted after 2011.

and to endorse the World Bank's recommendations. Their task was to find a way those recommendations could be adjusted to the new decentralised structure. The TFER ratified the World Bank strategy to fully devolve the administration of basic education to the local governments. It meant that the jurisdiction of primary schools and junior secondary schools would be transferred to the district and municipal governments. The committee also designed a strategy to reach that goal, which involved the merger of local offices of the (central government) Department of Education and local government education offices; and the control of the merged offices would be by the local government. Under the direction of local government, a new organisation would be also founded, to be known as the Board of Education Research and Consultation, whose members would consist of more professionals that are independent. The board would provide the local education offices with professional support on policy research as well as recording the aspirations of the public on education matters. This kind of independent institution is seen to be important, given that many local career bureaucrats assigned to run the local education offices, without being supervised by the central MoEC, were believed to lack technical capability. The design of this decentralisation framework, however, still left room for the central government's involvement, particularly in curricular development and guideline setting.

In addition, the TFER also adopted the World Bank's recommendation to provide more autonomy to schools through the school-based management (SBM) program. The TFER document states that 'educational decentralisation would eventually disembogue into SBM' (Jalal & Supriadi, 2001: 141). The SBM was designed to organise community participation in school management in the form of school committees. In the long run, such community participation was hoped to reduce public school reliance on government funding, particularly from the central government. And, once full autonomy was achieved, the school committee would be given a greater role in school governance, such as appointing principals, evaluating teacher performance, overseeing finance management and taking part in curriculum development. However, given the diverse characteristics of schools and their environments, SBM was to be gradually implemented. According to TFER, Indonesian schools can be classified into developed (*maju*), average (*sedang*) and less developed (*kurang maju*). The developed schools were usually in a supportive environment, such as a highly educated community whose degree of

participation is presumed to be high and with a well-funded local government that is less reliant for revenue from the central government. Similar logic applies to the average and less-developed schools. Therefore, the TFER classified three models of SBM implementation: minimum, medium and full.

There were some other ideas developing during the TFER discussions with regard to decentralisation, for example, the adoption of American-style school boards. The organisations would consist of independent members politically appointed by the local community. The school committees were to operate at individual schools, the school boards would supervise a number of schools in an area. Responsibilities of this organisation range from preparing selection criteria for teachers and students; selecting independent institutions to conduct school performance audits; and deciding the subsidy allocation to schools and its recipients (Gardiner, 2000).

The decentralisation policy, however, was designed to be initiated with a transition period in which the ministry of education would still provide supervision to those new local education offices until the time when full decentralisation would be implemented. As such, the SBM implementation was to be gradual; in short, there would be medium and long-term implementation. All of these decentralisation strategies were intended to apply to basic education (primary and junior secondary school). As with the senior secondary education, the focus was on how to make their curriculum suited to the needs of the labour market. To address the issue of inequality, the TFER adopted the World Bank suggestion of keeping the investment priority to basic education and increasing parent and community participation in financing secondary education by continuing the scholarship assistance for the poor (Jalal & Supriadi, 2001: 109).

Managing the Institutional Contradiction

Decentralisation and the Rise of Local States

Regional decentralisation was effectively implemented in January 2001. Following the decentralisation, district governments were authorised to take all administrative responsibilities, except in six areas: foreign policy, defence and security, the justice system, monetary and fiscal matters, religion and other responsibilities that are subject to the national interest. The local government responsibilities comprised public works, health,

education and culture, agriculture, transport, trade and industry, investment, environment, land, cooperation and manpower (GoI, 1999b). The Weberian theory of the state says that 'a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (Weber, 2009: 77). From this perspective, it appears that although the new local governments own the legitimate source of territorial claim (land, agriculture and environment), the source of physical force, which is defence and security, remains centralised.

However, as civilisation develops and sociological theories advance, physical force is no longer seen as the only means of power today. For example, Dahl (1957) conceptualises 'determination of behaviour', Bacharach and Lawler (1976) claim 'offensive and defensive tactics to manipulate outcomes', Foucault (1980) theorises 'knowledge' and Bourdieu (2011) offers 'the accumulation of capital' as the means of power. The list of decentralised responsibilities did provide the local governments with enough capacity to accumulate capital (economic, cultural and symbolic), create different bureaucratic behaviours away from the central agenda and pose resistance to manipulative central influence. For the local governments, decentralisation was a celebration. In 2001, hundreds of regional by-laws were issued to initiate bureaucratic consolidation: the dissolution of central government department offices in localities by merging them with local offices. In the education sector, it meant the closing of 27 provincial offices and 306 district offices of the central MoEC. All public school teachers had their employment status transferred to district and municipal governments.

The expansion of local states was also evident in the way these new local governments responded to the democratisation agenda. As Hadiz (2004: 711) witnessed in his fieldwork in North Sumatera and East Java in the early days of decentralisation, the process of democratisation and decentralisation in Indonesia 'has been characterised by the rise of new patterns of highly diffuse and decentralised corruption, rule by predatory local officials, the rise of money politics and the consolidation of political gangsterism'. Democratic procedures were co-opted by the entrenched interests of local patronage. He also reported that many local business people complained because the local government started imposing heavy levies on the ground that 'they [business people] have to give back to society some of the profits they have enjoyed' (Hadiz, 2004: 709).

However, this radical decentralisation raised serious concerns among international communities. It was reported that major donor institutions,

namely the IMF, USAID and the World Bank, expressed their concern about the extensive local district autonomy. The IMF was worried about the potential expansion of Indonesia's debt if the localities were not exempted from borrowing separately from the central government (Silver, 2003). USAID suggested amending the law to give more autonomy to provincial rather than district governments, though knowing that it would provoke resistance from district regents and mayors (Hadiz, 2004). Meanwhile, the World Bank was concerned with the absence of detailed guidelines and called for more reviews. The World Bank described its impression as follows:

> The ministry is still under-prepared for decentralization and is uncertain about how to execute obligations determined by law 22. Whether or not the degree of initial ministry inaction reflected a 'digging-in' against and resistance to decentralization, an unawareness of what is 'around the corner' in terms of the turmoil that decentralization may cause, or any other factor is unclear. (World Bank, 2001: 4)

The central government did attempt to respond to such mixed reactions to decentralisation. In January 2002, only one year after the decentralisation implementation, a proposal to revise the decentralisation law was made by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Among the most important provisions in this proposal was an article that gives the president the power to dissolve a regional legislature and another provision for withdrawal of regional powers if a region fails to perform its obligatory functions (King, 2004). However, it was difficult to set new limitations once the freedom has been given. The revised draft provoked local resistance and was attacked as an attempt to recentralise and a return to authoritarianism. The central government then decided to postpone the revision until the local resistance settled down (King, 2004).

Local State-Based Decentralisation Versus School-Community-Based Decentralisation

Different responses to the early implementation of decentralisation reflected the greater contradiction of institutional logics brought by the external and internal pressures for decentralisation. On one hand, the internal pressure arose from the local élite's discontent with the Jakarta-centred governance and aspired to a more local state-oriented

decentralisation. The euphoria that followed regional decentralisation has taken the implementation of educational decentralisation for granted. It was seen as a 'gift' from the political process, despite many reform programs being planned. By then district and municipal governments held unchallenged control over all school levels, including senior secondary schools whose decentralisation was not planned for. In the previous design, secondary and higher education were to have remained centralised because they prepared students for tough competition in the labour market, and local governments were reputed to lack the technical capacity to do this. All was justified because, despite the massive structural change, there was no regulatory guide to show how this new arrangement would fit into the current education system, which still referred to the central government 1989 education law.

Rather than democratisation, this local state-oriented decentralisation tends to lean towards the consolidation of local bureaucracies. In this sense, the education sector has a potential to be co-opted in two ways: structural and cultural. First, political decentralisation has placed education and school personnel (principals, teachers and administrative staff) in the structure of the local district government bureaucracy, so that local government élites would strive to retain their new privileges in controlling their new asset. Second, as some studies have shown (e.g. Bjork, 2005; Chang et al., 2013; Sumintono, 2006), Indonesian teachers have a long, deep-seated self-image drawn from a civil service patrimonial culture rather than professional tradition. This established culture becomes fertile ground for the growth of local bureaucratic intervention.

On the other hand, the external institutional pressure, whose ideas were crystallised in the World Bank report and the TFER recommendations, tended to the more liberal democratic platform of decentralisation where schools are empowered and the state intervention at all levels is regulated. The district-level decentralisation was also part of the plan but only for the district government to facilitate school autonomy and community participation. International institutions were worried that excessive power rested in the hands of local district governments and wished the central government to regulate some limitations (Blunt et al., 2012; World Bank, 2003). The 2001, a World Bank document, titled 'Strengthening local education capacity', explicates that Indonesia's educational decentralisation should be oriented to

> ... (i) strengthening districts' capacity to plan, budget, manage and monitor basic education programs and to support school-based management; (ii) strengthening and supporting schools' capacities to plan, budget and monitor school improvement; and (iii) enhancing the role of the community in school governance. (World Bank, 2001: 5–6)

The legal basis of educational decentralisation had been introduced earlier in 2000 when the government issued the law on national development programs for the period 2000–2004 (GoI, 2000). It says that educational decentralisation would involve:

> The realisation of school/community-based management by introducing the concept and initiating the establishment of a School Board in each district/municipality as well as the empowerment or establishment of School Committees in all schools. (GoI, 2000)

Yet, the absence of an implementing guideline for this provision when political decentralisation started in 2001 allowed the idea of school-based decentralisation to be overlooked.

Managing the Contradiction

Thornton et al. (2012) suggest that the institutional contradiction would lead to either transformational or developmental changes. The former takes on one of three strategies (replacement, blending and segregation); the latter adopts one of four strategies (assimilation, elaboration, expansion and contraction). I argue that in the case of Indonesian educational decentralisation, the central government has adopted the assimilation strategy, that is, the incorporation of elements of the less-dominant logic into the more prevalent one (Thornton et al., 2012). In this sense, the local **district-oriented decentralisation** becomes the prevailing logic because it originates from internal aspirations, whereas the school-based decentralisation, which is imported from an external environment, would have its 'practices and symbols made part of the prevalent logic' (Thornton et al., 2012: 165). However, assimilation does not necessarily lead to passive acceptance. Assimilation could also become the strategy of resistance and counter the dominant institution (Thornton et al., 2012).

The Indonesian government had to maintain its legitimacy by allowing the two contradictory institutional logics to coexist as an integrated

decentralisation structure. When decentralisation was first implemented in 2001, the education governance was caught up by the local state-oriented decentralisation system. This means that district governments along with their attached political structure (executive and legislative) became the only local education authority that controls basic and secondary education. The legitimate justification of this came not from educational regulations but from the 1999 decentralisation law. This was mainly because of the absence of technical guidelines that defined the real intention and design of educational decentralisation. When the central officials realised the problem, it was already too late. A former senior official of the MoEC and the TFER initiator explained the situation.

> At first, I did not expect that the decentralisation could be realised. But, as the reform happened, it turned out that it did happen and was too overwhelming. The frameworks were yet to be set up, but everything had been suddenly assigned [to the districts]. At that time, we began to falter. The central government was hesitant in designing the rules. The freedom has already been given and it is no longer easy to establish any limitations … (Interview, Former MoEC vice-minister, 29 January 2015)

Therefore, rather than creating limitations to the district power on education, the ministry opted to legitimate the centrality of the district government role in education. Later, in 2003, the new education system law officially endorsed this principle. However, to obtain the external legitimacy, the ministry also promoted the school and community-based decentralisation by adopting symbols and practices popularly used in educationally decentralised countries: school-based management and school boards. After an intensive campaign in 2001, in April 2002, MoEC issued ministerial decree 044/u/2002 on education boards and school committees. The ministry developed and upgraded the regulation later, in 2007 and in 2010. The regulation and its revisions were provided to balance district powers in education but without necessarily extending its given authority. The result is a rather different structural form of community and school decentralisation from what had been planned by the TFER.

Unlike similar organisations in traditionally decentralised societies like the USA and Canada, where education board members are democratically elected and the organisation has more control over education resources (Brown, 1990), members of Indonesian education boards are

selected by a government-appointed committee for their particular technical and political qualifications. And, unlike the initial TFER proposal that equipped the organisation with some decision-making powers, the current education boards have a non-binding, consultative function only. They do not have control over schools in their localities, nor may they impose any policy initiative. Rather, they are set to be the government's 'partners' at every administrative level. They serve as independent organisations to collect and to pool thoughts and aspirations in education matters that may then be channelled to the government or the parliament at respective administrative levels. They may propose or recommend policies, but the central or local governments are not bound to implement them. This form of education board was the best the central government could set up to complement the school-based and local state-oriented decentralisation structure. Giving more decision-making power to the education boards would be resisted by local governments.

As such, the vocabulary of school-based management is also introduced with school committees becoming the symbol of autonomy and participation. The school-based management (SBM) policy allows schools to manage some administrative tasks independently, such as planning school programs, setting school budgets, creating extra-curricular activities and evaluating staff performance. In executing this role, school principals and teachers are assisted by the school committee. The democratic kernel of the school committee is that they were designed primarily to represent parents. But, school committees may also include other representatives: teachers, government officials, business organisations, local community leaders and education specialists (GoI, 2010; MoEC, 2002). Yet, to adjust to the district autonomy, the role of school committees was made slightly different from what was designed before. According to the earlier design, for instance, a school committee might have had more influence and authority in the long term for, *inter alia*, hiring teachers and nominating principals (Jalal & Supriadi, 2001). In this current structure, the recruitment of permanent staff and the appointment of principals remains under the local government authority.

The design of school and community-based decentralisation structures has raised criticisms among Indonesian education professionals. One respected education professor and former chair of the Indonesian education scholar association (Ikatan Sarjana Pendidikan Indonesia) whom I interviewed in Jakarta said that an education board is nothing more than another name for the New Order's education consultative council

(Majelis Pertimbangan Pendidikan), which gave non-binding advice only. Because of their lack of decision-making power, many education boards are ineffectual. He said that an organisation of national education boards has not been formed because the MoEC officials themselves know that such a board would not have any substantial influence on education. With regard to school committees, he believed from the beginning that school committees could not work effectively in most Indonesian schools, which are predominantly rural. Either parents or community leaders who become school committee members would be patronised by school bureaucrats because they are not well educated (Interview, Soedijarto, 14 January 2014).

Another former senior official of MoEC and the president of a prominent teacher-training university said that despite their more extended role, school committees could not escape the shadow of their predecessor, BP3. BP3 is the Indonesian abbreviation for Board of Education Assistance, whose members comprise parents and teachers. Despite its formal role to bridge school-community-parents relations, BP3s had the pragmatic task of legitimising and collecting school fees (Kristiansen & Pratikno, 2006). He said that he had observed that many school committees behave as the BP3s did, that is, as fundraisers. He added:

> Our school committees are established only for the sake of fulfilling the required organisational structure. They function more as a parent representative bodies to validate this and that. Not many engage in more substantial matters. (Interview, Academic and former MoEC senior officer, 13 February 2015)

Nevertheless, as the former vice-minister argued, the central government had more strategic reasons for establishing the structure beyond the issue of technical contribution to education. He said that education boards and school committees were to contain the potential of local bureaucratic intervention. He said that for the sake of constructive education policy, education boards should play a balancing role and mediate the relations between the bureaucracy and schools.

> We hoped that local education boards would serve as the anchor for school committees. If there are frictions between schools and school committees or if there are problems between schools along with their school committees and the Dinas bureaucracy, they can go to the education board seeking

> backup … (But) the education board can also collaborate with the local government to endorse what is best from the legislative agendas for education … Or if the government has no initiative, it (may) collaborate with the local parliament to push the government (to come up with better policy) … So, in this triangle it should be more dynamic. (Interview, Former MoEC vice-minister, 29 January 2015)

As such, the inclusion of various elements into school committees was hoped to reinforce the school-based decentralisation structure against local bureaucratic interference. The former vice-minister of education admitted:

> We imagined that the SBM would become an umbrella or a kind of shield to prevent local bureaucratic intervention from being too deep into the school. With SBM, apart from [having a] good budget plan and its spending for maximum learning quality purposes, [we also hoped that] professional dialogues could be strengthened in the school … We hoped that the existing [local bureaucratic] influences could be tamed because the school already has a strong constellation. (Interview, Former MoEC vice-minister, 29 January 2015)

Having maintained the two logics of educational decentralisation, the central government has its compensatory legitimacy secured. And, as the problem of institutional legitimacy has been resolved, the next step is to set up the technical guidelines for this new structure that, effectively, is running the whole education governance. However, the concern with the technical strategy would risk the central government's legitimacy. Transferring power to localities has, on the one hand, given the central government a compensatory legitimacy because, for Indonesia, decentralisation was a 'make or break' game. By keeping the distance from decision-making power and giving more autonomy to localities, the central state has survived the legitimacy crisis that threatened its survival. But, on the other hand, decentralisation also means losing the political legitimacy in particular decentralised areas so that any central government's steps to return to influence in those territories must be taken carefully, because it might ignite a challenge to legitimacy. This tension between institutional legitimacy and the demand for technical efficiency is discussed in the next chapter.

Conclusion

Educational decentralisation has come as the result of global institutionalisation. From fewer than ten countries associated with its implementation before the 1970s, educational decentralisation has now become a global norm with almost all nations in the world engaging with it. The process of global institutionalisation of educational decentralisation emerged from the legitimacy crisis of centralised regimes in individual nation-states and the external institutional pressures played by isomorphic actors through coercive, normative and mimetic mechanisms. The most important institutional actors in global education governance are the World Bank, the OECD and UNESCO. The duality of external (global) and internal (local-national) pressure becomes the model that fits the process of the educational decentralisation reform in Indonesia.

In Indonesia, decentralisation had been adopted in education governance from the time of the establishment of the Indonesian nation-state. However, as the World Bank contended in the 1980s, it was not a real decentralisation because the local authorities that ran education were branches of two central ministerial bureaucracies and this system created a highly fragmented and bureaucratised education governance. The global pressure for the adoption of 'real' decentralisation in Indonesia commenced since the late 1970s when the economic crisis affected the severe legitimacy crisis of the centralised system in many countries, and decentralisation emerged as a global panacea. However, the internal legitimacy of the Indonesian centralised regime reached its peak at that time, so that external pressure met no local acceptance. It was in the 1990s, when the centralised regime started to lose its legitimacy due to political and economic crises, that the decentralisation could be fully embraced.

Nevertheless, because of this legitimacy project, educational decentralisation was placed not within the environment of education policy, that is, to meet the technical needs of education, but rather to adjust to the greater institutional order of new political arrangements, the political decentralisation. For the sake of garnering internal and external legitimacy, the central government must embrace this structural reality by subsuming the much awaited and externally adopted plan of school and community-based decentralisation into the local government autonomy framework. The result of this institutional assimilation was an imbalanced structure; the local state overpowering the institutionalised community participation. Even though this decentralised structure has given the

central government its legitimacy, the further question is how this legitimacy could be preserved. When the central government has to go further with more technical intervention to make sure that the decentralised structure can effectively address the real educational problems, another question of legitimacy might arise because of the conflicting interests from this act of intervention. The following chapter will further discuss this problem.

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CHAPTER 5

Manipulating the Institutional Legitimacy: The Centralised Standards in the Decentralised Structure

> Back then, in the early 2000s, I expected that the central ministry would be just a small [organisation] because it has no more left [to control]. In the future, it would be only a place where people are doing research and making policy. But it is not the case now, is it? Even when a school is damaged, the minister reacts … Now they even create a directorate general of teacher, whereas they no longer own the teacher. Teachers belong to the district, don't they? … The central government does not trust the district and the district does not trust the school – Academic and Former MoEC Senior Officer. (Interview, 13 February 2015)

Introduction

The previous chapter explained that Indonesian educational decentralisation was more politically than educationally constructed. The educational decentralisation reform's initial presence as a legitimacy project owed more to political decentralisation than to a concept of a professionally planned education reform. After surviving the legitimacy crisis, however, the central government started tinkering with more technical aspects of education reform. As this ensued, the debates about educational decentralisation became no longer important, and the politicians entrusted every technical detail of decentralisation implementation to be handled by the MoEC. MoEC officials had to create a system of education management that accommodates local differences and, at the same time,

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become globally competitive. However, the decentralised structure must be strongly highlighted here because it was the structure that kept the central state legitimate. For this reason, the central government could not reprise its old paradigm where regional autonomy was seen more as the local 'obligation' to participate in the national development process rather than the local 'right' (Bünte, 2004). Nor could it repeat its old trials of decentralisation where district governments and schools were given the responsibilities but central government structures continued to expand and interfere with local administrations. In other words, the central government needed to preserve its legitimacy by retaining the decentralised structure, but at the same time make its reform agendas address educational problems effectively.

Employing the concept of decoupling, this chapter elaborates the central government's strategies to cope with this dilemma. Through the means–end decoupling, the decentralised structure was reinforced; the central government structure in localities was left as an historical narrative, but the central government's control was restored in a different, non-interventionist way called standardisation. This chapter discusses how the central project of standardisation was justified, organised and enforced in the educational decentralisation framework. In the final part, this chapter also provides an analysis of how the enforcement of the central government's standards gave effect to the arrangement of education nationally and locally. This later analysis also becomes the brief introduction to the two case studies of local governance practices that will be elaborated in Chapters 6 and 7.

The Decoupling Justified

The Discourse of Local Incompetence

In his conceptualisation of compensatory legitimation, Weiler argues that decentralisation is not about giving authority to the local, but about 'appearing to be committed to decentralisation and thus reaping the benefits in legitimation to be derived from that appearance' (Weiler, 1990: 442). In this sense, the government's commitment to decentralisation can be seen from the appearance of the formal structure of its education governance. Formal structure is the official structure of a hierarchy and functions on the basis that any external party can assess the degree of isomorphic pressure—and I would also include the degree of internal

pressure—received by an organisation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In the decentralisation context, the adoption of a legitimate formal structure can be assessed by the extent to which the officially adopted structure reflects the regular decentralisation templates, such as the withdrawal of the central bureaucratic structure from local education management, the transfer of authority to district government, the implementation of school-based management and the establishment of school committees and education boards as new democratic institutions. Only one year after political decentralisation, the formal structure of Indonesian education had adopted these templates. The adoption of the decentralised structure had satisfied local aspirations and freed the country from international spotlight.

Nevertheless, once legitimacy is obtained, the ideal structure does not always translate into practice, but it can always be renegotiated for strategic and practical considerations. In this process, the decentralised structure might remain but the way it is implemented is decoupled from the question of legitimacy, and rather follows the justification of technical efficiency (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Since the early days of decentralisation, the MoEC itself appeared to be unsatisfied with decentralisation because it had discharged many of its previous responsibilities. As the national education regulator, the MoEC saw that the education governance following decentralisation had gone against its primary interest of having coordinated policy. Using the arguments of efficiency and competence, the central government justified the return of its central role in education governance.

As one of the MoEC officials acknowledged, initially, when political decentralisation was introduced and legalised through a new law in 1999 (law 22 of 1999), the central government ministry did not expect that local governments would be autonomous. Given the strong centralist tradition, the central government would, it was thought, naturally remain in control despite decentralisation. Therefore, the MoEC did not rush to amend the centralist 1989 education law. But as the real transfer of power to localities got under way in 2001, MoEC officials realised that they were wrong. They were wrong because it turned out that local governments enjoyed a greater political autonomy with less influence from Jakarta. The MoEC was then worried by the perception that the regional areas were not ready to administer education because of their lack of experience and technical expertise.

MoEC officials played down the capacity of the education Dinas bureaucracy because of its historical background as an administrative organisation that handled clerical jobs only, generally known as 3-M (manpower, materials and money). From administering basic education only, this office is now responsible for all the K–12 education systems. And, because it is subject to the discretion of each local government head, the Dinas personnel are also appointed from among the local career bureaucrats, most of whom have been accustomed to such clerical jobs. This fact concerns the central government the most, particularly with regard to the question of whether the Dinas personnel can be trusted to provide good quality education. For MoEC officials, the quality could be maintained in the past because Kandep (the district branch of the MoEC) and Kanwil (the provincial branch of the MoEC) were present to assist the Dinas with quality assurance. One of the MoEC officials recounted his perception of local education Dinas as follows:

> So, these Dinases, because they used to limitedly handle the 3-M, [I suppose] they know nothing of what quality is … And, this same Dinas, that was also used to manage elementary schools (SD), now have to manage junior (SMP) and senior secondary schools (SMA) … Organising SD is different from SMP and SMA. (Interview, Former MoEC vice-minister, 29 January 2015)

In addition to the problem of local bureaucratic capacity, MoEC officials were also concerned with teacher quality. Until the 1990s, most Indonesian teachers, particularly those teaching in elementary schools, held senior-secondary-school qualifications only. Leaving this situation to be handled by inexperienced local officials would undermine the effort to improve teacher professionalism and put at risk the future quality of education at large. Hence, MoEC officials demanded that local government authority should be limited in this matter. Allowance for central intervention should be provided to guide the way education decentralisation is administered.

Despite those perceived local problems, central government officials were aware that decentralisation would not allow the return of the central interventionist structure. To preserve the legitimacy and at the same time retain control, the central government used the symbolic power of professional-legitimated standardisation. As Brunson and colleagues

(2012: 612) put it, 'standards are instrumental in organising institutional change, as they are a powerful tool for challenging and altering institutionalised behaviour and identities'. In this sense, local governments and schools are left politically self-governing but—for the efficient and professional performance's sake—technically confined by the centrally standardised rules and routines. This standardisation is the way the means–end decoupling strategy works.

The Means–End Decoupling Approach

Bromley and Powell (2012) and Bromley et al. (2013) introduce a more clinical conceptualisation of decoupling. They regard decoupling as a symbolic practice working in either of two ways: symbolic adoption (policy–practice decoupling) and symbolic implementation (means–ends decoupling). The former occurs when the formal structure is ceremonially adopted but neglected in practice; the latter takes place when the formal policy is applied but the outcomes do not reflect the original intent of the policy. However, I reinterpret the policy–practice and means–end decoupling to represent the use of different instruments of control to divert the governing system from the adopted formal structure: one is empiric, the other symbolic.

The policy–practice decoupling occurs when the authority uses its empirical instruments of power—such as the hierarchy and bureaucracy—to impose a contrary practice that does not reflect the formal structure. In the decentralisation context, the decentralised structure is present in the form of local government control or of school-based management, but this new structure is dysfunctional because the central authority retains its former hierarchy to control the education governance. Meanwhile, the means–end decoupling occurs when the authority uses symbolic means of power—such as professional judgement and standardised procedures—to endorse contrary practices. In the context of educational decentralisation, the means–end decoupling occurs when the structure of decentralisation is present and the central hierarchy is dissolved, but the way the decentralised structure delivers is defined by highly standardised procedures of performance control.

In Indonesia's case of decentralisation, the policy–practice decoupling occurred when the central government imposed the local content curriculum policy in the mid-1990s. Despite the new responsibility of

schools, the MoEC, through its district and even sub-district representative offices, inspected and guided the way schools carried out the policy (Bjork, 2005). However, in the context of decentralisation that is being studied here, the means–end decoupling is considered to be more valid because the central government has dissolved all of its local bureaucracies and let the local governments and, to some extent, schools, manage education. Nevertheless, justified by the arguments of technical inefficiency or of local incompetence, the central government arranged another way of asserting power, that is, by instituting extra-bureaucratic agencies and imposing national standards legitimated by the community of the professional.

The 2003 National Education System Law

Following the indefinite role in the politically pressured decentralisation reform, in 2003, the central government passed a new education law to replace the previous education law of 1989. MoEC officials described the promulgation of this law as the 'recovery' from the 'disoriented decentralisation' (Interviews, 29 January 2015 and 13 February 2015). The most striking aspect that differentiates the new law from the old, however, is education management. Claiming that it has to make adjustments to the policy environment of political decentralisation and democratisation, the new law acknowledged the local government as the new governing authority in education on the one hand, and school-based management as the new principle of basic and secondary education management on the other. The formal structure of decentralisation found its official recognition in this new law where it stated that 'the district and municipal government shall manage basic and secondary education' (GoI, 2003: article 50[5]) and that 'the management of early childhood education, basic education, and secondary education should be conducted on the basis of minimum delivery standards and the principle of school-based management' (GoI, 2003).

The message of decentralisation appears much more obvious when we see that the term 'local government' (pemerintah daerah) is mentioned 31 times in this new law, but not at all in the previous law. Apart from the general management, as stated in article 50[5], local governments are also specifically designated to be responsible in many areas, such as funding their schools, monitoring performance, developing education

personnel and issuing operational permits. In addition, as decentralisation is categorised as part of the new public management (NPM) regime (Gruening, 2001), the law also adopted several terms associated with NPM such as *manajemen* (management [four times]), *efisiensi* (efficiency [two times]), *transparansi* (transparency [four times]) and *akuntabilitas* (accountability [six times]).

Nevertheless, the message of 'decentralisation' looks ambiguous as we learn that, excepting that one article (50[5]), all responsibilities that involve local government also involve the central government. We can look at the following clauses:

> The central and local governments are entitled to guide, lead, assist and supervise the management of education in accordance with relevant regulations. (GoI, 2003: article 10)

> The central and local governments are obliged to provide the service and facilities and ensure the realisation of quality education for every citizen without discrimination. (GoI, 2003: article 11[1])

> The central and local governments are obliged to ensure the availability of funds for the realisation of education for every seven-to-fifteen-years-old citizen. (GoI, 2003: article 11[2])

The term 'central government' is mentioned 85 times and, on top of everything, the law stated that 'the management of the national education system is the Minister's responsibility' (GoI, 2003: article 50[1]). In addition, despite the clear statement of the delegation of basic and secondary education management to local governments, the law acknowledges schools termed *lembaga pendidikan pemerintah* (central government school), which implies that the central government may itself own and manage schools. In other words, the enactment of the new education law not only legalised the adoption of decentralisation in the Indonesia education system, but also legitimised the return and redefinition of the central government's role in education.

And, it is interesting that, despite the centrality of decentralisation in the education reform agenda, the reformulation of the central government's role in the context of this decentralised structure became a minor topic during the discussion of the bill. The discussion of educational decentralisation was marginalised during the lawmaking process. Musa

(2009) lists the five most debated topics during the discussion of the education bill in the parliament: none dealt with decentralisation. Those topics that were considered important were the teaching of religious education in secular schools; university authority to confer honorary degrees; university funding and its management; the age limit for compulsory education and preschool education (Musa, 2009). The most debated topic was whether every school should provide religious education for its students. The public was divided for and against with regard to the proposed clause dealing with religious teaching, and it provoked many demonstrations throughout the country. These debates clouded the discussion about educational decentralisation, which had been the central topic in an earlier phase of the reform.

This confirms the arguments for technical efficiency as the justification for decoupling. The lawmakers acknowledged that they knew little about the technicalities of education, and they left them for the MoEC bureaucrats whom they trusted to have the expertise. The former chair of the Education Bill Working Committee in the parliament explained why many were silent on educational decentralisation during the debate on the bill.

> Educational decentralisation was a consequence of the regional autonomy law. Everyone agreed on that and there was no question about it. We left further elaboration on that matter to the government, in this case, the Department of Education ... They are professional bureaucrats who we trusted, knew more technical things about education. We were more concerned about how the education system would promote and protect our national culture from secularism and liberalism ... [as much as] we were concerned about our education competitiveness. (Interview, 3 February 2015)

The return of the central government's role in the new law confirms the compensatory legitimation theory, that it is no longer important whether real decentralisation is achieved. The most important outcome is whether the system appears to be decentralised (Weiler, 1990). Because direct intervention and the use of bureaucratic instruments are not effective in preventing the excessive political influences in decentralised education, the use of symbolic control can be a more strategic option. Following Bernstein (2001: 30):

> Symbolic control refers to the direct application of specialised discourses entailed in the shaping, evaluating, regulating and distributing the forms

> of consciousness, disposition, desire and relations, intrinsic to the control of individuals or groups…

The imposition of symbolic control was relatively unchallenged because it regulated the consciousness and controlled the knowledge, using a specialised agency that dominated the particular discourse (Au, 2008; Bernstein, 2001). The new important role assigned to the central government was setting up the national standards of education. These standards then became a new, symbolic means of centralisation. Standardisation is part of this symbolic control strategy because standards represent the presence of discursive authority whose influence is received more as cultural than political (Higgins & Larner, 2010). The 2003 education law introduced the national standards of education as the institutional framework that legitimated and integrated the whole education arrangement across the country. The law also introduced a new specialised and extra-bureaucratic agency to develop these standards and monitor their implementation. By regulating standards, the central government might control everything it wanted without sacrificing its legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Werle & Iversen, 2006). Now, the question is, how was this standardisation strategy organised.

Three Standardisation Regimes

Having been outlined in the education law, the national education system was set to 'ensure equal opportunity, improved quality, and relevant and efficient management of education in order to address challenges from the local, national, and global changes' (GoI, 2003). For the national education system to adjust to local, national and global needs, the central policymakers introduced three regimes of standards: minimum service standards (SPM), national standards (SNP) and international standards (SI). Despite the education law's stating that the standards are minimum criteria, the three regimes of standardisation instead represent the standard hierarchy. They were intended to address the immediate effects of decentralisation, that is, differences in local capacity. Thus, these three regimes cluster the local governments and schools based on their capacity, so everyone was accommodated and bound by the national system. This left the localities with no justification for being uncompliant with the system.

SPM have the most basic status because they provide the least restrictive standard and, therefore, become the direct 'measurement of local government performance in education service' (MoEC, 2004: article 1[1]). The first SPM regulation was issued in 2004 and covered all education levels and types but not for higher education. In 2010, the MoEC issued a separate SPM provision for basic education (primary and junior secondary schools), which was again revised in 2013. The SPM regulations mostly addressed the management education. Given its very minimum standards, SPM also functioned to affirm the great number of disadvantaged local governments and of schools that had limited resources to manage their education. SPM criteria were less stringent than those of SNP. For example, the SNP required schools to employ only teachers with at least a four-year university degree, but under the requirements of SPM, a primary school might operate if 70% of the teachers were qualified. In special regions, the proportion tolerated was 40% (MoEC, 2013). For senior secondary schools, the proportion was higher, 90% (MoEC, 2004). The MoEC official I interviewed said that meeting the requirements of SPM is a step on the way to reaching SNP (Interview, MoEC officer 1, 28 January 2015).

SNP constitutes the second tier of standards and their core. Most of the discussion on standardisation in this chapter refers to these criteria. What is meant here by SNP is 'the minimum criteria of the education system in the whole legal territory of the unitary state of Indonesia' (GoI, 2005a: article 1[1]). Thus, despite their difference in status, the SPM and SNP regimes claim to deal with the 'minimum criteria'. But, broader than SPM, SNP had eight items to standardise, that is, eight technical aspects of education: academic competence, content, process, evaluation, personnel, facilities, financing and management. The central government designed a national curriculum, defined education personnel qualifications, and set up school accreditation measurement based on the SNP. Upon meeting the SNP criteria, a school would be classed as a national standard school (SSN). SNP was first introduced in 2005 through government regulation (GR) 19 of 2005 but was later revised by GR 32 of 2013 to accommodate new developments.[1]

[1] Among these new developments was the need to legalise the adoption of a new curriculum (K–13) in 2013. The curriculum was first implemented in 6221 schools and was to be extended to others in the following years. However, it caused a large national controversy and the new education minister asserted it to be ill-prepared and, in December

The most controversial standardisation was the international standard. The imperative for the setting of this standard came from a single clause in the 2003 education law, which required 'the central and/or local governments to prepare at least one education institution to be developed as an international standard school' (GoI, 2003). In 2006, the MoEC initiated a project called International Standard Schools (SBI) and whose comprehensive regulating guidelines were issued later, in 2009. A number of élite schools, private and public, were selected to be 'a national school that has met the whole SNP criteria enriched by particular qualities borrowed from an OECD or another developed country' (MoEC, 2009: article 1 [8]). The central government set exceptionally high standards for these schools to differentiate them from ordinary schools: English to be the medium of instruction and all students must pass the 'TOEFL with a score of at least 7.5'; an international curriculum, such as the International Baccalaureate or Cambridge, was to be followed; strict selection of students for admission and allowing parents to contribute school fees, even for basic education (MoEC, 2009).[2] However, the policy was extensively criticised for its poor design, and the public was concerned that it would create social stratification in the education system. An evaluation published by the MoEC itself showed that many SBI schools appeared to perform below the SNP. This was exacerbated by the fact that many SBI schools quoted high tuition fees (Noor, 2011). Hence, in January 2013, the Constitutional Court accepted a public petition and set the policy aside. To comply with the verdict, the MoEC abolished the SBI system and ordered all SBI schools to return to the regular national school system.

Standardisation and the Regulatory Governance

The decentralisation policy has removed many of the central government roles in the education sector. Losing its long-running, extensive

2014, he instructed that its implementation be suspended (*Kompas*, 2014). In addition, the amendment of GR 19 of 2005 was made as a response to some developments in the national examination policy, which are discussed in the later part of this chapter. The revision, however, did not replace the original regulation. It only changed some relevant provisions.

[2] The TOEFL score of 7.5 was officially mentioned in the ministerial regulation and because the TOEFL does not use single digit scoring (the IELTS does), this showed that the policy had been poorly prepared.

bureaucratic structures in regional localities has reduced its capacity to coordinate the implementation of national policies. In such a scenario, the state needs to move from 'interventionist' to a 'regulatory' type of control. The former attempts to assure the effectiveness of national policy through 'planning and centralised administration', the latter is by 'reliance on regulation … [where] political accountability can be ensured by a variety of substantive and procedural controls' (Majone, 1994: 77). With authority to set up and enforce those standards remaining at its disposal, the central government has made this regulatory control even more important and influential. These standards keep Indonesian education as a single and integrated national system with the MoEC its central authority, despite the managerial decentralisation.

The 2003 education law had opened a Pandora's Box that spilled out hundreds of standardising regulations. From 2001 to 2014, there have been nearly 200 ministerial regulations on basic and secondary education governance. The GR 19 of 2005 itself had delivered 28 core ministerial regulations to fine-tune its technical guidelines. These ministerial rules do not include sixteen presidential decrees, eight government regulations and two pieces of legislation. As Fig. 5.1 shows among



Fig. 5.1 Numbers of MoEC standardising regulations (2001–2014) (*Source* Compiled by author from hukumonline.com and kemdikbud.go.id)

those regulated items, it is interesting that education management has been the most highly regulated, despite the massive managerial decentralisation. Hence, apart from more substantial matters, like curriculum and teacher qualifications, the central government now also regulates every small administrative matter: school establishments, procedures for appointing principals, school admissions, the use of government funds, user-fee collection and many others. The number of regulations on education management overcomes the regulations of other aspects which were traditionally under the central government control like curriculum and assessment.

According to Majone (1997), the regulatory state is characterised by 'the rise of a new breed of specialised agencies or commissions operating at arm's length from the central government'. Hence, to legitimate its regulatory role, the central government avoided a 'bureaucratised' and 'interventionist' appearance; it introduced specialised, extra-bureaucratic agencies to perform a number of its education responsibilities. In 2005, the government established BSNP, the Board of the National Standards of Education. The BSNP's official statement declared that the board is to develop national standards; run the national examinations; provide recommendations for the central and local governments on quality assurance and control; formulate the graduation criteria for schools and assess school textbooks (BSNP, 2016). In addition, the government also decreed another agency, the Board of National Accreditation (BAN). The BSNP developed and improved standards and organised national examinations; the BAN conducted regular assessments at schools of the implementation of those national standards. The members of BSNP and BAN are education experts and professionals, mostly recruited from reputable universities. In addition, the government has assigned the university-based Institute for Teachers and Education Personnel (LPTK) to operate teacher certification programs.

Nevertheless, despite its claimed extra-bureaucratic nature, we can see that decoupling occurred in the organisational structure of the so-called independent agencies themselves. Rather than being independently managed, the organisation of BSNP and BAN is under the coordination of the MoEC bureaucracy because their members are politically appointed by the minister. As such, despite its institutional autonomy as part of the higher education system, LPTKs are using the similar, centrally developed, certification assessment instrument (Jalal et al., 2009). This creates much overlapping of functions between the agencies and the MoEC. The

BSNP, for instance, has an overlapping role with the MoEC's Centre for Educational Evaluation (Puspendik) in organising the national examinations. The official company profile of Puspendik claims that it is technically more responsible for organising national examinations despite that function being assigned to BSNP. The former organisation, Puspendik, is responsible for almost the whole of the examination system; from developing the materials, preparing the exam documents, coordinating with relevant authorities, monitoring the exam document publication and distribution and analysing and reporting the results (Puspendik, 2015). Meanwhile, the BSNP plays a ceremonial role only, providing the sense of professional, extra-bureaucratic legitimacy. For example, in the composition of the 2015 national examination committee appointed by the Minister of Education and Culture, three BSNP representatives were the only non-bureaucratic members among the other 60 government officials (MoEC, 2015).

The Audit Culture

In spite of their ceremonial function, the presence of specialised independent agencies provides a symbolic legitimacy; the return of the central state's role in education is not anymore a matter of power legitimacy but of professional judgement (Ball, 2000). This allows the central government to go much further in imposing particular measures in the name of national standards attainment. These independent organisations are, on behalf of the state, running an auditing service to measure and evaluate performances. Quoting Leys (2003: 70), these 'inspection agencies were charged with "naming and shaming", "failing" individual teachers, schools …' With regard to the effects of this auditing practice or audit culture on educational decentralisation, Apple (2005) maintains:

> The ultimate result of an auditing culture of this kind is not the promised decentralisation that plays such a significant role rhetorically…, but what seems to be a massive re-centralisation and what is best seen as a process of de-democratisation. (p. 15)

The central government delegates to these regulatory agencies the responsibilities to 'control and ensure that education quality meets the SNP' through the acts of 'evaluation, accreditation, and certification' (GoI, 2005a: article 2[2]). BSNP organises national evaluation

for students, BAN conducts school accreditation and LPTK trains and assesses teachers before they are granted their professional certificate. The discussion of each audit practice will show not only how the practice has diverted the education management to centralisation, but also how the auditing practice itself has been inconsistently implemented and therefore decoupled from its original goal.

School Accreditation

The accreditation policy has been in effect since the time of the New Order, but it 'discriminatively' affected private schools only. Traditionally, public schools were the most sought after and relatively competitive schools because the government regularly monitored them and supported their quality. In contrast, except for the Catholic and Protestant institutions, Indonesian private schools greatly varied in quality, and most were below average (Bedi & Garg, 2000). Even though the government imposed a *laissez-faire* policy on school admissions, it meant almost nothing for private schools because the competitive advantage always went to public schools. Therefore, the highest grade of accreditation was *disamakan* (equalised), to indicate that the assessed private school was comparable to the public school system. The other grades were *diakui* (recognised) and *terdaftar* (registered) (MoEC, 1983).

The accreditation system changed after the introduction of new national education standards. A more radical *laissez-faire* policy is employed through which all schools, public and private, are similarly assessed. Grades of accreditation are made in a more neutral hierarchy, that is, A (for the highest), B (for the average) and C (for the lowest). All schools are motivated to reach the highest grade because of its central role in attracting enrolments. Such competition has demolished not only the barrier between private and public schools but also the established stratification between more and less-favoured public schools. Certain public schools that were deemed to perform less well but with much effort were able to achieve a higher accreditation ranking and to enjoy a more favourable reputation.

However, accreditation also brings pressure that is quite challenging for schools. All schools must be accredited and renew their accreditation every five years. Only accredited schools whose certificates have the

government's authorisation are eligible for admission to the next education level (GoI, 2003). All government offices and many private companies would reject job applicants holding education certificates issued by unaccredited schools. Accreditation itself is an overly complex process. Assessors are equipped with detailed instruments, evaluating every single indicator of the degree of implementation of eight national standards. For senior secondary schools, for instance, there are 165 questions with four indicators for each question. In responding to those questions, schools must be prepared with documentations or other physical evidence.

In time, this complex process of accreditation has been taken less seriously: the accreditation ends up as a ritual of 'list ticking' without being concerned whether meeting mandated standards correlates with practice. Some schools manipulate the accreditation by hiring supporting evidence. A teacher illustrates this matter as follows:

> A school health-service room that was normally dormant, does not even have any single equipment but a label on the door could be magically transformed to be having all the required tools for the sake of accreditation. Once the accreditation passes, it soon turns back as before with no equipment and even becomes a spider house. This is because all tools and equipment were rented. (Kartono, 2009: 15)

In addition, the centralised management of accreditation creates some complications and ambiguities. The implementation of accreditation by BAN is not need-based but quota-based. Even though a school's accreditation might have expired, the BAN or BAP might not assess that school for accreditation if the quota, which is set by the central government for a given period and area has been fully allocated. For example, in January 2016, there were 13,662 schools in the East Java Province whose accreditation had expired but the BAN could only assess 9400 of them and left the remainder, 4262, unaccredited (Bisnis.com, 2016). To some extent, this makes the strict rule on accreditation no more than a paper tiger because of the failed enforcement from the central government itself.

Teacher Certification

The second practice of audit culture in Indonesian education reform is manifested in the teacher professionalisation policy. Traditionally, Indonesian teachers were considered to be obedient civil servants who were

not valued for their pedagogic expertise or commitment to their profession, but rather for their respect and compliance with their superiors' orders (Bjork, 2006). This culture is seen as dangerous for teachers who are now under the supervision of a highly politicised, local government bureaucracy. This culture was a consequence of the low education qualifications and poor salary for teaching (Jalal et al., 2009). In 2005, the central government passed the teacher law whose central premise was to improve teacher management and quality. The law upgraded teachers' status to that of specialist civil servant and with a professional label. As part of this professionalisation, the government upgraded the status of those teachers who had at least a four-year university qualification, completed professional training and had met the requirements of the professional certification program (GoI, 2005b). Aware that most teachers were underqualified, in 2007, the central government launched a massive certification program, which was aimed primarily at in-service teachers and was fully central government funded and was the most rapid certification program any education system has ever had. In-service teachers can simply earn a professional certificate in either of two ways: their portfolio assessment and the 90-hours training program of PLPG.

The important part of this certification program, however, is not the certification itself; it is rather what comes after certification. The central government grants to those who acquire certification a professional allowance, an amount twice their regular salary. This allowance does not replace other stipends, such as functional services and meals. This makes teachers the highest paid civil servants in the country. This incentive scheme not only has driven the massive certification movement after 2007 but also encouraged colossal qualification upgrading and has caused greatly increased enrolments at teacher-training institutions. In 2006, before the certification program, only 17% of teachers qualified for the four-year post-secondary degree but, in 2011 the proportion doubled to 35% (Chang et al., 2013). Following the certification policy, the trend for students to enrol in education programs in Indonesian universities also increased from 200,000 in 2005 to over 1,000,000 in 2010 (Chang et al., 2013). The former vice-minister of education and culture, who was also the initiator of this teacher reform, acknowledged that the motivation for this reform is more of a welfare increase than for professionalisation.

> I was the team leader from the government side when discussing the teacher bill with the parliament. [The main reason was that] we were actually fed up with all the efforts we had tried to increase the teacher welfare ... We then agreed to escape from the rigidity of the teacher payment system. Because if not, first, they will never be well-off; and, second, people will always underestimate teachers. Whatever training given will be useless and whatever books you give [are the same] because they are not proud of their job and people do not respect them. So, my offer at that time was how, if we create a new stratum, a layer above the ordinary teacher who already has a functional allowance. Those who are able to reach that stratum will be rewarded; we call it a professional allowance because they have shown their professionalism. (Interview, 29 January 2015)

However, with a great bonus comes great onus. And, at this point, the very idea of professionalism meets its contradiction. Hargreaves and Goodson (1996) characterise professionalism as self-regulating autonomy in practice and committal to an endless development of knowledge and practice. The professionalisation project has otherwise diverted teachers from these professional ethics. The project facilitates the rise of managed professionalism, that is 'where professional goals and standards would become closely aligned to current policy concerns of the government' (Furlong, 2008: 731). In this sense, teacher performance is no longer seen from their own individual or school objectives but simply through a completion of a quantified indicator called working hours. The regulation stipulates that teacher with professional status must teach at least 24 periods (18 hours) per week. Otherwise, their entitlement to professional allowances might be suspended or even abolished (GoI, 2008b: article 63[02]).

In the Indonesian case, where education resources are not yet evenly distributed across the regions, the regulation has become an unfairly restrictive performative regime. For some teachers, the new regulation is seen as a light responsibility, but for others it is a heavy burden. And, the teachers working in secondary schools face much greater burdens than those in primary schools because the former are mostly subject teachers, but the latter are classroom-based.

For junior and senior secondary teachers employed in urban schools, working a 24-hours week is a light responsibility. With most schools increasing their student population each year, schools can easily rearrange classrooms to adjust to the available teachers. In this sense, teachers could teach more than for 30 hours a week in a school. Even teachers of

special, rarely taught subjects, whose teaching hours are fewer in their home school, could manage to fill the gap by teaching in the many other schools in their neighbourhood. Unfortunately, such a privilege is not available to rural-school teachers, particularly in senior secondary schools. With the fluctuating enrolment rates, many schools have a limited number of students and classrooms, which give less chance for teachers to meet the required workload. As a result, teachers have to find other schools in those areas where the population density is less and there are fewer schools than in the cities. As well, there is the issue of travel distance, which adds to the effort teachers must make (Interview, Senior officer of Kupang Education Authority, 19 November 2013).

In addition, the strict enforcement of the workload rule has affected teaching performance and learning quality. As more teachers seek to pursue or maintain the certification allowance, their motivation is more to comply with the rule than to provide quality teaching. Because they have to travel to other schools to ensure they work the required hours, teachers have to spend more energy coping with travel time and other physical burdens (Chang et al., 2013).

National Examination

The audit regime also has a strong effect on students who take the high-risk examination. Similar to many other nations, like China, Singapore, South Korea and even the USA (Kang, 2012; Liu et al., 2009), standardised testing is a feature of the Indonesian school system. The national examination (*ujian nasional* [UN]) introduced at the time of the country's independence had been used as the only way to decide school completion until the early 1970s. The policy was re-implemented in the early 1990s but made little contribution to school completion decisions, and then it was rejuvenated, in 2000, as a test to determine the successful completion of secondary education (Firman & Tola, 2008). Despite constant modifications, the UN system has long been the central motivation for all educational activities throughout the school year (Leigh, 1999). It is the measure for the central government to control performance, not only of the students and schools, but also local governments. This causes education governance to become a hierarchy of pressures. As a national indicator of education achievement, the national examination forces local governments to compete in gaining higher completion rates. As a result, they force school principals to achieve certain target

of completion rates, or they risk their position. The pressure then is applied to teachers and eventually to students and parents. These final-year students, along with their parents and teachers, are stressed by their preparation for the judgement day. Some high school principals admitted that the normal learning plans never work for final year students and their teachers because, during the whole academic year, their focusses are given to UN preparation. In preparation of the UN, teachers spend some time, almost every day, in or after school hours, to drill their students with many practice examinations. At home, parents must find some extra funds for their children's supplementary lessons with private tutors (Interviews, School Principal Kupang 3, 25 November 2013 and School Principal Surabaya 2, 31 October 2013).

In Indonesia, UN days have also caused several dramatic events. There have been many occasions before the test days where students and their parents have taken part in massed assemblies led by local religious leaders making religious supplications. Some schools hire prominent personages to deliver motivational speeches to their students.[3] Among other preparations, the Indonesian military has an essential role, unrelated to war and defence, that is, delivering and safeguarding the centrally distributed exam documents to remote areas. For places easier to reach, the delivery of documents 'only' needs police assistance. The UN papers are regarded as highly confidential state documents, so much so that law-enforcing units should ensure their safety. One of the sights during the test days is uniformed police officers standing guard in almost every school neighbourhood to maintain 'security' and 'noiselessness'.[4] Because of some criticism, however, the police changed their policy on uniforms for this particular task; in 2015, when guarding the examinations, they began

[3] A number of journalistic reports have covered the events during the national exams (UN) days such as: '6 ritual unik para pelajar jelang Ujian Nasional' [6 unique student rituals ahead of UN] (Merdeka, 2013); 'Ratusan Siswa SMA Yogya Gelar Doa Bersama Jelang UN' [Hundreds of senior secondary school students in Yogyakarta gathered for prayer ahead of UN] (*Republika*, 2013); and 'Jelang UN ribuan pelajar Bengkulu gelar istighasah' [Ahead of UN, thousands of students in Bengkulu hold mass praying] (Liputan6, 2014).

[4] Among the media coverage of this issue are: 'Soal UN Bali diamankan di markas TNI' [UN documents in Bali are in safe keeping at a military base] (*Kompas*, 2012); '90 tentara di Jogja ikut awasi UN' [90 soldiers in Jogja joined UN supervision] (*Suara Merdeka*, 2015); and 'Soal UN tiba di Jakarta dengan kawalan Brimob' [UN documents arrived in Jakarta with a Mobile Brigade Corps escort] (*Kompas*, 2015b).

wearing *batik*, the Indonesian traditional fabric, instead of their regular uniforms (*Kompas*, 2015a).

Indeed, the UN policy has had much criticism. It has been blamed for instigating vast stress and anxiety among students and parents (Arifin, 2012). It is also deemed an unfair policy, given the great gaps remaining in education quality between regions. In addition, the policy was also held to be responsible for the spread of cheating and corruption (Widiatmo, 2012). In 2006, the first lawsuit was raised in the Central Jakarta district court by a number of citizens who claimed to be 'victims of the national examination'. The district, provincial and then the supreme court heard the petitioners from 2007 to 2009. The Supreme Court instructed the government to improve teacher quality, develop school infrastructure and remove regional gaps before the UN policy be enacted. However, none of the court verdicts instructed that the government should discontinue the policy (Rosser, 2015). Therefore, the central government, with parliamentary support, continued to apply the policy with some modifications. Since 2011, the national examination has not continued to be the sole tool for judging student academic achievement; rather, school-based examination results make a 40% contribution. The effect of these developments is the amendment of the national standards of education regulation in 2013. The new regulation, inter alia, removed the UN from being implemented in primary schools. But it remains compulsory and is a school completion prerequisite for junior and senior secondary school students.

The audit culture does not have an immediate effect on the arrangement of local education governance, which is also subject to standardisation. In this sense, another way of enforcement must be adopted by the central government so that national education runs on a standardised course.

Redistributive Policy and the Return of Interventionism

Despite the decentralised management, the central government has little confidence in the capabilities of the new autonomous local organisations. Therefore, standardisation regimes are endorsed, and local governments and schools must refer to these standards in meeting their responsibilities. To date, there are 67 ministerial regulations about the way education should be managed locally. The regulations govern almost everything,

such as school establishment, principal appointments, student admissions and tuition-fee collection. As the national standards keeper, the central government needs to ensure that all stakeholders comply with those standards and any externalities that impede the application of those standards must be addressed. And, when those standards have been used to coerce compliance with state regulation, there is always a justification to enforce regulations by means of intervention. In other words, regulations by themselves come with a legitimacy to enforce interventionism. However, there must be an institutional rationale for the central government to justify such interventionism so its legitimacy would not be challenged.

Potterba (1996) argues that there are two economic reasons by which the government's intervention in education can be justified: market imperfection and the potential for inequality. The same argument applies for the central government intervention to the local education governance. The local governance imperfection in terms of the lack of technical capability becomes the rationale for the use of centralised regulatory agencies and standardisation. As such, the potential of inequality, because of the differences in local resources, becomes the reason for the redistributive policy to support the enforcement of those standards. One MoEC official confirmed this, saying that these standards are not aimed at promoting uniformity, but at dealing with regional inequalities. He explained:

> Some NGOs misunderstood the national standard as an effort for uniformity, but we meant it (as an effort) so that inequalities that exist between regions subside. Our duty is to enforce those standards … and this has become our constant struggle. (Interview, MoEC senior officer, 26 January 2015)

Besides, as previously discussed, the central government's control remains pervasive in the 2003 law despite the managerial decentralisation. The central government remains authorised to take similar responsibilities to those of the local governments, such as for financing, monitoring, issuing permits, controlling performance and more. In this sense, the central government can take any measure it sees necessary. Through this authority and, especially, in the name of enforcing national standards, the central government has tried to return to its former interventionist role. This is what the Indonesian central government has adopted.

The use of an extensive redistributive policy is one that characterises an interventionist state (Poterba, 1996) and in education the redistribution mostly translates into school subsidies (Fernandez & Rogerson, 1995). Despite decentralisation, the central government spends more for education than do all local district and provincial governments combined. Figure 5.2 shows that the proportion of central government spending on education compared with local governments is greater over time. Since 2005, the central government has funded the operation of public and private schools through a per-pupil subsidy scheme, called school operational assistance (BOS). In this regard, basic education receives the full standard cost and secondary education earns half of the standard cost. The central government also shoulders the monthly salaries of public school teachers along with allowances for professionally certified teachers. In 2012, the World Bank estimated that this professional allowance will consume almost three-quarters of the total national education spending in years to come (Chang et al., 2013). In addition to routine allocations, the central government also funds non-routine needs through two schemes: Special Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi Khusus [DAK]) and social aid grants (Bansos). These funds are distributed to those local governments and education institutions that need to accelerate the growth of infrastructure and personnel development to attain the minimum standards of education service.

The redistributive function has two important effects for centralisation. First, it allows the MoEC to maintain all its Jakartan bureaucratic structures even after education has been decentralised. A respected university professor who was also a former MoEC senior official said that in the early days after decentralisation, he believed that the MoEC would lose most of its giant bureaucracy. Some technical directorates that used to have an immense bureaucratic staff at the provincial and district level, such as directorates general of basic and secondary education, would be cut off, leaving the central ministry's organisation with only policy research and development functions. He recalled that in the early days of decentralisation, he once asked some staff in the directorate of basic education of the MoEC to leave their positions and soon look for new ones in local education offices in Jakarta's surrounding districts. But, now because the central government still has to spend large amounts of money for all the sector resources, it needs an optimally sized organisation to handle this. Thus, except for the provincial (Kanwil) and district–municipal offices (Kandep), the rest of MoEC's directorates remain and have been extended. The



Fig. 5.2 Sources of basic and secondary education budget, 2010–2013 (USD billion)[5] (*Source* Compiled from (Ministry of Finance, 2015))

former MoEC official asserted that the MoEC still retains the core directorate general for primary and secondary schools 'as if they still have the authority over schools' (Interview, 13 February 2015). These MoEC organisations govern not only technical matters, as was intended after decentralisation, but also administrative. For example, the MoEC's directorate generals regulate not only the technicalities of curriculum implementation but also some managerial aspects, for instance, who may receive DAK and Bansos funding and how the funds should be used in schools.

In addition, teacher management is highly influenced by the redistributive policy. Because the central government makes the larger investments, local responsibilities are not entirely free from central intervention. For example, a local government can hire contract teachers on its own but needs to seek approval from the central government in recruiting the permanent teachers. In 2011, for example, the central government

[5] Converted from IDR values on the basis of the average exchange rate of December 2013, USD 1 = IDR 12,021, see: http://www.x-rates.com/average/?from=USD&to=IDR&amount=1&year=2013.

delayed the recruitment nationally of civil servants, including teachers, for 16 months. This caused problems for schools that needed new teachers. Surabaya, which claimed a deficit of 800 teaching personnel, could do nothing to respond to the policy except transfer teachers from some schools to those schools whose needs were more dire. The central government also maintains control over teachers' career development. As part of the civil service system, a teacher's career is subject to highly fragmented management involving central and local institutions.[6] In addition, former MoEC official and president of a teacher training university argued that the 2007 certification program has become the central government's statement to recentralise teacher management. This was officially confirmed when, late in 2014, the MoEC established the new directorate general of teacher management (Interview, 13 February 2015). On this, a MoEC senior official defended it, saying that 'there has been a constant aspiration that teachers are to be recentralised because of the incapability of local governments' (Interview, 26 January 2015).

Second, the redistributive policy allows the central bureaucracy to extend its direct influence on localities, that is, to local governments and to schools. For local governments, the policy is used to buy local commitment to the central government's programs. In 2008, three years after the implementation of BOS, the central government promulgated the regulation on compulsory education in the basic and junior secondary schools, that students should be charged no fees (GoI, 2008a). This program became one that President Yudhoyono campaigned strongly for when he stood for his second term in the 2009 election. The central government urged local governments to ensure free basic education in their territories and supported BOS by providing additional funds called BOSDA or local BOS (Rosser & Joshi, 2013). Although not all local governments have abolished fees for their elementary and junior secondary schools, the central government's BOS funding and its free compulsory

[6] Central institutions include the MOEC, the Department of State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform (KEMENPAN-RB) and the National Civil Service Agency (BKN). In local government administrative areas, it involves the school bureaucracy, the education Dinas and Local Civil Service Agency (BKD). The KEMENPAN-RB is the regulator for all career development. To obtain promotion to a higher rank in the civil service, teachers have first to claim their credit points assessed through a number of hierarchies up to the MOEC office. With the required credit points, the BKD can propose a teacher's promotion to the BKN, which may grant the candidate a suitable title and rank. Hence, the local government is left only as the local registrar.

education policy have generated public pressure on local governments and schools. Free education has become among the most popular topics campaigned for by politicians in many local leadership elections. As such, mass media began scrutinising local government and public schools' policy on school fees and are constantly critical when schools impose fees or charge unreasonable amounts to parents.

Nevertheless, rather than creating central intervention, the former vice-minister argued that the BOS funds were distributed to schools to support the implementation of school-based management. He claimed that in the case of BOS, the funds were given to protect school managements from being overly controlled by local bureaucracy because the schools did not have to rely on local government assistance to cover daily school operations. In addition, the BOS was also aimed at empowering school committees as part of school management (Interview, 29 January 2015). In this, the central government has maintained that all the BOS-related school documents are deemed invalid unless signed by the chair of a school committee. This might be true because, since the period 2005 to 2010, the BOS funds were directly transferred from Jakarta to individual schools' accounts. However, in 2011, the National Ombudsman released a report saying that most schools generally had only a small role for their school committee in the BOS management. Some schools even tried to remove entirely the role of school committees from the BOS funds management (*Kompas*, 2011). The loosely controlled school management allowed widespread corruption. The National Board of Financial Audit, for instance, found that BOS funds were misappropriated in 2054 of 3237 sampled schools during the financial year 2007–2008. Indonesian Corruption Watch also reported that from 2004 to 2009, the police and prosecutors had investigated 33 BOS-related corruption cases, which resulted in many school principals and local education officials going to jail (Hendri, 2011).

Because of criticism that the principle of local government autonomy was being encroached, in 2011, the central government changed the transfer method: funds from Jakarta were transferred to district government accounts before being transferred to schools. But this was a short-lived experiment. One year later, for reasons of efficiency, the method of transfer was again changed and, since 2012, the BOS funds have been transferred to the provincial governments (that is, from Jakarta to provincial governments to schools). The central government also established BOS committees (Tim BOS) whose members were drawn from central,

provincial and district governments and from schools. And this has made the BOS system highly bureaucratic.

In addition to BOS, the second function of the redistributive policy also works with DAK and Bansos. But, Bansos is worth noting because its funding amount is, on average, higher than DAK and BOS (see Fig. 5.3) and, in contrast to the two other schemes that the central government entrusts local governments or schools to manage autonomously, the Bansos program is entirely organised by technical directorates within the MoEC. This means that for schools to receive these funds, they have to directly register their proposal to relevant affiliated technical directorates. For example, a senior secondary school would have to address its proposal to the MoEC's Directorate of Senior Secondary Schools. Bansos has built the closest power relations between the MoEC and schools, especially schools in localities whose governments are not able to give adequate financial support. Bansos has made these schools highly reliant on central government assistance. A senior-secondary-school principal, for instance, said that he frequently flies to Jakarta to deliver their proposals and to



Fig. 5.3 Education DAK and Bansos Allocation, 2011–2013 (USD million) (*Source* Compiled from (DPR Ministry of Finance, 2016; RI, 2013))

lobby Jakarta officials. He even said that the central government is more responsive to their proposals than are their superiors in the Dinas bureaucracy (Interview, 25 November 2013). For central government officials, it provides them with the sense of power. It is at this directorate's discretion to assess and approve proposals and distribute the funds. Later, the directorate officials will also evaluate whether the funds are being used appropriately. The MoEC member of staff who was responsible for organising Bansos funds told me:

> After decentralisation it was not easy for any MoEC staff to access the schools without local government official's consent. But when you come as a member of the Bansos team, everything is much easier. You can come any time you like, sometimes without any notification. (It was because) you offer them fresh cash (Interview, MoEC officer 2, 28 January 2015)

The redistributive policy is expected to compensate the central demand of the implementation of standardised governance by the local authorities. However, the result does not always come that way. Or even such defined results might never exist. As Brunson and colleagues (2012) argue, rather than leading to stability and sameness, standards and standardisation are a dynamic phenomenon. This dynamism occurs because, according to Braa and Herdberg (2002), standardisation involves a number of linked and overlapping networks and structures. In this case, it involves the dynamic relations between the central and local actors, which in the new Indonesian democratic environment become more fluid and interpenetrating. It also involves the degree of localisation, that is, the flexibility of local adaptation based on its internal dynamic of relations.

The Standardisation Effect: Structuration and Destructuration

The dynamic process of standardisation can be seen as the process of structuration (Braa & Hedberg, 2002). In this sense, standardisation provides the structure that constrains action but inherently contains the opportunity to change that structure because of internal conflict and resistance. From the central government perspective, the standardising rules should have given the structuration power, that is, the ability to generate structural convergence and consensus in the organisational fields of education. In this sense, the enforcement of standards through regulative and

interventionist strategies is expected to end up in the routinisation of behaviours and practices in education governance. However, the structuration process does not always result in the construction of patterned relations and structural convergence, but might also cause a breakdown of structure or destructuration when the organisational field is filled with domination and resistance (Clegg, 2010; Scott, 2013).

The Structuration Effect

The audit culture has facilitated a smooth transition to the resumption of centralisation. It has successfully structured the technical aspects of education. With the centralised school accreditation, teacher certification and student examinations, it looks probable that the education system has converged as a single national system. There have been isomorphic behavioural effects taking place to follow this central pressure: the similarity of responses to the central policy. In this sense, regardless of the goals and outcomes, schools are competing for accreditation, teachers are chasing professional certification and students are struggling for success in the national examination. This act of standardisation has a stronger basis of legitimacy because it is believed to incorporate educational actors not only in the national state project of political integration, but also in the larger cultural project of empowerment to survive in what Randal Collins (1979) has termed the credential society. The national examination, school accreditation and teacher certification are the only legitimate institutions providing credential authorisation and there is no other way to survive in social and economic competition but by engaging with them.

The Destructuration Effect

Nevertheless, the enforcement of national standards in the managerial aspect tends to result in destructuration. The breakdown of bureaucratic hierarchy following the decentralisation has created a structural barrier for the central–local relations so that the central structure can no longer impose obedience to the locals (Rasyid, 2002). It means that, although it sets national standards, the central government does not automatically have all its policies effective at the local level. Hence, unlike the audit culture that generates nearly isomorphic responses in the regions, the standardisation effort in managerial aspects came with different and sometimes contradictory local practices. Some local governments are

pursuing and are committed to meeting the standards—many are not. The implementation of the central government rules would be dependent on meeting both sides' interests. Because some local governments found that central government rules are either irrelevant in the local context or contradictory to their interests, they use their discretion to disregard the rules. It means, in cases where the local government does not comply with the national rules, that the local education governance can still claim legitimacy to carry on. The central government cannot impose any measure to the detriment of national standards and there are many inconsistencies between central programs and local practices.

The central government's vision of developing the teachers' professional culture, so that they become more independent of direct state intervention, sometimes contradicts local government interests in having teachers as members of the local government administration. The number of government teachers is greater than the number of their non-teacher colleagues in the local public service (see Fig. 5.4). Thanks to the professionalisation policy, which requires teachers to have a four-year university degree at least, these government teachers are, as a group, the most resourceful of local government employees. For a local government, this means a great deal. On the one hand, seeing teachers as bureaucrats who maintain the old patrimonial culture is important for local politicians because public servants can be mobilised for political support. On the other hand, teachers being the most qualified public servants in terms of



Fig. 5.4 Population of local government civil servants (National Data), 2014 (*Source* Compiled from (BPS, 2015))

their higher education qualifications, have the potential, as civil servants, to fill positions in the bureaucracy. Should they engage in the political process, teachers have opportunities for particular benefits: either promotion to school principal; positions in the Dinas bureaucracy; or, for those without permanency, to be granted a permanent position. On this matter, the former vice-minister of education explained:

> The locals were taking benefit from this [decentralisation] and even abused it because [its effect on] the economic resource is big and its leverage to local politics is also big. [We are talking about controlling] all schools and teachers! Eventually [the education personnel] started to engage in local leadership elections… So, educational decentralisation has been coloured more by the potential of the political role of education personnel themselves… (Interview, 29 January 2015)

Another MoEC official I met in Jakarta was concerned about the massive violation of national standards in the recruitment of education personnel. He, for instance, frequently found that teacher recruitment was the local politicians' means to reward their political loyalists. The MoEC official acknowledged that his office frequently had to deal with an unreasonable number of nominees in the local government's teacher recruitment program. Politicians put all of their loyalists on the lists proposed to the central government regardless of the professional competence of those nominated, of the number of local vacancies and of the distribution strategy. The burden is passed to the central government because it pays the teacher salaries. This, according to the official, also explains Indonesia's ideal low teacher–pupil ratio, one to sixteen, which matches that of OECD members and exceeds other developed countries like UK, Japan and France (see Fig. 5.5), but the distribution is highly uneven (Interview, MoEC senior officer, 26 January 2015). The local governments regularly recruit teachers every year, but these teachers are concentrated mostly in urban areas. A survey report in 2005 showed that 55% of Indonesian primary schools were overstaffed and 34% were understaffed (Chang et al., 2013). The situation has not significantly improved despite several teacher reform programs in the past decade. In 2012, a World Bank report showed that 30% of primary schools remained understaffed and, worse, 59% were kept overstaffed (Chang et al., 2013).

The evasion of national standards also occurs in the case of the central government's compulsory, free, basic education program. Not



Fig. 5.5 Teacher–pupil ratios by country and region, 2013 (*Source* Compiled from (World Bank, 2013))

all local governments ensure their schools comply with this program and its related regulations. Local government officials were blaming local resource scarcity and choosing to overlook the practice. The local authority did not issue any regulation to arrange regular monthly fee collection. Without this government regulation in place, public schools freely quoted non-standard fee amounts. However, resource scarcity is not the only reason for this practice. Even in better-off localities, where governments have provided additional BOSDA, fee collection still persists. As Rosser and Joshi (2013) reported, despite the presence of BOSDA, some public schools in Jakarta still quote user fees to parents. Some schools establish formal user fees, for example, for building costs; others set informal fees for, say, private lessons, excursions and books (Rosser & Joshi, 2013).

Nevertheless, the violation of central standards does not represent the whole of local practices. There is always some other extreme set of circumstances. In Surabaya, for instance, the national standards are enforced and provide an institutional legitimacy for the local education reform initiatives. Not only adopted, but those standards are also even expanded. For example, to avoid political intervention, the city government added to the central government's principal appointment procedures some new

techniques of selection, such as employing independent consultants and using an online recruitment system. Furthermore, even though the central government's free education policy applies only to elementary and junior secondary schools, the Surabaya city government took the initiative to abolish fees for senior secondary education. In addition, after distributing a set amount of BOSDA funding, the city government imposes very tight restrictions for all public schools on collecting contributions from parents. The policy created problems for some schools, particularly the élite schools, because it limited their innovation and creativity, but the local education officials insisted that the schools had to do so to eradicate illegal fees collection.

Despite some impressive local responses to national standards, in my interviews with MoEC officials in Jakarta, I understood there to be more disappointment than contentment with the general performance of local governments. They felt that the big investment the central government had made to enforce national standards of education did not trigger constructive policies from the local authorities. One official even claimed that the country had over-invested for this educational decentralisation project and called for the involvement of other central departments in enforcing the rules.

> You know, there is nothing we can do with the situation. We have done our part … [Eventually], we can only suggest, and we cannot force them to do whatever we ask. (Interview, MoEC senior officer, 26 January 2015)
>
> The Department of Home Affairs should have taken part in guiding [this process], because ... so far there is hardly any disincentive for the heads of local governments who do not comply with the central government regulations. We have set everything: how the good management should look like, we have mapped carefully when someone could become a school inspector; when he or she could become a principal; how long it takes until a teacher is eligible [to become principal] … Everything is regulated. But if not implemented with no sanction attached, then what are all of these meant for? ... We paid too much for this decentralisation. (Interview, Former MoEC vice-minister, 29 January 2015)

Conclusion

To preserve the legitimacy and restore its authority over education governance, the central government employs the means–end decoupling approach. This strategy involves the strengthening of decentralised

structures and the use of symbolic, professional-legitimated control of standardisation at the expense of the dissolution of central government structure in localities. The standards are enforced by imposing regulatory governance, an audit culture, and redistributive policies. The central government believes that national standards and their enforcement can help anticipate the side effect of decentralisation, that is, the inter-regional discrepancies. For this standardisation project, the MoEC has produced hundreds of regulations and invested trillions of rupiahs to make all stakeholders support the standardised national education system.

The dynamic process of standardisation has led to structuration and destructuration. The audit culture has delivered the structuration effect in the sense that it leads to convergence and similarity of educational practices. The audits have made known the real and legitimate presence of the central government in local areas: students feel the pressure of the UN, schools cannot escape accreditation and teachers are striving to teach as required by the certification scheme. That sense of pressure, however, did not affect the standardisation efforts that demand the local governments' responses, which is the managerial aspect. The enforcement of managerial standards leads to destructuration, which is characterised by the breakdown of structure and coordination systems. Many central rules in education management are violated because of interest differences between the central and local governments. Thus, rather than combating inequalities, standardisation is challenged by different and contradicting local agendas in education.

However, the destructuration not only comes from the different interests of between central and local governments. It also emerges from the dynamic relations within respective local organisational fields. In the next two chapters, drawing from the two local case studies of the Kupang and Surabaya city governments, I will present a more detailed discussion on how such local organisational fields affect the particular arrangement of education governance in localities.

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CHAPTER 6

Educational Decentralisation and the Rise of the Neo-Patrimonial State: The Case of Kupang City

> The Mayor is the king here. His power overcomes the governor and even the minister – Senior officer of local education authority. (Interview, 19 November 2013)

Introduction

In the next two chapters, I look at how educational decentralisation works in the context of greater political decentralisation. In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that political decentralisation has facilitated the expansion of Weberian states in the local arenas. That is why we have also learnt how standardisation has resulted in destructuration in terms of the breakdown of coordination systems between the central and local governments. The next two chapters will further discuss local sources of destructuration, that is, how the different practices of local state consolidation provided different responses to the pressure of national standards and gave effect to the formation of different local education governance. The discussion starts with the case of Kupang in this chapter and is followed by a discussion of the case of Surabaya in the next chapter.

In Kupang, political decentralisation has facilitated the consolidation of neo-patrimonial regimes centred on the city mayor and bureaucratic élites. This patronage is managed not in the old-fashioned manner when clients served their patrons for cultural reasons or simply for existential

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protection. Rather, it works on the basis of exchange. As Khan describes it, this new patrimonialism works as 'clients agree to provide political support to the patron in exchange for pay-offs that the patron can deliver by using political power to capture public resources' (Khan, 2005: 714). This neo-patrimonialism also assumes that the control of public resources, including those in the education sector, are centrally and exclusively in the hands of the patron. This logic runs counter to the national standards of education that introduce some elements of professionalism, which promote more autonomous schools and education personnel.

The first part of this chapter discusses the construction of neo-patrimonial structures in Kupang following the implementation of political decentralisation; the second part elaborates the local practices of education governance as the response of this neo-patrimonial structure to the pressure from national standards. In the last part, there is discussion of some internal resistance to the neo-patrimonial structure as part of the dynamics of structuration.

The Political Construction of the Neo-Patrimonial Bureaucracy of Kupang

Decentralisation and the Politicisation of Local Bureaucracy

In his classical exposition of bureaucracy, Weber (1952) characterises this entity with at least three features: hierarchy, competency and rules. Bureaucracy is coordinated through interactions between leaders and their staffs, where the latter take orders from the former. All members of a bureaucracy are recruited on the basis of required skills and capacity for particular allocated jobs, and their careers are also determined by organisational assumptions of their credentials and capacity. Finally, bureaucracy is organised by strict rules that apply to anyone associated with the organisation. These rules protect the bureaucracy from any external influences and thus make its members more focussed on their instrumental function. In the latter development, these ideals of bureaucracy are seen as problematic. Weber himself warned of the potential of the 'overtowering' power of the bureaucracy as its apparatus grows vastly and becomes increasingly immune to public control (Wilson, 1975). This has inevitably caused the gathering of political power into bureaucratic hands (Wilson, 1975). As such, in the consolidated bureaucratic state it has also become increasingly less possible to separate administration from policy (La Palombara,

2006; Whitford, 2002) or, as Egeberg (2007: 78) puts it, 'the structure can therefore never be neutral, it always represents a mobilisation of bias in preparation for action'.

Following the implementation of the 2001 political decentralisation, Jakarta is no longer the sole representation of meaningful power in Indonesia. Political decentralisation has transferred power to the district level. Local governments are authorised to manage their affairs with no more intervention from Jakarta. The old structure that politically and administratively incorporated the local government into the central government's bureaucratic body has been abolished. This institutional environment allows the reorganisation of power where local élites have become its centres (Hadiz, 2010). Since 2005, when the first elections (*pilkada*) for local leaders were held, the district regents (*bupati*) and city mayors received an additional source of legitimacy, that is, they were elected by popular vote. Although the organisation of political parties remains centrally controlled and politicians standing for local leadership must obtain a party's central committee consent in Jakarta, individual leadership of the *bupati* or mayor still is the most important factor. Elected, popular leaders would then overcome a political party's influence and establish their domination over bureaucracy.

What effect has this new institutional environment had on the bureaucracy? Since the bureaucracy itself cannot claim popular representation, it can no longer control politicians. Rather, politicians now control the bureaucrats. The effect is that, on the one hand, it enables bureaucracies to become more sensitive to public aspirations as its programs and performance are tested through public opinion and popularity ratings. The more popular the program, the more likely the government and its bureaucracy are to retain power (Gormley & Balla, 2012). Yet, on the other hand, it means that a democratic bureaucracy is prone to politicisation. Ståhlberg defines politicisation as the degree of administrative autonomy: 'the less autonomous the administration is with regard to the political power, the more politicised it is' (Ståhlberg, 1987: 365). This is reasonable because, by controlling the bureaucracy, politicians are able to control what their governments do (Peters & Pierre, 2004). As Peters and Pierre (2004) argue, there are at least two ways that the politicisation of the civil service might work. First, 'marrying the natives', that is, when politicians assign new people from among their loyalists to fill leadership positions in the bureaucratic machinery. Second, by mobilising public servants to influence their behaviour using political leadership and

ideology, or through manufacturing 'fear'. Normally, career bureaucrats are afraid of losing their job, being demoted or being transferred to less favourable positions (Peters & Pierre, 2004).

The politicisation of local bureaucracy starts as early as the local election processes commence. Because of the scarcity of popular leaders at the local scene, it has been common that some senior bureaucrats, either active or retired, try their luck to become politicians and stand for election. In that sense, even when they are not incumbent, because they retain an influence over bureaucracy through the remaining old patronage culture, they can mobilise local public servants as part of their political campaign. If successful, they reward those who take part with promotion and replace those who don't. Yet, if a rival competitor were to win the election the rewards and punishments go the other way. For incumbents, moves of bureaucratic positions might even be started before the election. They have to make sure that they have loyalists only in their team so that their political campaign can run smoothly. Besides, this is also a warning for those who might cross to the other side (Hidayat, 2009; Prayudi, 2013).

What is important, from the elaboration of the bureaucratic consolidation, for our analysis of educational decentralisation in Kupang is related to the position of teachers. As described in Chapter 5, after decentralisation the management of schools and teachers became a local government responsibility; all school teachers with permanent civil service (PNS) status are official members of the local bureaucracy. In Kupang, those teachers comprise the dominant element in the local bureaucratic structure (see Fig. 6.1). And, as Chapter 5 has briefly discussed, the patrimonial civil service culture has also been a tradition accepted by Indonesian teachers for decades. Hence, when the bureaucracy is politicised, this affects employment conditions for teachers and other school personnel. The following discussion will reveal how the politicisation of bureaucracy took place in Kupang and how it affected the governance of education in that city. To understand how the local bureaucracy has been politicised we should start with an understanding of the structure of local patronage.

The Reproduction of Patronage in Kupang's Bureaucracy

The formal political structure of Kupang has been long dominated by the Golkar party. This party always secured the local legislative council (DPRD) leadership until the takeover by the PDI-P party after the 2014



Fig. 6.1 Composition of the Kupang Bureaucracy, 2013 (*Source* BPS Kota Kupang, 2014)

election. Nevertheless, since direct mayoral elections were introduced in Kupang in 2007, the political structure of the DPRD has never been reflected in mayoral elections. In the previous two mayoral elections, in 2007 and 2012, Golkar candidates failed to win. Though political parties became increasingly influential in post-reform Indonesian politics, in elections they tend to function more as political vehicles than aspirational aggregators. Rather than promoting their long-serving cadres, many parties tend to recruit popular figures as candidates for election to DPRD or government leadership. Because there are no strong or binding ties, politicians can easily move from one to another party (Choi, 2011). In the 2007 mayoral election, the elected mayor was Daniel Adoe, a former vice-mayor, whose candidacy was supported by a number of small parties (*partai gurem*). In the 2012 election, Adoe stood for his second term confidently with the support of the giant Golkar and other small parties. Unfortunately, he lost to his old rival, Jonas Salean, who stood as an independent, non-partisan candidate. Upon his triumph, Salean led the government without any formal political party backup in the DPRD.

Nevertheless, in Kupang, the real political power resides not in formally recognised political organisations, the political parties. Rather, it resides in the bureaucratic élites. These élites serve as incumbent actors who survive all pressures of external institutional change. To some extent, they even

become the real skilled social actors (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012) or institutional entrepreneurs (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), who are able to seek opportunities within the contrary institutional logics in the field. For more than two decades, from 1986 to 2007, Kupang had one mayor only, Samuel Kristian Lerik. He was the second mayor of Kupang since the inauguration of the city in 1978. He was a fine example of a typical New Order strongman: an army officer, a Golkar leader and a bureaucrat (Malo & Nas, 1991). He survived all regime changes from the heyday of New Order until its collapse in 1998 and went through four presidential reigns during the Reform era.

Despite the institutional change to a more democratic government and the fierce patronage rivalry, the patronage of Lerik's bureaucratic circle survives even today. The rivalry of Adoe and Salean signifies the centrality of this circle in local politics. Adoe and Salean are both former Lerik's men who were rivals from the time they both served the patron and gained top positions in his last period of power, from 2002 to 2007. At that time, while Adoe was the vice-mayor, Salean was the city government secretary. However, during this period the public saw that Lerik showed he had more confidence in Salean and gave to his deputy, Adoe, assignments more ceremonial than influential. As Lerik was by law denied standing for another term, the two rivals competed in the first direct mayoral election in 2007, and then at the second one in 2012. In the first election, won by Adoe, the Lerik family through its Golkar machine backed Salean, but Adoe picked up a number of small parties as his political vehicle. Later, although Adoe had successfully taken over the Golkar leadership from Lerik's family, he and his powerful party backer failed to win favour with the voters who in 2012 endorsed Salean.

Adoe and Salean both have had a strong influence over the bureaucracy because of their previous roles in the Lerik regime. And certainly, their rivalry affects the bureaucracy. When Adoe won the first local election in 2007, he dismissed all Lerik (and Salean) loyalists in the bureaucracy and made himself the new patron. In the first month after his inauguration, he replaced Gabriel Kahan, Salean's successor as government secretary. His term was marked by bad relations with the DPRD dominated by Lerik loyalists. The speaker was Lerik's son, Viki Lerik, who also chaired the local Golkar party. However, in 2011, Adoe successfully overthrew Viki Lerik from his parliamentary and party leaderships. The mayor then became the new Golkar chairman, a position that gave Adoe more confidence to take control of Kupang's political realm.

As such, after his dramatic victory in the 2012 mayoral election, Salean retooled the bureaucracy and removed his predecessor's allies. In his first year, he faced many criticisms for his five waves of official mutations. In late October 2012, two months after his mayoral inauguration, he recast the bureaucracy, filling 224 third and fourth-echelon posts with new officials (*Pos Kupang*, 26 October 2012). Five months later, 27 prestigious second-echelon positions had new incumbents. Indeed, the most affected group from this mutation process were from the education sector because teachers constitute the largest occupation group in the public service (see Fig. 7.1).

Although having no political backup in DPRD, Salean built good relations with local politicians. He benefited from Adoe's political career coming to a complete end. In 19 December 2013, the Nusa Tenggara Timur high prosecutor arrested the ex-mayor for alleged corruption involving school textbooks. He and his former head of education Dinas were accused of unlawfully giving direct appointments to the winning bidder. On 10 July 2014, the court sentenced Adoe to two and a half years imprisonment (Antaranews, 2014). This meant that the Golkar leadership had to be changed and Salean had publicly announced his interest. On 4 March 2016, Salean officially took over the party leadership after a unanimous vote of support at the party's conference.

The Structure of Local Education and the Policy Initiatives

The city government of Kupang has 238 schools; elementary to senior secondary. Generally, there are more public schools than private, but the number of private secondary schools (junior and senior) is greater than the number of public secondary schools (see Table 6.1). This public to private school ratio is part of a national trend. The great increase in the number of public schools in Indonesia started in the 1980s when the country was flooded with oil boom money (Christano & Cummings, 2007). At the secondary level, there were numerically more private schools, however, public schools teach many more students than do private schools. Public schools have to struggle with higher student to teacher ratios than do private schools. However, just like the national trend, private schools in Kupang are generally less competitive except for a small number of élite schools. The admission competition is always tight for getting seats in public schools, particularly the élite ones, or what have been locally known as *sekolah favorit* (favoured schools).

Table 6.1 Education Figures for Kupang, 2014

Level/Status	*Public*			*Private*		
	Schools	*Students*	*Teachers*	*School*	*Students*	*Teachers*
Elementary	81	28,020	1,623	54	11,115	639
Junior Secondary	21	11,543	1,033	33	2,442	372
Senior Secondary	12	10,736	599	14	2,996	332
Vocational	8	2,800	499	15	755	199
Total	122	53,099	3,754	116	17,308	1,542

Source MoEC, 2014

Despite the problems that might affect education quality, the access to education in Kupang shows a relatively good trend. From 2011 to 2013, gross and net enrolments at all educational levels increased gradually. The positive trend in enrolments more fundamentally is a result of the national program of nine years of compulsory education rather than any local program. Through BOS, the central government covers all costs for elementary and junior secondary education and all elementary and junior secondary public schools ought to be free. In the meantime, for senior secondary schools, the central government covers only half of the standardised operational cost (see Table 6.2) and therefore the provincial and city governments must share the burden of the remaining balance; two-thirds each. Yet, because of the poor locally generated revenue (PAD) of provincial and city governments, hardly any additional funding has been allocated for senior secondary education in Kupang. This makes the central government the most generous funding resource.

In 2014, the education sector in Kupang was allocated as much as IDR380 billion (USD31.6 million) or more than four times Kupang's

Table 6.2 School Enrolments in Kupang

Level	*2011*		*2012*		*2013*	
	Gross	*Net*	*Gross*	*Net*	*Gross*	*Net*
Primary	126,18	103,25	126,43	103,25	126,67	105,5
Junior Secondary	116,99	80,7	117,58	81,31	118,18	81,93
Senior and Vocational Secondary	94,54	60,72	97,51	62,17	100,56	63,64

Source Bappeda Kota Kupang, 2013

PAD. Most of the amount came from a central government transfer. Because most of the budget was spent on routine salaries, the amount was not enough to cover all other schemes, a local education authority officer told me (Interview, 19 November 2013). Therefore, although the central government has made elementary and junior secondary education free, the mayor did not ban Kupang schools from collecting tuition fees. The amount of school tuition fees at all school levels in Kupang ranges from USD 0.83 to USD 16.6 per month. The officer contended that such a funding constraint has limited the room for infrastructure expansion and policy innovation. Even with more and more public schools exceeding capacity because of rapid urbanisation, opening new schools is difficult. Central government schemes are available to fund renovation only, rather than building new schools. There is a classroom surplus in private schools, but most parents are reluctant to send their children to those schools for economic or educational reasons. Public and private schools both charge fees, but public schools are seen as better than private schools in general. There are a small number of good private schools, but only well-off parents can afford their fees (Table 6.3).

The official also blamed the limited budget for the lack of local policy initiatives. The education sector in Kupang is organised more through a random than systemic arrangement. There are no policy documents in terms of government regulation or guidelines for either general or particular education agendas. All programs are those jotted down on annual budget lists of activities. Some local policy observers I interviewed said

Table 6.3 The Comparison of the Central and Local Governments' Per pupil Non-Personnel Operational Grants to Schools in Kupang, 2013

School level	*The standardised unit cost per pupil per year**	*Grants (USD)*[1]		
		CG BOS	*LG BOSDA*	*Shortfall*
Primary	48.2	48.2	0	0
Junior Secondary	59.1	59.1	0	0
Senior Secondary	81.9	46.6	0	−35.3

* Based on MoEC Regulation 69 of 2009

[1] The conversion is based on the USD to IDR exchange value rate as of December 2013, USD1 = IDR12,021.

that they frequently raised the problem of why education legislation has not been produced ever since. And, to such questions, government and DPRD have replied that the discussion is still taking place.

Hence, there are hardly any local policies on education except for a small number of social aid programs. The city government, for instance, provides scholarships for selected students from poor families. The policy was initiated by Adoe's administration (2007–2012). Under Mayor Salean, other redistributive policies have also been introduced. In 2013, he provided scholarships for a university education for 1000 recent school graduates from poor families. Other scholarships are for underqualified teachers to obtain a standard university degree with university fees shared, half by the student and half by the government.

In addition, it had been a common talk among civil service élites that those social aid programs were used for political campaigns. The local government usually exploits the leverage of such redistributive programs as the end of their term in office is approaching. In August 2011, for instance, Mayor Adoe announced what he called Dana Kesejahteraan Guru (teachers' welfare funds), which is granted to all teachers of public and private schools, to start from January 2012. This was to prepare for the mayoral election that would be held in June 2012. With similar intentions, in October 2015, Mayor Salean also promised that his government would provide extra incentives to 2312 non-permanent teachers, starting from 2016. Some people related this is as preparation for the 2017 mayoral election. In the next part, I will discuss further the way politicisation was organised in the local neo-patrimonial system and has shaped the education bureaucracy.

Neo-Patrimonialism and the Politicisation of Local Education Governance

Most Indonesian teachers are civil servants or *Pegawai Negeri Sipil* (PNS). Others are either contract teachers or private school teachers whose combined proportion is 38.2% of total teacher population (MoEC, 2012). PNS is a lifetime occupation that provides not only economic security but, more important, social status in the community (Kristiansen & Ramli, 2006). Therefore, it is the ultimate dream of most Indonesian teachers to gain permanent PNS status. They will do anything possible to obtain the permanency and once achieved they will make every effort to preserve it. Decentralisation has integrated the administration of schools

with the local bureaucracy. This is reinforced by the transfer of all PNS teachers to local government employment. Although the central government still has the final say on PNS teachers' recruitment and dismissal, the local government has full control of their placement and promotion. In addition, local government is fully authorised to hire contract teachers whose numbers significantly expanded after decentralisation. Cited in the Jakarta post (2016), the minister claimed that the number of contract teachers had been boosted by 860 per cent over the previous 15 years, from 84,600 in 1999 to 812,064 in 2015. Thanks to this policy environment, schools are placed at the base of the Dinas bureaucracy and school personnel (principals, teachers and administration staff) would normally serve as members of staff of the head of the Dinas. As PNS, teachers and principals are bound by strict bureaucratic rules and hierarchy. As members of the Dinas bureaucracy, their careers depend on this office's evaluation of them. In the Kupang context, the structure has established a patron–client relation between local government bureaucrats and all school personnel.

However, the central government has introduced another institutional means to limit local government's excessive intervention in schools. The 2003 Education Law stipulates that schools be organised on the basis of a school-based management (SBM) model. Government regulation 17 of 2010 defines this SBM as 'a form of school autonomy … in which principals and teachers are running the school with the assistance of a school committee' (GoI, 2010: Commentary article 10[4]). The government also introduced many other regulations to standardise the management of education, particularly in areas, such as the appointment of principals and student admissions. Some of these regulations reduce particular privileges of the local government and endorse the involvement of professional elements, in terms of content and control. Although content is related to the possession of relevant knowledge and expertise, control concerns an 'institutionalised or disciplinary control of professional practice by professionals' (Noordegraaf, 2007: 767). In terms of content, for instance, the school must follow four principles: objectivity, transparency, accountability and non-discrimination (MoEC and MoRA, 2011). In terms of control, for instance, the process of appointing principals must involve other parties ranging from fellow principals, school inspectors, training institutions and an independent committee (MoEC, 2010).

In the education sector, the adoption of national standards is the only way for the local government to obtain institutional legitimacy so that

its policy outcomes are administratively and professionally justified. This is to consider the common perception that local government officials are incapable in dealing with technical education matters. Nevertheless, this runs counter to the established neo-patrimonial logic that safeguards the entrenched interests of local institutional actors: politicians and government élites. To solve the contradiction, rather than totally rejecting the national standards that cost them the institutional legitimacy, Kupang local government officials performed an institutional assimilation by 'combining one logic's elements into the most prevalent one' (Thornton, et al., 2012: 165). In this sense, the professional logic that underlies the regime of national standards was manipulated to become more adaptable to the patrimonial system. In this case, the assimilation process then ended up as the politicisation of professional discourse in two ways. First, by introducing a ceremonial professionalisation policy that decouples professionals from their core professional skills. Through this, the patrimonial local government garners professional legitimacy simply by creating a teacher regime in the bureaucracy in which teachers are granted some administrative positions but whose responsibilities are irrelevant to their professional work. Second, moving the professional control, not just from an autonomous to heteronomous organisation (Scott, 1965), but also from the heteronomous to a fully state-co-opted bureaucracy.[2] The local government uses its own definition of professional and continues the intervention in school governance regardless of the central government's standards.

The Ceremonial Professionalisation of Local Education Authority

The integration of schools into the local government bureaucracy has affected not only the schools but also the bureaucracy. In the past, only elementary school teachers were part of the local bureaucracy but, after decentralisation, all public school teachers became local government employees. The effect is not only on the size of the local bureaucracy, of which teachers are now the predominant proportion, but also on the quality of the human resources of the bureaucracy. Teaching qualifications

[2] A professional organisation is autonomous when the organisation and control of all professional activities within the organisation are handled by the professional staff and heteronomous when those activities are organised and controlled by the administration (Scott, 1965).

have been continuously improved, thanks to the central government's professional certification policy (Chang, et al., 2013). It means that in particular areas their value as a resource is indicated by their educational qualification, which helps them gain preference (or priority) when competing with other local public servants. In big cities that have large economic bases this does not create any significant differences, but in small cities like Kupang it certainly does. Practically speaking, this gives incentives for government and for teachers. For the government, it has contributed to developing its bureaucratic resources, for teachers it means more opportunities to advance.

Ideally, as teachers become more professional, schools and students would benefit from improved teaching and outcomes (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Fishman et al., 2003). But, in Kupang, the incentive of having professional status with a higher education qualification along with a title and rank is linked to teachers' new role in the bureaucracy. Because of their status and qualification, teachers are more than ready to be appointed to a number of structural leadership positions within the bureaucracy. For the local bureaucracy, this means professionalisation simply because it is able to hire an occupational group with legitimate official status as professionals. But this is ceremonial professionalisation because in the new jobs teachers are assigned to administrative roles that are loosely coupled from their technical skills as an educator. In addition, they are forced to enter a new environment where the political control prevails over the administrative and professional roles. This entire professionalisation project is used to support the legitimacy of the local patronage.

The most extensive involvement of teachers in the bureaucracy was during Adoe's administration (2007–2012). At that time, the municipal government recruited 60 teachers to occupy senior positions in several government organisations. Of those 60, six became top leaders of the Dinas departments, that is, education, citizen registration, taxation, cooperative and small enterprises, urban community development and the civil service police department. Nevertheless, the massive movement of teachers into the bureaucracy brought public criticism and, in 2013, the new mayor, Salean, returned those teachers to schools. He promised not to assign teachers again to administrative leadership positions in the bureaucracy. However, he insisted on retaining the teachers who had been placed in the education Dinas. The mayor has publicly declared this a professionalisation project, saying that teachers are 'the ones who

understand education-related issues' (Pos Kupang, 2012). Thus, unlike other sectoral departments, the education Dinas has become the only Kupang government institution whose officials are mostly recruited from among non-administrative employees. In this sense, the administrative civil servants, whose whole career is in the education Dinas bureaucracy, have had to yield their opportunity of promotion to a higher rank to this new professional group of civil servants.

Nevertheless, whether the professionalisation project is relevant to the real organisational change to a more professional institution can be seen from two aspects: content and control (Noordegraaf, 2007). I reinterpret 'content' here as the kind of work being mandated and the technical skills needed to handle the responsibilities in the organisation. As with control, it is the mechanism through which the recruitment and performance assessment of the officials are done in more professional ways.

In terms of content, despite the professional leadership, the Dinas organisation needs to use only a little of the professional properties of the teachers in its activities. This can be explained by the fact that educational role of the Dinas is more administrative than technical, so that it is managerial skills that are most needed in the organisation. The Dinas only has one relevant technical division in its organisational structure, the curriculum division, but because the central government has set content standards, what is left for the Dinas to do normatively is to coordinate the implementation of these standards. In that sense, the education Dinas nearly functions as a clearing house that schools and teachers can refer to in obtaining information about central government policies. The other divisions are administrative divisions such as infrastructure and personnel management. One education Dinas official spoke of his routine activities in the following manner.

> What we usually did [about technical education matters] was to distribute information (*sosialisasi*) to schools … We passed on what the central government has told us related to, for example, the new curriculum, new policy … We facilitated teacher discussion groups to develop the syllabus … Other than that, we are managing infrastructure, admissions, teacher allowances, … teaching hours …. (Interview, Senior officer of Kupang Education Authority, 19 November 2013)

In terms of control, the education office did appear to become more of a professional than administrative institution because it was then run,

not by technical administrators, but rather by knowledge-based professional teachers. However, having the Dinas occupied by professionals did not necessarily mean that professional values prevailed over the traditional bureaucratic norms. If professionalism requires autonomous professional judgement, then the Kupang Dinas did not allow this to be exercised: it functioned as the full executor of higher political decisions. In Kupang, the Dinas officials could not use any initiative on strategic personnel matters, such as the appointment of principals and teacher recruitment, in areas where they should be in charge, because they must defer to political intervention from the mayoral office or the DPRD. For example, in the student admission process, where Dinas had the responsibility to set up standard procedures, frequently they could not prevent these procedures from being subverted by politicians. Parents often sought a recommendation from a politician to avoid the standard admission requirements so that their child may be admitted to a preferred school. On many occasions, the mayor intervened in education matters. On this, a principal shared his experience:

> IZ: How often did you attend meetings in Dinas?
> P: I am not sure. But mostly we were summoned when the mayor had some issues, for example, when parents have complained about school policy … umm, but yea, I think we met quite regularly when new student admission season comes …
> IZ: What was discussed in the meeting?
> P: … the Dinas official usually passed on the mayor's concern, what he wanted us to do in response to particular issues and we were asked to stick with that … (Interview, Kupang School Principal 2, 22 November 2013)

Nevertheless, the most important thing behind this teacher professionalisation was what it meant for the local government. On the one hand, the particular skills relevant to teaching are not needed in the Dinas and, on the other hand, the appointment of all Dinas personnel is subject to mayoral discretion; the placement of teachers does not necessarily consider whether the person meets the requirements of the job. According to some local participants, appointments to several administrative positions were related to 'political redemption'. A respected local university professor and social scientist I interviewed in Kupang said that following the dynamics of local politics, teachers offer more electoral potential because they have traditionally long been de facto leaders in their respective communities. Politicians can benefit from the political influence

these teachers have in their communities. As compensation, politicians offer positions in the local government bureaucracy (Interview, Alo Liliweri, 30 November 2013). But only teachers who have supported the winning political group could earn a position in the office (see Box 6.1).

Box 6.1: AF's Story
A number of research participants told the story of AF, one of the education Dinas' most senior officers. In 2009, he was suddenly removed from the X school headship before his term ended and seconded to be a government teacher in a mediocre private school. He mobilised a number of teachers to protest against the decision, arguing that no proper procedures were followed, and no reasons were given. This did not change the decision. The head of Dinas replied that his decision-making authority cannot be questioned. Controlling his anger, AF managed to join Salean's political campaign team aspiring to remove education from political interests. He saw that Salean would support this mission, [because] he was the only non-partisan, independent candidate standing. Upon Salean's victory, he was promoted to the senior level in the education Dinas. Because of his influence, he was also elected the local PGRI (teachers' union) leader a few months after his appointment to the Dinas. Because he had the power, he applied the political rules. AF followed the traditions of the predecessor he had opposed. Only four months after the new mayor was sworn in August 2012, the Dinas discharged 24 school principals and five inspectors in favour of new officers (Tribunnews, 2012). One year later, the second such move was much greater: no fewer than 88 principals and three inspectors were replaced (Pos Kupang, 2013).

Challenging the External Pressure: The Case of School Principal Appointments

Professionalism has become a contested discourse between the central government and the local government in Kupang. The contest is framed by each party's interest in the control of education governance. On the one hand, the central government has long been worried by the potential for local government political intervention in schools and, with this in mind, it initiated the creation of a more autonomous school administration through the school-based management (SBM) scheme. The extent to which school-based management can be productively implemented

largely relies on strong and professional school leadership (Botha, 2006; Cranston, 2002; Leithwood & Riehl, 2003). In this sense, the criteria of professional leadership should be reformulated and mechanisms to meet such criteria should also be designed. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, education personnel are the largest component of the bureaucratic apparatus, and the local government has a great need to optimise its control over them. This means that the local government's discretion to manage schools and their personnel will be used to fulfil such interests despite all the central government's efforts to realise its own ideals. Hence, in opposition to central government demands, the Kupang government opts to define its position on professionalism from the fact that all certified teachers are professionals by law, so that nominating any of them to perform a job of school leadership would be more than enough. By adopting this position, the local government is more relaxed in using its discretion.

From 2003 to 2010, the MoEC has developed at least three regulatory frameworks to standardise the nomination of school principals by each local government authority (MoEC, 2003, 2007, 2010). It is a standard that requires that principals must come from the teaching profession but possess five more competencies as indicators of their professional capacity: personal integrity, managerial competence, entrepreneurial skills, supervisory competence and social competence (MoEC, 2007). The ministry uses a strict mechanism to make sure that these indicators are possessed by each nominated principal. The most important of these is that the candidate must be actively involved from the very beginning of the recruitment process. Unlike the common practice in which the local government head at his or her discretion directly appoints a principal, the standardised processes would involve training and assessing each candidate. The process takes up to two years before the official placement is made.

As the MoEC's regulation has it, the professional route of principal recruitment started from the nomination proposed not by the Dinas but by other professionals, namely current principals and school inspectors. The Dinas then assess the proposed names against administrative and academic criteria. Once selected, the candidates must attend a 100-h professional training course organised by any institution accredited to the MoEC. As part of this training, they also have fieldwork for three months. By the end of the training, their achievement is then assessed to decide whether they deserve certification. Only candidates with a professional training certificate are eligible for official appointment and posting.



Fig. 6.2 National Standard Process of the Nomination of Principals (*Source* MoEC, 2010)

The appointment itself is not solely made by the Dinas official but rather involves an independent consultative committee whose membership consists of school inspectors and members of the city education board. Once appointed, a principal is entitled to a four-year service period that may be extended for another term should they show significant achievement (see Fig. 6.2).

Nevertheless, such a standardised mechanism has been disregarded when it comes to local government practice. For the local government this is not a regulation they feel obliged to comply with. In Kupang, almost all principals acknowledge that they were appointed without any preliminary selection process as mandated by the national regulation. All they know was that they were appointed by the mayor at his discretion and that they had never been actively involved in this process. Of eight senior secondary public school principals interviewed, only one said that he was recruited through open competition and that was before the decentralisation process. This senior principal compared the process of his recent appointment as principal with the first time he became principal, before the decentralisation was effective.

> At that time I was involved in the selection process. I attended some interviews, tests and training. There were tiered assessments from the district office to the central government's education department. The competition was nation-wide or at least province-wide. Then [following the decentralisation program] there was a merger of Kandep (the district office of the education department) and education Dinas ... Based on the district level grading, I got the highest ranking. I was then appointed on the basis of a

> provincial Dinas decree. Now there is no more selection ... I don't know if there is an internal selection in Dinas ... But, in terms of the selection that actively involves us in the process, I don't think so. (Interview, Kupang School Principal 4, 26 November 2013)

The Dinas official himself admitted that his office developed its own methods. According to him, the Dinas selected the candidates from among the teachers and assessed them using the criteria of official rank, length of teaching service and managerial capability. The head of the Dinas then nominated the selected candidates to be assessed by a local civil service agency (BKD) and local rank and position consideration agency (Baperjakat). The Baperjakat passed recommendations to the mayoral office with the mayor making the final decision. However, this process is a normal procedure for PNS promotion to any senior civil service position. No external committee, as instructed by the MoEC, was ever established in Kupang for the process of school principal selection. Therefore, as the Dinas official himself acknowledged, the selection process tended to be ceremonial since the mayor would normally select the candidates from his 'side' only. Aware of this, the Dinas usually screened the candidates being proposed to the mayor and in the end 'politics overcame professionalism' (Interview, 19 November 2013). The professionalism was simply reduced to a label attached to all certified teachers. The Dinas officials perceived that the appointed principals were simply professionals because they were selected from the professionally certified teachers.

The national standards for the recruitment of principals failed to gain legitimation in Kupang. The professional intentions of the national standards have been politicised to suit the interests of those who want to retain the patronage arrangements in the bureaucracy. A participant, who was chief editor of the leading local newspaper, said that the appointment of principals was like any other posting in the bureaucracy, which was based on either of two reasons: rewards (*balas jasa*) or retaliation (*balas dendam*) (Interview, 20 November 2013). The terms have been widely used in local political discussions since direct mayoral elections were introduced in 2007 (Tidey, 2012). Mayoral elections (*Pilkada*) have become the key event where all the processes of this bureaucratic politicisation originate. This is the moment of truth for local bureaucrats who want to keep their position or advance their career. This is also the chance for retaliation by those who have been displaced by the ruling regime. Some

principals, however, were not comfortable with the term 'retaliation', but agreed with 'rewards' arguing that in a political competition all parties are aware of the consequence of their decisions. As one senior principal of one of the most prominent public senior secondary schools acknowledged:

> There is no such thing as retaliation (*balas dendam*). Everyone knows the consequence of his or her political choice. Principals who choose the losing candidates understand the consequence of being sacked in order to accommodate those who helped the winners. This is a redemption (*balas jasa*) and it is normal. (Interview, Kupang School Principal 3, 25 November 2013)

As Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested, institutionalised actors tend to take their routine practices for granted. The pressure of working with a politicised bureaucracy has made the involvement of principals and teachers in the political process routine. A principal wisely put it this way:

> There is no political mobilisation initiated externally... it is rather those principals and teachers who mobilise themselves. (Interview, Kupang School Principal 4, 26 November 2013)

The pattern of relations among organisational actors as a consequence of local elections has constrained the way teachers react to the political dynamics. They are trapped in a situation in which, as local leadership is contested in a more open political battle, positions in the bureaucracy follow suit. Local élites 'identify who are with and against them' (Interview, Senior officer of Kupang Education Authority, 19 November 2013) and principals feel that this is a time when their careers are at stake. Displacement of principals from their positions happens because, as clients of their patron, most principals would stand or fall with his success or failure at an election. The 2007 and 2012 mayoral elections did see the incumbent fail to be re-elected, and this explains why many principals had been replaced after the election.

Nevertheless, as organisations, schools give major political actors an amount of bargaining power because they possess some potential resources that are politically invaluable. The Dinas officer acknowledged that a school's political capital rests on its two community groups: senior students and teachers. Senior secondary schools host 11th and 12th grade

students, most of whom are new voters, according to Indonesian electoral system records. In addition, school teachers traditionally serve as informal leaders in their respective communities and their influence in their community is particularly useful for political promotion (Interview, 19 November 2013). The relations of constraint between schools and bureaucracy have made education highly politicised. Principals are those responsible for organising the potential of such political capital in their schools. As a local journalist and a politician whom I interviewed recalled, these principals are held responsible for all potential votes coming from the school community. They co-opt teachers to consolidate the student vote and the school committee to take care of the parents' voting intentions (Interviews, 20 November and 5 December 2013). One testimony by a principal explains how this happened:

> We first persuaded our relatives and showed to the [mayoral candidate's] team members that they supported the candidate ... [Also], because a school principal is public figure, his or her act would by any means influence other people's choice. Teachers usually know our choice and most of them would follow a principal's choice. In our regular meetings, I presented the candidate's reputation and programs so my teachers would know him better. The rest is up to them. However, I never spoke about other candidates' weaknesses. I also suggested other supporters to run a polite and fair campaign, avoiding any backbiting against our competitors ... We never posed intervention to 11th and 12th grade students. We just let them know [our stand], no more. If we gave them too much intervention, they would tell their parents and that will appear in the newspaper. (Interview, Kupang School Principal 3, 25 November 2013)

Nevertheless, not all members of the school community always agree with the principal. Most principals tend to support an incumbent's political agenda, but teachers who have nothing to lose are more diverse in their political preferences. As a senior politician and local parliamentary member acknowledged, there is always internal competition for positions by members of a school's teaching staff and this affects their political preferences. Teachers who have been waiting long for an advance in their career would support those candidates who are likely to offer them better opportunities (Interview, 5 December 2013). The higher the school's prestige, the more intense is the competition. In this sense, such political dynamics do not or rarely galvanise less favourable, small schools. Most of these schools are miles away from the city centre and have fewer than two hundred students. Some have no access to public transport and serve

only a neighbouring community that need to cope with poverty. With a poor budget allocation from the local government and an inability of most parents to pay a tuition fee, principals have to struggle more than their colleagues in larger schools. Hence, it is unlikely that this kind of school is one that local politicians are interested in. This, for instance, is reflected in my interview with the principal of a senior secondary school which had fewer than 150 students and 17 teachers of whom only five were permanent employees.

> IZ: After decentralisation I heard that many teachers are actively involved in local politics. What do you know about it?
> AD: Yes, surely, they are. But I only know about it: [for example, I know] this one is working for this candidate [and the other one for the other], and you do not have to be involved [to have such knowledge]. Indeed, such a thing was present ... it is no longer a secret ... though there is no legal evidence, but I know it was there.
> IZ: What about in this school?
> AD: Here such things never influenced my teachers. Moreover, there are not any permanent employees. They did vote but are not actively involved in politics.
> IZ: What about you?
> AD: In my case, when I got [this position, it was because of] trust, it is nothing to do with that [politics] ... I do not know why [I was appointed] ... [politicisation is] impossible in this school because the [number of] teachers are still small ... not many students ... it's just not possible (Interview, Kupang School Principal 1, 21 November 2013).

The Politicisation of Formal Structure: The Case of Student Admissions

Another aspect of education management that has also been regulated by the central government is student admissions. School admission is the crucial case where the professional logic of school reform faces challenges in the local arena. The ministerial regulation on student admissions was first issued in 2002 but was revised in 2011 and again in 2014. There are no significant changes in the 2014 revision, but this study bases its analysis on the 2011 regulation. The central ministry requires that admissions must be a matter for individual schools and organised with the assistance of the school committee. The regulation stipulates the admission principles of objectivity, transparency, accountability and non-discrimination. It also prescribes details, such as student age limits; the maximum number

of students for each learning group; the restriction of admission fees; the use of the national exam score as a selection criterion and the specification of home-to-school distance. In all of these processes, the Dinas is left with the role of authorising the inter-district and inter-school student transfer as well as general coordination and monitoring of the admission process in the schools to comply with the nationally regulated standards (MoEC and MoRA, 2011).

Unlike the case of the appointment of principals, the central government standard for student admissions became an unchallenged institutional pressure for local governments. The local government bowed to this pressure; the formal structure of student admission practices is set out in 'the Education Dinas guideline for new student admission' (Dinas Pendidikan Kota Kupang, 2014). In the guideline, for instance, the Dinas set 34 as the maximum number of students a public school could admit to each learning group. This is below the maximum number allowed by the central government, which is 40 students. Because in each of 12 senior secondary public schools in the city there were eight learning groups, every school could have enrolled a maximum of 272 students and, in total, there would be 3264 new students admitted (Dinas Pendidikan Kota Kupang, 2014). In the schools, eligibility criteria for admitting students were also set up. Every school launched its admission team whose responsibility was to select candidates based on the specified criteria. To control the enrolment size, some schools employed the minimum score taken from the previous school level's final examination. This normally applied in some élite public schools. For others, they did not require any score limit.

However, as Meyer and Rowan (1977) maintain, the formal structure serves as a powerful rationalised myth to legitimate organisational behaviour, but will last only as a window dressing policy when the demand for technical efficiency comes. At this time, the organisation will decouple this formal structure from its practices. In our case, the formal guideline for admissions had never translated into practice. Such decoupling was inevitable because the professional logic of national standards runs counter to the established cultural belief that is supported by the patrimonial politics. This cultural belief centred on another myth, that of *sekolah favorit* (favourite schools). This is the local term for élite public schools. The myth was not rationalised by the number of observable achievements, such as accreditation score, but rather by the commonly accepted beliefs about a school's reputation. There were four favourite high schools (of 12

Table 6.4 Senior Secondary School Student Admission in Kupang, 2014

No	*Institution*	*Accreditation**	*New Student Admitted***
1	SMAN 1	Non-accredited	694
2	SMAN 2	B	607
3	SMAN 3	A	765
4	SMAN 4	B	503
5	SMAN 5	A	345
6	SMAN 6	B	324
7	SMAN 7	B	349
8	SMAN 8	B	193
9	SMAN 9	B	255
10	SMAN 10	C	68
11	SMAN 11	B	65
12	SMAN 12	Non-accredited	56

Sources *http://referensi.data.kemdikbud.go.id/ (accessed 20 November 2015) **http://dapo.dikmen.kemdikbud.go.id/ (accessed 20 November 2015)

in all) to which parents and students' aspiration were concentrated every year (schools 1 to 4 in Table 6.4). The parents insisted their children be admitted despite the schools' limited capacity. The higher accreditation ranking of other, non-favourite schools did little to attract these parents. A high school principal of non-favourite school illustrated the huge pressure for children to be admitted to those favoured schools by saying: 'they even do not care if they squeeze together in one classroom as long as they are enrolled in those schools' (Interview, 21 November 2013).

The strength of this myth has provoked a profound political resonance. The parents' aspirations for their children soon transformed to political pressure, which involved not only those parents but also high-ranking officials and politicians. All shared the pressure over schools. It has been a traditional practice that senior officials in the bureaucracy use their influence to press the principal to give favourable treatment to their relatives. Parents who got their wishes to place their children in desired schools unfulfilled went to the Dinas officials or city councillors to ask that they use their political influence to prevail over the school's admissions policy (Ombudsman and PIAR NTT, 2013). Thus, the professional logic of formal structures gave way to political influence. Principals had no choice but to follow or risk their position. A principal described the conflict

between professional and patrimonial logic in the admission process as follows:

> Within the admission guideline it has been clearly written what is to be done. Yet, when the entire process ended, [but] some interests remained unfulfilled we were then summoned [to a meeting] and then asked to find the way out for all to stay safe. In the end, [we had to] bypass the official guidelines. So, there was no consistency between regulation and implementation. Sometimes we were confused. We were blended into the political process. In politics illegality [is the one] which should be endorsed. (Interview, Kupang School Principal 7, 27 November 2013)

In this sense, two types of admission were possible: the official admission (*seleksi resmi*) at the first phase to comply with the formal regulation and unofficial admission (*seleksi tidak resmi*) at the second stage to accommodate popular interests (Ombudsman and PIAR NTT, 2013). Some principals also called it pure selection (*seleksi murni*) and impure selection (*seleksi tidak murni*). One of the principals of an élite school acknowledged that the proportion of both types of admission could be equal at his school. It means that half of the student population in this favourite school was recruited 'unprofessionally'. During the school admissions season, the principals of these favourite schools became the centre of attention. Their offices and houses attract visitors lobbying for places. A principal of one favourite school admitted:

> In this city all people know me. They contacted me, came to my school or my house. [To avoid them] I often disappeared. I switched off my cell phone ... I asked my wife to tell these people I was going to Jakarta, while in fact I was at home taking a nap. (Interview, Kupang School Principal 3, 25 November 2013)

However, only those who have strong backing are admitted through political selection. Children of relatives of high-ranking officials are more likely to secure a place, for the others it depends on how hard their backers fight for them. In addition to Dinas officials, local parliamentary members frequently play a role as a backer for a student's admission. The chief of the education committee of the city legislative council confirmed that:

> There has been misperception among parents, they always said that particular schools are favourites and others are not. Eventually they took all the

> efforts to send their children into those schools although they did not have enough score qualification. We in the council received many rejection forms brought by these parents. Because they insisted, we then decided [asking those public schools] to open morning and late afternoon classes … It is our responsibility to accommodate people's aspirations and it is the government responsibility to provide education for its people without discrimination. (Interview, 5 December 2013)

The launch of morning and late afternoon classes means that student numbers in each class go beyond the ideal. The practice of unofficial admissions has become routine, and the government has been always tricked by its own policy. In 2010, after the regular admission process, the government offered 13 new class places in some favourite schools. In 2012, the DPRD and Dinas made a controversial decision when they ordered the number of classes in one favourite school to be three times the optimum (from 5 to 16 classes). The most contentious point was that the decision affected one school only, which is the favourite school in the city and in high demand, although there were ten other public schools. The reason for the decision was the excessive insistence by parents that their children should be admitted to that school. To cope with inadequate classroom accommodation, the school modified other rooms, such as teacher rooms, laboratories and libraries. In addition, students admitted through this unofficial channel had to pay extra money as compensation for the school to provide more facilities and to pay for teachers' extra hours.

Student admission has created an education crisis every year. Certainly, the problem not only stemmed from the patrimonial political environment but also from uncertain policy arrangements. Few education policies in Kupang were endorsed by local legislation, on which the city councillors and mayor should agree. Each government policy has been supported only by what are known as 'technical guidelines' (*Petunjuk teknis* or abbreviated as *Juknis*) that were issued by the local education Dinas. This kind of Dinas-made regulation can be easily changed at any time. Besides, its implementation is prone to subversion and intervention from higher authorities. A local NGO activist I interviewed over the phone said that some civil society organisations have pushed to legislate for these policies but have yet to get any response (Interview, 27 November 2015). In addition, the myth of favourite schools has been increasingly institutionalised because of the support from the technical environment of school policy

arrangement. What makes a favourite school favourite, apart from mythical aspects of pride and history, is that these schools are more advanced in terms of facilities and accessibility. Although favourite schools are spoiled by continuing government aid, this is at the expense of the other schools, which are overlooked. Because the government grant is given on the basis of individual students, big schools always get more.

Internal Resistance to the Neo-Patrimonial Education Governance

The strong dominance of the neo-patrimonial structure has led to structuration that either constrains the patterns of relations in the organisational fields or incites resistance from those who have been disempowered by the structure at the expense of its dominance. In Kupang, the dominant neo-patrimonial structure was proven to lead to agreement and convergence because most believed that decision-making in education governance was controlled by the ruling patron and those who wished to be part of the dominant system must follow the known but unwritten rules. Yet, as sociologists like Fligstein and McAdam (2012) contend, the relational system in the organisational field is dynamic and therefore the potential for disagreement and dissonance always exists. These opposing, the less dominant, come with different frames and narratives to justify their resistance (Thornton, et al., 2012: 166). In Kupang, not all education personnel were co-opted by political patronage. There are school inspectors and principals who criticise the political approach in education arrangements. They use some confronting vocabulary such as 'incompetent official', 'poor performance', 'violation of the procedure', 'intervention' and 'political interests'.

School inspectors were among those critical of the local education governance in Kupang. The school inspector office was an organisation under the Dinas responsible for monitoring the technical aspects of education in schools, and more important, school principals' leadership and teachers' teaching performance. During the New Order era, school inspectors were highly empowered because they were part of the regime's surveillance system. A senior school inspector I met explained that before decentralisation, school inspectors were 'very respected and nerve-wracking [for teachers]'. He illustrated this by saying that at that time a school inspector could impose on-site punishments to school principals or teachers who were found coming late to school or failed to show

a teaching preparation document at the time of inspection. Their recommendations on teachers' and principals' performance were considered highly important by the Dinas or the central government ministry. But after decentralisation, although their official supervisory function remains, the inspector's role is marginalised. In Kupang, the school inspector office was no more than a shelter for senior educators and school principal retirees who were dumped because of their contrary political views. Knowing that their careers are affected more by political influences than by professional and that inspectors' evaluations had no more influence on their careers, school principals and teachers are now behaving differently. For example, he has frequently visited schools that were unattended by their principals despite his giving them notice of his visit (Interview, Kupang School Supervisor, 6 December 2013).

This organisational change has made many school inspectors critical of Dinas policies despite their positions as members of the Dinas bureaucracy. I met three school inspectors and all expressed disappointment with the pattern of education governance in the city. In the matter of principal appointments, a senior school inspector saw that the state-co-opted process has sacrificed the more competent in favour of the less capable. According to him, the school inspector office always had regular evaluations of principal and teacher performance reported to Dinas every semester. Yet, these reports have never been reflected in mayoral decisions. He noticed that the 2013 appointments mostly accommodated the professionally mediocre leaving many more capable teachers unposted or even discharged. He bore witness of how political preference is advanced in the face of professional records and integrity. He narrated a profile of a successful school principal who was dumped from his position because of political considerations.

> There was one principal who has made exceptional achievements during his term ... He made lots of important changes from the first day he served. First, the improvement of graduate quality ... then the improvement of graduate percentage ... But he is now removed unreasonably ... Before his arrival, the school was in a total mess ... Graduate percentage was extremely low ... Then came this guy and everything changed dramatically ... Whereas during the old principal's term you would have seen most school buildings covered by tall grass ... Toilets were awfully dirty ... There was no good [environment] for students' learning. (Interview, Kupang School Supervisor, 6 December 2013)

However, although the demand of change was high from these opposing field participants, not all were committed to active involvement in bringing about the change. In other words, not all were playing the role of institutional entrepreneur. Institutional entrepreneurship is defined as 'the activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or transform existing ones' (Maguire et al., 2004: 657). In this sense, despite their critical voices, the school inspectors failed to drive any change in the politicised environment. However, some principals succeeded in playing the role of 'institutional entrepreneur' to counter the prevailing logic of patronage and to offer their own way to promote professional behaviour.

Hence, not all principals were passively submerged in the patrimonial bureaucracy. Some I interviewed claimed that, despite the powerful local government, the regime was in fact powerless at the same time. This particularly stemmed from the lack of knowledge and of economic capital: there were not enough resources to maintain control consistently or universally. The local government involvement in school affairs mostly happened on the 'front stage' and rarely reached the 'back stage' (Van Tatenhove et al., 2006). Thus, besides the technical and substantial matters of the learning process, the local government also lost control in some administrative areas. Because high schools were given money, mostly from external resources, such as the central government, parents and the private sector, the local government did not have the legitimacy to control school spending. Some principals on their own initiative communicate with and lobby MoEC officials in Jakarta to get some funding and the Jakarta officials directly monitor the spending through on-site visits.

Some critics among school principals see that the situation reflected local government ignorance and indifference to education development, despite its continuous politicisation. But for some others, the situation was seen as an opportunity to advance the professional logic in their own school environment. Among those seeing the opportunity behind this politicised governance was Principal AB. The elaboration of AB's story is important to be presented here because it offers not only arguments for resistance to the highly politicised field but also the narrative of institutional entrepreneurship through his effort to establish a professional environment in his school. The narrative of AB was popular among school inspectors in the city: he was known for his effort to reform the school away from local government support despite his failure to survive for a second term. His narrative will be complemented by the contrary

narrative of AA, his predecessor in school Y and strong upholder of the hegemonic patrimonial logic.

I managed to interview AB one day after his replacement was announced. For comparison, I also interviewed his predecessor, AA, the principal stigmatised by the school inspector as a non-achiever but who managed to retain his position under two different political regimes. AB came to take over AA's leadership in that school in 2009, or two years after the mayoral election. The school was not known to be among the élite schools. Until the end of AA's leadership in 2009, its reputation remained the same. AB described his impression on his first arrival; the environment was just as the inspector had told me: 'boggy schoolyard with tall grass, dirty toilets, damaged classrooms, low accreditation …' (Interview, Kupang Principal 7, 27 November 2013). During his leadership he transformed the school. He improved the accreditation grade from C to A in less than three years. He built five new classrooms and renovated the old ones. He also transformed the previously marshy schoolyard to a sports training facility. He claimed that all of these physical developments were made with not a single cent of local government funding.

To improve the school's management, he introduced more transparent administration and more disciplined behaviour for school personnel. He required all his staff to come to and leave the school on time. He imposed an unprecedented, strict regulation of monthly food allowance entitlements: the allowance is now precisely calculated on an attendance basis. Previously, the staff received additional allowance by default, regardless of the number of unattended days. The discipline, he acknowledged, had to some extent helped reduce teacher absenteeism because teachers often left school for outside employment. After this regulation was enforced, teachers were forced to focus on their responsibilities at school.

However, these reforms eventually caused him trouble. Some teachers who disliked his policies accused him of acting against the norm. They particularly questioned the food allowance policy, which was seen as abusing their rights and they lodged a report to the top leader who was supportive of their protests. That AB belongs to an ethnic minority group, he supposed, aggravated his situation. There are indeed some theories saying that ethnic affiliation does matter in the recruitment of civil service officials in Kupang (Dagang, 2004; Tidey, 2010). AB also believed that the new leader preferred his own ethnic group and relatives being posted to the public service. After all that he had done, he was disappointed that

his career as a principal ended unexpectedly. He claimed that from the performance point of view, all the benefits he had achieved for his school should have granted him a second term. Yet, like other principals, he had never been shown his performance evaluation and that makes him think that no proper procedure had been taken to remove him. He complained, pointing out that some underperforming principals were granted another term.

> Everything is out of the procedure. If procedure is to be followed, the local government should have reviewed my performance and let me know what their opinion is … I bet among all the existing principals, I am the only one holding principal training certificate ... But when we talk about decentralisation, power speaks louder than regulation. (Interview, Kupang School Principal 7, 27 November 2013)

But, unlike AB, AA strongly believed in the neo-patrimonial leadership and intentionally involved himself in maintaining its domination in Kupang's education governance. After his six-year spell in school Y, which was branded a failure by the school inspector, AA was promoted to school X, one of the élite public high schools in the city. And, at the time when AB was dismissed, AA was given a second term as principal in the same school. It has been a political tradition in the city that the next step, after being a principal in school X, is a senior position in the Dinas bureaucracy. Several times, former principals of this school were promoted to lead the city education Dinas. However, unlike AB, whose leadership had achieved much for the school, AA's leadership resulted in a decline in the school's quality. The school inspector considered that, despite its strong popularity, the school's academic reputation had been challenged not only by its private school competitors (Christian and Catholic institutions) but also by other, less-favoured, public schools (Interview, Kupang School Supervisor, 6 December 2013). The accreditation score fell from A to B and, as I observed, the school did not present a good environment for learning: the classrooms were overfull, and schoolyards were poorly cleaned. Parents were competing for places for their children in that school only because of its historical reputation.

AA himself acknowledged that what concerned him during his leadership in school X was neither the progress of students' learning nor the school management. He claimed that the school enrolled the best students of the city, so it takes only a small effort to teach them. Similarly,

in terms of the managerial system, he argued that the school bureaucracy had also been settled for a long time so that there is no need to create any improvement. What troubled him the most was the external pressure from politicians, government officials, mass media and the parents. This is because the school is the place where all these interests meet. According to him, becoming a principal in school X always brings anyone fame not only among élites but also among the common people. Hence, the most important skill needed is how to deal with external pressures. Or, as he put it bluntly:

> To survive as a principal here you have to smartly analyse the direction of 'political gale'. Whether we want it or not we have to be involved in politics. (Interview, 25 November 2013)

AA shows how he managed to internalise this logic so that he survived different political assignments. According to AA, the competition to win the position of principal in school X is always tough, even though he claimed that he never particularly placed himself in contention. He delayed his acceptance for a period of religious contemplation when offered the job for the first time. But, for him, blending into local political games is unavoidable, and it was his political preferences during the mayoral election that got him through. He believed that those discharged principals were either supporters of the opposition or simply reluctant to be part of the game. AA himself survived three mayoral spells during his career as a principal. He strongly believed that as part of the local government bureaucracy, public school principals are the mayor's servants so that they must be loyal to him or her. In the first direct mayoral election in 2007, he put himself on the vice-mayor's side, who run because the mayor did not stand. In the second election in 2012, he initially went for the incumbent, but since the mayor failed to go to the second round, he shifted his support to the contender, who in the end won. This political move was part of what he called 'a smartly analysing political gale'.

Conclusion

In Kupang, educational decentralisation has led to the emergence of a politicised schooling environment. This has happened because the central government's national standards of education management failed to cope with the locally established structure of a neo-patrimonial bureaucracy.

The neo-patrimonial structure prevails because it suits the entrenched interests of local institutional actors, politicians and bureaucracy élites. This local structure then assimilated the elements of the professional logic of national standards to legitimate its domination. The professional discourses have been politicised in many instances: bureaucracy, school leadership and student enrolment. However, structuration involves the dynamics of domination and resistance as well as agreement and disagreement. Thus, despite the hegemonic influence of patrimonial bureaucracy, there are some education personnel in Kupang who seek the opportunity to challenge the established structure. Although these attempts at resistance end in failure, in the sense of influencing the whole organisational field of Kupang education, but some of them have been successful in changing their own organisations. The next chapter will discuss different educational decentralisation practices in which the local élites have otherwise used the national standards as the source of institutional legitimacy to break down the established local structure and invent a new governance tradition.

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CHAPTER 7

Educational Decentralisation and the Rise of the New Managerial State: The Case of Surabaya City

> We hired the university (for recruiting school principals) because we have a new vision regarding school principals. For us, they are more than ordinary educators: they are managers – Senior officer of Surabaya education authority. (Interview, 18 October 2013)

Introduction

Over the past decade, there has been a growing number of local government leaders whose legitimation emerges as they change their leadership style away from traditional bureaucratic approaches. They are not career politicians but have managed to combine political populism with the discourse of the new public management, which promotes ideas of good governance, accountability and privatisation. President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was among the early figures who brought this trend into popular discourse when he became the mayor of Solo (2005–2012) and then the governor of Jakarta (2012–2014). While he was mayor he introduced some 'business friendly' policies to restructure the inefficient bureaucracy, deregulate business procedures and redesign public service offices to be like bank lobbies (Von Luebke et al., 2009). All of these were combined with populist programs, such as providing free healthcare services, awarding education scholarships and revitalising traditional markets (Mietzner, 2015). Since 2010, there has been a growing number

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of local governments adopting similar managerial styles, and Surabaya is one of them. This managerial government is another example of the local response to the political decentralisation framework, which then influences the construction of local policy arrangements, including those in the education sector.

Just like Solo under Jokowi in the mid-2000s, Surabaya under Mayor Tri Rismaharini (Risma) has also been in the national spotlight since 2010. Although not the originator of several public service reforms in the city, the public gives her credit for those reforms, which centre on the transparency, efficiency and empowerment. Similar to Chapter 6 (on Kupang's case), this chapter analyses how this locally developed managerial state corresponds to the central government's pressure for standardisation; whether institutional contradiction has taken place in Surabaya and how this local institutional setting gives effect to the arrangement of local education governance? Before answering such questions, this chapter will start with a brief discussion on managerialism and its relationship to decentralisation, education and educational decentralisation.

Decentralisation, Managerialism and Education

Managerialism and its relationship to decentralisation and education decentralisation has been the subject of many studies (for example Clarke & Newman, 1997; Gewirtz, 2002; Mok, 2003; Simkins, 2000; Thrupp & Willmott, 2003). Decentralisation and managerialism have several similarities in terms of goals, strategies and even technical terminologies. First, managerialism and decentralisation share the idea of revisiting the state's role in public services. Decentralisation offers the transfer of responsibility from the central to the local level: managerialism offers the transfer of method from structured bureau-professionalism to business-like public management (Clarke & Newman, 1997). Second, both share the strategies of how to reduce the government role in public administration, that is, by giving autonomy to schools or any unit in the management and empowering parents as consumers. Third, decentralisation and managerialism are supported by some official discourses, such as management effectiveness, accountability, efficiency and competitiveness. The most familiar concept associated with education decentralisation has been school-based management (SBM). As many have described, SBM is the way a school changes from a classical bureaucratic structure by adopting business management principles and instruments (Gewirtz,

2002; Hatcher, 2005). And this reflects the essential core of managerialism: the superiority of management in organisational life (Hoyle & Wallace, 2005).

Nevertheless, most debates about the relationship between managerialism and decentralisation centre on a contradiction: despite its vision of decentralisation, managerialism also provides another means for centralism to find its way back. Hoyle and Wallace differentiate 'management' and 'managerialism': the former is a means to achieve effective leadership for the sake of greater organisational goals, the latter is management as a goal in itself (Hoyle & Wallace, 2005). What is meant by 'management' here is the leadership culture and practices commonly used to run private enterprises. In this sense, it is strongly believed that practices that are effective and efficient for the private sector should be relevant to the public sector (Rees & Rodley, 1995). Because the very core business of management is the art of leadership and control (Koopman, 1991; Lynn, 1996), managerialism becomes 'an ideology which holds that not only *can* all aspects of organisational life be controlled but that they *should be* controlled' (Hoyle & Wallace, 2005: 68).

How does that control take place in the managerial context? Historically, the ideology emerged in reaction to the centralised welfare state whose overarching bureaucracy suffered from inefficiency and was ill-adapted to the demands of complexity and change (Clarke & Newman, 1997). The environment that shaped its massive institutionalisation was the collapse of welfarism and the reinforcement of the neoliberal market economy. Thus, as Newman and Clarke argue, managerialism transformed the state and its public service apparatus from bureau-professionalism, characterised by sociopolitical impartiality, commitment to public service and valued knowledge, to the rule of managers, characterised by individual freedom, market competition and valued efficiency (Clarke & Newman, 1997). Managers are guided by technical rationality and bounded by a self-disciplined culture of cost-effective performance. Management must have tight and transparent budgets. To achieve efficiency, public service and public goods provision are pushed to embrace the competitive market mechanism by contracting third-party providers. As with the state managers, performance is measured by universal criteria of accountability. Managerialism is held to promote the decrease of professional values and the intensification of work over organisational goals (Rees & Rodley, 1995).

Nevertheless, just as centralism can be reversed through the dynamics of central–local relations (Karlsen, 2000), so can the managerialism (Desai & Imrie, 1998). As an ideology, managerialism is not only a national or state level business. As local governments adjust to political decentralisation, they can initiate managerial practices and build their own managerial states with or without a national institutional template. Apart from a central mandate, the managerialisation of a government also depends on other legitimating environments, such as the extent of modernisation that is being promoted (Brooks, 2000; Cochrane, 2000), the dynamics of local politics and the development of a market economy (Dannestam, 2008; Desai & Imrie, 1998). For example, because of their relatively strong desire for greater modernity and the benefits of an advanced market economy, urban local governments are more likely to adapt a managerial ideology faster than rural administrations. More recently, the increased use of information and communication technology has inspired many city governments in the world to improve the capacity of their managerial administration, creating what is popularly known as e-government (Moon & Norris, 2005). This new technology, on the one hand, strengthens coordinated network building, increases external collaboration and empowers citizens as customers (Tat-Kei Ho, 2002). Yet, on the other hand, as a managerial instrument, it also enforces effective accountability through the architecture of information control (Homburg, 2004). As Homburg describes it:

> The information architecture consists of one or more relatively centralized databases that more or less enforce common procedures to be used. Here, informatization is the precursor for further standardization, formalization and (implicit) centralization (Homburg, 2004: 554).

In the meantime, scholars have shown in a number of studies how managerialism affects the organisation of education (Hall, 2005; McInerney, 2003; Simkins, 2000; Thrupp & Willmott, 2003). McInerney states that the managerialist education decentralisation has paved the way for schools to enter 'a dangerous territory' because it 'devalues the pedagogical attributes of school leadership and reinforces a growing divide between teachers and administrators' (McInerney, 2003: 57). Having interviewed a number of Australian principals for his study of the effect of SBM on school leadership, he found that, in their view, educational leadership has nothing to do with educational skills but with administrative

skills such as budgeting and setting organisational programs (McInerney, 2003). As such, Wong has shown how decentralisation creates massive deskilling for teachers because of an overwhelming government control over curriculum and testing within a competitive schooling environment, and increased administrative workloads being imposed (Wong, 2006).

The Political Construction of the Managerial State of Surabaya

Flyn (2000) argues that the institutional changes that support the rise of managerial logic are preceded by either one or more of three events: a fiscal crisis that requires a spending reduction; a legitimacy crisis that pushes the government and the political parties to restore popular support; or an internal power struggle that makes managerial reform a critical way to retain or gain power. The second and third scenarios have been reflected in the Surabaya experience. Since the first post-reform election in 1999, Surabaya has been an area of strong support for the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). The party had been widely known as the New Order's strongest political opposition and it inherited huge political popularity from the collapse of the regime. Despite winning the local election, however, the PDI-P failed to dislodge the local strongman, Sunarto Sumoprawiro, from the mayoral office. At that time, the mayor was elected by the city legislative council (DPRD), and Sumoprawiro used his political influence to retain his position as mayor. However, in October 2001, Sumoprawiro fell sick for a long period and went to Melbourne for medical treatment. His absence allowed the opposition to plot his impeachment in January 2002 and paved the way for Bambang Dwi Hartono, a PDI-P politician, to be appointed mayor (World Bank, 2003).

Hartono was the founder of Surabaya's managerial state and his willingness to favour it was much more constructed by the local political environment. Newly appointed, he had little of the political capital needed to run the government effectively at a time when political power rested with political parties, the military and the bureaucracy. Hartono was the first civilian mayor of Surabaya after decades of military leadership ever since the country's independence. Unlike Kupang's mayors, who have all arisen from dominant local bureaucratic patronage, Hartono was a former mathematics teacher who turned to politics shortly before the end of the New Order. He could not control local politics and the DPRD because he

was not a party leader. However, despite the odds, he was determined to build his own political regime. The only institutional resource for him to legitimate many of his policies were the central government's civil service reform programs.

In addition to political decentralisation, after 1998 the central government did much to differentiate itself from the New Order. The new government introduced managerial discourses of good governance, transparency and accountability as antitheses to the New Order's image of corruption, bureaucracy and inefficiency. Vast quantities of regulations and academic papers were produced and disseminated to support and legitimate the implementation of these principles in public service administration, nationally and locally. In 1999, the government promulgated Law 43 of 1999 to amend the New Order's civil service Law 8 of 1974. One of the most important changes being made in the amendment was the replacement of the term *pembinaan* (development) in almost all parts of the regulation with the term *manajemen* (management). The term *pembinaan* was seen as patronising and had characterised the previous Indonesian bureaucracy. In contrast, *manajemen* is a completely new term that is hardly to be found in the old version of the law. On civil service management, the law explains as follows:

> Civil service management is the whole effort to improve efficiency, effectiveness and the degree of professionalism in the implementation of official tasks, functions, and obligations consisting of planning, provision, quality development, placement, promotion, payment, benefit, and termination. (GoI, 1999: article 1 [8])

The law strictly regulates the detachment of civil service bureaucracy from political organisations: civil servants are forbidden to become members of any political party. This was contrary to the New Order tradition that all civil servants should be members of the Golkar Party. The central government also produced hundreds of regulations to standardise public service management throughout the country. Despite the national campaign, local autonomy and strong local patronage in the bureaucracy have led to differences in the reform implementation. But in Surabaya, the central policy became the institutional resource for the new leader to create a new tradition as well as a new power resource.

By garnering the institutional legitimacy from those central standards, Hartono initiated the path to managerial reform in Surabaya's

bureaucracy. He introduced business ethics to his bureaucracy: performance, accountability and transparency. To support those goals, he started to promote fresh, young professionals to fill top positions in his local government bureaucracy: Rismaharini, his then successor, was one among them. The managerial reform also involved the recast of managerial structures of local government-owned companies from being bureaucrat-dominated to being more autonomous, controlled by professional managers with open, third-party agents involved in recruitment (Ashadi, 2012). Later, under Rismaharini, this recruitment system has been extended to many public service areas including education. Hartono also initiated electronic-based public goods procurement (e-procurement) before the central government introduced the same system in 2003 (Ashadi, 2012). His successor, Rismaharini expanded this electronic management to other sectors: budget (e-budgeting), administrative performance (e-controlling), departmental work planning (e-planning) and civil service performance assessment (e-performance). Under Rismaharini's administration, e-performance is central to her managerial reform. It is supported by an incentive scheme in which civil servants are rewarded or punished.

The affiliation to the national standards had strengthened these mayors' external legitimacy but at the same time threatened their internal legitimacy. They obtained institutional supports from the professional communities among Jakarta-based policymakers and university academics but had to face resistance from the entrenched patrimonial structure of local political parties and bureaucratic elites. Having the bureaucracy turned into business-styled organisations means that civil servants are very unlikely to extend their political influence on technical decisions and therefore to gain personally from the process. During their leadership, Hartono and Rismaharini were both faced with impeachment by the DPRD. Less than a year after his inauguration, on 11 July 2002, all members of the DPRD, including members of the PDI-P, decided to impeach Hartono because they were not satisfied with the mayor's accountability report.[1] Hartono's successor, Rismaharini, faced parliamentary impeachment in 2011 because of a trivial case involving

[1] Some analysts contended it was because the mayor refused to provide 'special compensation' for the city councillors as had been traditional. The other reason was that Hartono had a bad relationship with his party's leader who was also the DPRD speaker, Muhammad Basuki. This latter name was then gaoled for corruption (Aribowo, 2008).

charges for street billboards.[2] However, both mayors did not retreat, and the impeachments were denied by Jakarta. Instead, the impeachment proceedings earned both of them much more popular support.

In time, these managerial leaders successfully installed themselves as the new local power source. Hartono and Rismaharini were both extremely popular during their time in office. In the first direct mayoral election in 2005, Hartono won the contest against three other contenders. In 2010, he was legally barred from standing for another term and therefore endorsed a former member of his staff, Tri Rismaharini, to stand while he acted as her vice-mayor. Both won office in the 2010 mayoral election thanks to Hartono's popularity. Yet, after the pair won the election, Rismaharini unpredictably managed to move from under Hartono's shadow and to become a more popular and stronger political figure. This made for friction between the two, which led to Hartono's resignation in 2013. Rismaharini proved her reputation when she won the 2015 election for her second term with 80 per cent of the vote despite conflicts with Hartono and with all the Surabaya political parties. This gave her important source of internal legitimacy to strengthen her managerial government despite the challenge from the entrenched interests of local elites. In the next part, I will discuss how the managerial state influenced the structural form of local education management.

The Making of the New Managerial Leadership

From Bureau-Professional to Managerial Leadership

As an institution, managerialism legitimates the introduction of market values and business management ethics to public service organisations. In terms of organisational structure, managerialism empowers the managerial class to replace the established bureau-professionals who were subject to politicisation and state co-optation (Clarke & Newman, 1997). These

[2] Shortly after her inauguration, Rismaharini issued two mayoral decrees to increase the street billboard charge by up to 300 per cent. This was to deal with city streets overcrowded with billboards. This was against the interests of businesses that had benefited for a long time and some of the businessmen were city councillors. In 31 January 2011, the DPRD announced its official recommendation for the impeachment of the mayor. Hartono, who was Rismaharini's deputy at that time, was suspected to be the mastermind behind this impeachment because the competition that started to rise between the two leaders (Amalia, 2016).

institutional models have been adopted in restructuring the organisation of education in Surabaya. However, this kind of managerial class is not the one that, as Gottfried once characterised, had 'already had positioned itself in a corporate economy and would now provide state-authorised social services' (Gottfried, 2001: 51). Rather, this new managerial class develops from among traditional bureaucrats as the result of the promotion of managerial values. In Surabaya, the acceptance of managerial values is also conditioned by the dynamics of resistance against the politicisation of the bureaucracy.

Traditionally, the organisation of the education Dinas in Surabaya was the realm of professional educators, where teachers, usually, were assigned to leadership positions. Hartono's regime kept this tradition: he assigned former school principals to fill top positions in the education Dinas throughout his mayoral term. During his two terms in office, the Dinas was led by two teachers, both former high school principals, Soeparno and Sahudi. Other teachers filled second-tier positions, such as secretary and technical field coordinator (*kepala bidang*). Just like Kupang, the organisation then came to be led by professional educators, where teachers controlled the administration. And, as we have discussed in the case of Kupang, this kind of professional grouping is easily politicised.

Hence, despite his managerial reforms, Hartono was not able to control fully the intrusion of political interests in his bureaucracy, particularly the education sector, which is among the biggest disbursers of local government funding. Hartono himself became increasingly influential in the PDI-P élite, and it may be inferred there was some accommodation of political interests. During Hartono's time, the reputation of Dinas had been crushed by several corruption scandals involving its head. From 2005 to 2011, several adverse reports were lodged against the Dinas head; the cases involved manipulation of central government's special allocation fund, online school admissions corruption and the misuse of local school grants. In 2006, the police named him a suspect for the provision of fake microscopes in schools. However, he was said to have strong political backup, particularly from the PDI-P, and remained in office until the end of his term in 2011.

Rismaharini ended such bureau-professional traditions after her election in 2010. As an academic and member of provincial education council put it, this was because of her attitude that a political party is more 'a troublemaker than problem solver' (Interview, 19 October 2013). The nominations for positions of leadership in the education Dinas was a long

process that caused tensions between the mayor and the party, the PDI-P. From the beginning, the party had warned that for political ethics' sake she should respect the party's advice despite her right not to. The reason, as a PDI-P politician and chairman of the city legislative council's education committee, explained, was simply because the party was involved in delineating the mayor's education program for an election campaign (Antarajatim, 2011). The PDI-P suggested that the tradition of appointing bureau-professional officers should be kept by selecting from among internal Dinas professionals. Some opposition parties, such the Welfare and Justice Party (PKS), argued for the nomination of external, but professional, people whose visions on education were widely known (Koran Nusantara, 2011). These political differences took eight months of negotiation from Sahudi's last day in office on 1 July 2011 until the inauguration of a new head on 1 March 2012.

Against all political pressure, the mayor firmly defended her stance. She intended to extend her managerial vision, isolating the Dinas from intervention by political parties. In 2012, she appointed two external, non-teacher bureaucrats as the head and the secretary of the Dinas. The head had spent most of his career in a city development-planning agency, the secretary had been a local tax office administrator. These portfolio appointments tell us much about Risma's vision for the education bureaucracy. The Dinas' head had some educational experience in his academic background as a psychologist. He also had been a part-time lecturer at a local public university. However, as the Dinas secretary described,

> (The Dinas head) only started his self-learning about education and its technicalities soon after he assumed the Dinas headship. Luckily, he has proven himself as a fast learner. He can involve himself in a complex discussion on any education topic including the curriculum. (Interview, 18 October 2013)

I did not manage to interview the Dinas head, but I did attend one of his presentations at a conference in Batu, a small town 30 kms from Surabaya. For the conference he brought with him a 118-page power point presentation titled, 'Leading Surabaya to become a national education barometer'. The document, complete with graphs, showed all that he had done during his one-year leadership, along with plans to achieve the ambitious goal of making Surabaya's education system a national benchmark.

The Dinas secretary described himself as an experienced administrator. He admitted that he had been put in such a senior position with a mandate to sort out technical administrative issues, especially budget management. For him, because education reform had become the local government's priority program that consumes almost 35 per cent of the annual budget, the key to successful execution of education programs mostly lies in budget management. He claimed that since he first took office, he had fixed the problems to do with bad accounting and budget leaks. He imposed strict standards of administration, and back-door transaction was not tolerated. It had been common, for parents, teachers, politicians, businessmen and community leaders to lobby Dinas officers to accommodate their private interests. It had been possible previously because the Dinas had an absurd degree of autonomy from the politically established government so that political interests were always able to be entertained. Now, according to him, the education Dinas was given a significantly greater degree of autonomy to the extent that even the mayor had to refrain from being involved in technical policies.

In 2012, the city promulgated its first education bylaw. The regulation defined more clearly the role of the education Dinas as the local education authority. As the bylaw specifies, the head of Dinas is authorised to advise the mayor on teacher appointments and transfers, on the appointment of principals, on the guidance and development of teachers' careers, and on the performance and discipline of teachers and other education staff. As well, the regulation also stipulates that the head of Dinas is the one person directly responsible to the mayor in education matters (Government of Surabaya, 2012: article 135). The regulation has become the firm foundation for Dinas to manage with authority. As the managerial authority, the Dinas official added, the mayor has repeatedly directed the Dinas leadership to have more autonomy in translating her vision for education into practical programs. As we shall see, this managerial style eventually led to another occasion for politicians to strike back.

The Recruitment of School Principals as Professional Managers

Apart from the Dinas, the principals as school managers have also become members of the new managerial class. Unlike the Dinas managers who have emerged as a result of the tension between politicians and the established bureau-professionals, the group of school managers has been created through institutionalising managerial technologies. The

central government has set the standards for school principals, among which is the possession of five competencies: personality, managerial, entrepreneurial, supervisory and social (MoEC, 2007). In addition, the central government has also issued a regulation on the procedures that local governments must use to select and appoint public school principals so that national standards can be achieved (MoEC, 2003, 2010). Like the case of Kupang, many local governments do not comply with such ministerial regulations because the regulations limit local government heads from exercising their privilege to make appointments. However, Surabaya's response has not been typical. Since the period of Hartono's leadership, the Surabaya government has been adopting the central government standards to organise the recruitment of public school principals. In the past, there were seven steps in the selection of candidates and part of the process involved third-party consultants from Surabaya State University (UNESA), a local teacher training university. Even so, after passing written and oral tests (set by consultants), the candidates must pass a test by the local government to show that they are fit and proper persons to be appointed (Interview, Surabaya Principal 2, 31 October 2013).

Later, when Rismaharini took office and the tradition of bureau-professional administration in Dinas was largely nullified, the Dinas had a stronger legitimation to expand its managerial vision to school principal recruitment. The Dinas office even went further than the central government standards required. According to the national standard, to be nominated as candidates, teachers needed to be recommended by either current principals or school inspectors. Nevertheless, since December 2012, under the new managerial leadership, the city government of Surabaya commenced a new recruitment system. The Dinas allows any individual teachers, who are at a particular career rank, to have the opportunity to nominate themselves through an online recruitment system called Seleksi Calon Kepala Sekolah (school principal candidacy selection) or SICAKEP. All the administrative selection and written tests are done online and assessed by a computerised system. All candidates can go online to check the progress of their applications.

More than before, the Dinas kept itself above the selection process and extended the roles of the third parties. The Dinas also changed the type of the third-party consultant hired for selecting principals and this move reflected a symbolic significance with regard to the managerialisation project. It no longer employed the services of a teacher training

university, which suggested professionalisation. Rather, it used Airlangga University, a bigger university and one of country's best, on consideration that it has more extensive knowledge specialisation departments. The Dinas was aiming at producing not only principals with professional leadership in education but also principals with broader managerial skills who are able to provide solutions to problems. The move to a different type of third-party client was in line with the shift of Dinas' perception of school principals. The Dinas secretary described the decision as follows.

> We hired the (Airlangga) university because we have a new vision regarding school principals. For us, they are more than ordinary educators. They are managers. They must possess excellent leadership, know how to solve problems, and have visions for their schools. We believe that the university has the resource and capacity to provide us with what we want. (Interview, 18 October 2013)

The Dinas more particularly hired the university's Department of Psychology to run the assessments and this department also outsources academics from other relevant departments within the university to assess the required skills of candidates. The consultant fully developed the recruitment system and organised almost the whole process of selection. In addition to the online process, the consultant also organised separate written psychological, and focus-group discussion-based leadership assessment tests. In the leadership assessment, the candidates were challenged to conduct collaborative work with their peers to solve problems (Dinas Pendidikan Surabaya, 2012).

Another aspect in which the local policy goes beyond the central government standards of principal recruitment is the introduction of a new method to assess a candidate's social and individual integrity. This is done by a special committee formed by the Dinas. In this sense, the assessors secretly gather information from the candidates' former supervisors, colleagues, relatives and other relevant parties. Some principals liken this assessment method to those used by intelligence services because they have no knowledge who from or where the committee collected their profiles and private information. According to the Dinas official, this surveillance method is important because the Dinas needs not only a technically capable principal but also one who is morally trustworthy. For the official, a public school principal is a role model for many people, not only for their students and teachers, but also for the larger community.

A principal supporting this policy explained why the Dinas has taken this path.

> There was a principal who was found committing polygamy, and his legal spouse went to the Dinas with a complaint. Polygamy is forbidden for a civil servant. The Dinas then summoned this principal and he explained that he already lived separately from his wife for a long time without legal divorce. I personally understood his situation and did not blame him, but the Dinas had to remove him because this had led to a chaotic condition, which was no good for the school. (Interview, Surabaya Principal 5, 6 November 2013)

With all the processes, the Dinas official claimed that recruitment is free from external intervention, even from the mayor herself. The Dinas was given authority to take responsibility for the entire process. The organisation has the final say on those who are appointed and to which schools they are placed. Therefore, the Dinas official claimed, public schools have highly qualified and independent principals. However, the extent to which those ideal qualities, 'qualified' and 'independent', are consistent with reality is discussed later in this chapter.

The Performative Culture and the Expansion of Managerial Reforms

Institutional pressures serve as templates to which the organisation refers for its structural formation (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Studies reveal that the biggest contradiction between managerialism and the spirit of decentralisation is one called 'performative culture'. Decentralisation aims at releasing state power and giving autonomy to professionally managed organisations, and the performative culture becomes the new control mechanism by which centralism resumes in a different setting. This performative culture controls organisational accountability and efficiency (Ranson, 2003; Stone, 1999). Ball (2003) defines performative culture or performativity as:

> A technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition, and change—based on rewards and sanctions (both material and symbolic). The performances (of individual subjects or organisations) serve as measures of

> productivity or output, or displays of 'quality', or 'moments' of promotion or inspection. (Ball, 2003: 216)

The officers of the education Dinas of Surabaya have made this performative culture central to their managerial governance. Dinas has several policies to force schools to do their performative best. The government generously rewards those who comply with the standardised performance measures and become more competitive. Those policies range over teacher performance, budget control, school mergers and the formation of élite schools. All these performative demands are supported by large funding. The city increases its education budget annually and in 2013 it reached IDR1.8 trillion, which makes it 33% of its annual budget. Because of such massive funding, the local government is well able to support the central government's program of compulsory education.

Teacher Performance Allowance

One among the performative managerial reforms is teacher performance allowance or *tunjangan kinerja guru* (TKG). Public school teachers earn their basic salary and a professional allowance from a central government transfer. These funds are given to pay teachers for their core responsibility, namely teaching. Particularly for the professional allowance scheme, the central government has set up its own performative standard and the teachers are entitled to the allowance if they comply with the standard, that is, fulfil the requirement to teach a minimum of 24 h per week. TKG is an additional performative scheme imposed by the Surabaya education Dinas to control teacher accountability in non-teaching assignments. In this scheme, the school principal must assign additional responsibilities to all his (or her) teachers, and TKG is disbursed according to their performance.

The policy requires school principals to assign teachers to fill positions in eight given tasks that are listed in an online application called the 'teacher performance information system'; these are student affairs, finance, curriculum, facilities, general affairs, treasurer, academic supervision and extracurricular supervision. Teachers assigned these responsibilities then undertake self-assessment of their detailed performance by filling out the online form. The principal reviews this assessment and endorses his or her satisfaction with the teacher's performance. The system then

automatically converts the result of this assessment into workload points from which is calculated the amount of TKG the teacher is entitled to.

Nevertheless, the TKG is problematic in two ways: ideological and practical. First, the TKG reduces teachers' professional work to the regime of administrative responsibility and accountability. As professional educators, the teachers should be primarily evaluated based on their performance in achieving the goals of their teaching. The TKG would trouble the teachers with non-technical, administrative tasks unrelated to their core responsibility as professional educators. However, this ideological problem did not translate into reality because the implementation of TKG itself was decoupled in two ways: means-end and policy-practice decouplings. And this is the second problem.

The means-end decoupling appeared in the sense that, like the central government's teacher certification, TKG was designed not to address the fulfilment of managerial accountability. Rather, it was introduced as a replacement of the old sources of teachers' non-salary income. There is an absurd demarcation between accountability as the goal of the policy on the one hand, and the allowance as the reward for the achievement of that goal on the other. In practice, the reward has been institutionalised as the goal itself and the administrative arrangement of the policy becomes the ritual classification for legitimating that goal. A school principal I interviewed confirmed this, saying that the TKG has otherwise made teachers slacker rather than conscientious.

> In the past, teachers could earn additional income when they were involved in numerous school activities like meetings, invigilating exams, representing their school in attending workshops or seminars, organising extra-curricular activities, etc. But after the implementation of TKG, all of these sources of income were abolished from the school budget. Now there is only one source of (extra) income ... Teachers become reluctant to take some tasks, for example, representing their school at external activities or doing extra administrative jobs, because there is no allocation (in the budget) to pay for their time. The payment is already calculated in the TKG scheme, but it is not (as) big (as before). Sometimes I felt uneasy to give order. (Interview, Surabaya Principal 5. 6 November 2013)

In addition, TKG has also created technical complexity in its implementation (policy-practice decoupling). The policy demanded that all teachers must take non-teaching responsibilities; it means that they must

be posted to all the defined eight job titles by which they will have permanent work assignments to be claimed for. The problem is that the number of teachers, particularly in big schools, would be disproportionate to the available job titles that make the school organisation fat and inefficient. In one school, for example, there are 59 teachers to be distributed in those eight portfolios so there might be around seven teachers assigned for each, but a position like treasurer might only need two or three teachers. Besides, assigning teachers to some clerical positions will also duplicate the work of existing administrative staff in the schools. However, because of allowance incentive, many principals and teachers just did it ceremonially in two ways. First, the school principal randomly distributed the teachers to the jobs regardless of their capacity and motivation. Second, as long as the teacher fills out the self-assessment form, the principal found no reason not to provide positive feedback so all teachers would receive the maximum amount of their allowance entitlement.

The Budget Restriction

Since 2010, Surabaya has implemented a 12-year, universal, free schooling program for all primary and secondary school children. For this, the local government allocated a per-pupil, school operational grant to cover the difference between the standardised cost and the established central government's school grant. Applying this policy, the Dinas banned all public schools from collecting additional funding from extra-government sources, including parents and, therefore, imposed more restrictions on a school's budgeting policy. This latter policy involves electronic budgeting using an online application, called the school financial management information system (SIPKS). A Dinas official maintains that the policy will force schools to become more accountable, to avoid corruption and to be competitive with each other.

As a mode of performative managerial policy, SIPKS allows the Dinas to control not only the school budget itself, in terms of administrative accountability, but also school activities. This is because the system provides templates for the school to set up its budget from the planning to the report stages. Before this system was first implemented in 2010, the schools had the freedom to propose whatever activities that were consistent with the amount of money they wished to spend from their annual budget. In this regard, different schools would propose different activities and therefore different allocations from their budget. The government

argued that such a system often led to unaccounted budgeting: illegal mark-ups became a common practice because school personnel could easily manipulate the budget to earn additional income. Hence, through SIPKS, such problems could be avoided because the system itemises every single activity and product, along with their prices that are available to be proposed in the school budget. Here activities proposed outside the template's limits would be automatically rejected by the system.

School Rationalisation

Another product of managerial reform in the Surabaya educational system is the enforcement of efficient schooling. The Dinas has made an effort to make schools and teaching personnel more closely match local demographics, and to be distributed evenly across the city. Unlike the national trend, the policy has made the number of schools in Surabaya gradually decrease. Since 2005, the government has been closing or merging what they claimed to be ineffective and inefficient schools. This unpopular policy drew its legitimacy from the national standards for education. On 12 February 2008, the Dinas launched its plan to restructure 20% of the 1511 primary and secondary schools. The Dinas head claimed these schools did not comply with the standards set by the national government (Surya, 2008). The plan caused a public controversy because almost all these schools had been open for decades and employed thousands of people. Yet the government persisted with the plan and by July 2008, the Dinas had closed 55 private schools (20 junior secondaries, 25 senior secondaries and 10 vocationals) (Kompas, 2008). As for the public schools, the government imposed some mergers. In 2009, Mayor Hartono established the Committee for Public Primary School Mergers in Surabaya, which resulted in the merger of six public schools in 2010.

Under Mayor Rismaharini, the program for school restructuring continued. In 2011, the Dinas closed 31 private senior secondary and vocational schools and 39 others were under a threat of not being granted permit extensions. In June 2013, the rationalisation campaign was endorsed by the introduction of a new mayoral regulation on school management in which this issue was treated more specifically. This new regulation added more complex requirements to the strict central government regulation on school establishments. According to the new regulation, there are fifteen criteria to be met by each school to obtain a new permit certificate. Some are related to education, such as syllabuses,

Table 7.1 School Permit Regular Appraisal

Accreditation score	*Appraisal period*
A	3 years
B	2 years
C	1 year
Non-accredited	6 months

Source Mayor of Surabaya, 2013

funding resources and management structure, but others are not related to education, such as traffic effect analysis certificates, building certificates and disturbance permit certificates (Mayor of Surabaya, 2013). In addition, the Dinas monitors accreditation scores regularly. The higher the score, the less frequent is the need to apply for a new permit and vice versa (see Table 7.1). The regulation also endorses school mergers and closures when all those requirements are not met.

This regulation gave the Dinas more legitimacy for its rationalisation policy. In September 2013, the Dinas resumed its school merger project, which involved 135 primary schools. This reduced the number of primary schools from 463 to 395. Later, from April to June 2014, the head of Dinas caused headlines and a public controversy for his decision to close another 28 schools. The mayor claimed that her Dinas' school rationalisation has eased the management of schools and relieved students' psychological problems (Humas Pemkot Surabaya, 2014). However, the new regulation, and the government measures that followed, ignited greater protests, particularly from the private schools. Dozens of school principals, parents and students rallied against the Dinas, protesting that the rationalisation policy was inhumane, despite it being consistent with the regulation (Antarajatim, 2014). The protesters claimed that the schools had been serving the nation for decades despite the lack of government support. Hence, they asserted that the new regulation was unfair and had been invented not to facilitate the development of education but rather to restrain it (Surya, 2014).

The Creation of International Standard Schools

In 2007, the central government initiated a project called International Standard Schools (SBI). A number of élite schools, private and

public, were selected to be 'a national school that prepares the students based on the national education standards and offers an international standard [education] by which the graduates are expected to have international/global competitiveness' (Kustulasari, 2009: 53). The central government set exceptional standards for these schools to differentiate them from ordinary schools: English to be the medium of instruction; an international curriculum, like International Baccalaureate Oxford and Cambridge, were to be followed; strict selection of students admission; and allowing parents to contribute school fees, even for basic education (MoEC, 2009). However, the policy was controversial because it was seen as creating social stratification in the education system. This was exacerbated by the fact that many SBI schools demanded high tuition fees. Hence, in January 2013, the Constitutional Court accepted a public petition and set the policy aside. To comply with the verdict, the MoEC abolished the SBI system and ordered all SBI schools to return to the regular national school system.

Surabaya became the only school district that provided a different response to the court's decision. Despite removing the SBI label, the mayor insisted that the system continue. She said that the problem of SBI was its costly tuition fees; as long as the school is free of charge there would be no reason to revert to the previous system and that she would not change anything from former SBI schools in Surabaya (Kompas, 2013b; Surya, 2013). Her decision provoked another controversy; one Constitutional Court judge accused her of acting against the law (Kompas, 2013a). Aware that the Department of Education approved of her move (but could not officially endorse it), the mayor kept her policy but renamed it, Sekolah Kawasan (SK), which translates to 'District School'. The term 'district' was adopted because the system is to empower and develop selected public schools to be like SBI but distributed regionally so that good quality schools are not all in the city centre. The choice of the term 'district' was intended to counter the dominant discourses associated with SBI, which in Surabaya's context were to do with élitism and preferment of the city centre. With the SK policy, all children from the peripheral areas would attend the best schools available in their neighbourhood so they need not travel to the city centre. One of its effects is that, as the Dinas official put it poignantly: 'SK is an educational solution to control the urban traffic' (Interview, 18 October 2013). Until 2014, there were 23 public schools under the SK system, comprising 11 junior and 12 senior secondary schools.

Nevertheless, except for the absence of school fees, SK represents the continuation of the abolished central government's SBI program. Its establishment fulfils the managerial ethics of performative competition (Ball, 2003). The system created a competitive environment for students from its beginning. It employs competitive selection, the process and criteria of which are regulated by the Dinas. Unlike the regular schools, to be eligible for taking part in winning one of the SK limited places, the students must have a national examination score of 85 (0 to 100 scale) at a minimum. Then, they also have to sit a written test, the *Tes Potensi Akademik* (TPA), which is similar to the American GRE system, and was organised and developed by Airlangga University as the third-party consultant. Aspirations to be admitted to SK are high every year; it was reported that many final-year students of elementary and junior secondary schools spend their after-school hours in school or at private tutoring to prepare for the TPA (Jawa Pos, 2014b). The competition for the SK admission compares with competition for admission to the best universities.

Responses to the Managerial Reforms

Contesting the Rhetoric of Social Justice Settlement

On her analysis of the rise of managerial schools in the UK, Gewirtz (2002) differentiates 'welfarist' and 'post-welfarist' settlements. The welfarist settlement was reinforced by a combination of social democratic-affiliated power groups, a coalition comprising major political parties, big business, and the trade unions on the one hand and by the legitimation of greater popular support on the other hand. What this welfarist settlement is committed to had been the one of 'distributive justice, that is … the redistribution of social goods on a more equitable basis' (Gewirtz, 2002: 1). In contrast, the post-welfarist settlement was underpinned by neoliberal ideology and its formal commitment to the enforcement of market democracy and competitive individualism (Gewirtz, 2002).

In Surabaya, even though the managerialist settlement has appeared in some managerial policy reforms, the legitimation of those reforms is owed, paradoxically, to the spread of the welfarist rhetoric of social justice. The social justice settlement which is enforced and, at the same time, contested by powerful groups of politicians in the government and in the DPRD, always garners massive popular support. At a particular

point, the policy paradox can affect the disengagement between government and school interests. In this sense, all the managerialist reforms in Surabaya are supported by the expansion of the social justice rhetoric of free schooling. This immensely popular policy has given the government political popularity as well as the legitimacy to impose its performative regimes onto school institutions. To some extent, this was against the interests of both opposition parties who were politically disadvantaged by government popularity on the one hand and the schools, particularly their principals, who have been promised more relaxed, independent managerial authority on the other.

Initially, politicians in the city council were reluctant to endorse the free schooling policy. Early in 2011, those councillors affiliated with parties other than the PDI-P reportedly criticised the Dinas proposal to extend free education to senior secondary schools. For example, a councillor from the Golkar Party stated that free education was against the characteristic of Surabaya as an upper-middle-class city (Republika, 2011a). Another councillor, from the PKB party, criticised the policy as having lacked a sense of priority: the fund should be allocated to improve the infrastructure in elementary schools (Republika, 2011b). Nevertheless, because the city council did not want to argue against the popularity of the government's free schooling proposal, in early 2012, that institution agreed to include the proposal in the first education bill, which was passed as a bylaw in June 2012. The passage on this reads that 'the city government is obliged to fund the provision of education in both the primary and secondary levels' (Government of Surabaya, 2012: article 112 [1]). Because of the popularity of the policy, a councillor who previously opposed the free schooling explained:

> The bylaw is one of our most important legacies … Certainly, there were debates on free education. Some people said that the policy is unfair for the poor … The money should go to the neediest more. But, this is about social justice. Even the rich have equal rights … They pay tax more … [But] there is an affirmative solution included in the bylaw … that every public school must save at least 5 per cent of their admission places for the poor. The government should cover everything they need: uniforms, books and even their meals. (Interview, Masduki Toha, 17 October 2013)

This policy obtained more divisive responses from school principals, particularly those of senior secondary schools that were the most affected

by the policy. Unlike basic education institutions, senior secondary schools get the central government's operational grant whose amount is lower the calculated national standard of education cost (see Table 8.2). To make up the difference, schools used to collect regular tuition fees from parents. Different schools collected different amounts of fees. The free schooling policy commanded schools to cease collecting fees from parents. Hence, whereas the city legislative council and the Dinas arrived at a convergence regarding the social justice approach to education provision, the secondary schools are divided.

Schools may be categorised according to their perceived social standing: favourite and non-favourite schools. To some extent, this certainly reflects different school interests. Many favourite schools, which used to enjoy abundant demand for enrolments and have a huge number of students from high socioeconomic backgrounds, tend to reject the policy. The number of these favourite schools increased following the introduction of Sekolah Kawasan to 12 of 22 senior secondary schools by 2013. In contrast, non-favourite schools that had always suffered from low enrolments and catered mostly to students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, certainly see the policy as a blessing. A principal of one favourite school, who is critical of the free education policy, for instance, blames the policy for misguidedly forcing budget standardisation, which undermines the idea of school competitiveness, as suggested by the Dinas itself.

> You cannot compare my school with school X … The parents wanted to send their kids here not because they wanted them to get schooled in the ordinary way. Rather, they wanted them here because they see something different in this school … We might have an equal number of students with school X, but certainly our dreams and visions are different … The free schooling has the potential to shut those dreams down. (Interview, Surabaya School Principal 5, 6 November 2013)

In contrast, there are those who praise the free school policy because it has helped poor students, as one principal of non-elite public school mentions:

> The free education is a breakthrough. This is a form of government commitment to small people … I have some experiences of dealing with students who could not afford the certificate after graduation … [their] debt was because of overdue tuition payments … We were always facing

> dilemmas of that sort … We found that free schooling has helped us cope with that kind of difficulty. (Interview, Surabaya Principal 4, 4 November 2013)

In fact, the local government has allocated funding that is much higher than the central government's standard unit cost and far more than the central government grant for senior secondary schools (see Table 7.2). For each student, the institution receives IDR2.4 million in total annually. It means that the more students, the higher the amount from central and from local governments. Despite critical arguments, Dinas officials insist that such treatment will make public schools compete for student enrolments. Yet, the favourite schools, even with the generous student grant from the local government, have had their income decrease. Before the free education policy, in 2010, the Sekolah Kawasan that used to be under the central government's International Standard School program, were authorised to collect a student tuition fee of IDR400,000 (USD53) per month (Faiq, 2010; Surya, 2010) that is, each student paid at least IDR4 million (USD530) per annum. This figure does not include income from a parent contribution scheme, called a 'development fund', that is paid once a child has been accepted for a place in the school. The Dinas officials and politicians struck back at the principals who opposed the policy.

> The public complained to us about many fee quotations in schools (that is why now we impose strict prohibition) … It is normal that some [principals] criticise the policy because they lost some potential income. But they will understand. Otherwise, they have no option but to run on our track. (Interview, Senior officer of Surabaya Education Authority, 18 October 2013)

One councillor noted that the opposition to the free schooling policy is about changing the business mentality in schools.

> They [principals] must change their mentality. A school is not a for-profit institution. As long as the government has enough money to fund education, so we can't put the burden onto the people. And the schools have to follow accordingly. (Interview, Masduki Toha, 17 October 2013)

Nevertheless, there is something more than just the money that causes some principals to be opposed to the policy and that is the extension of

Table 7.2 The Comparison of the Central and Local Governments' Per-Pupil Non-Personnel Operational Grants to Schools in Surabaya, 2013

School level	*The Standardised Unit Cost per-Pupil per Year**	*Grants (USD)*[3]		
		CG BOS	*LG BOSDA*	*Shortfall/ Surplus*
Primary	48.2	48.2	28.9	+ 28.9
Junior Secondary	59.1	59.1	70.4	+ 70.4
Senior Secondary	81.9	46.6	151.7	+ 116.4

* Based on MoEC Regulation 69 of 2009

control over schools. Under the free school policy, schools are subject to frequent audits, performed by state and non-state organisations. For the state, they are justified because they ensure that performance standards are being met. For civil society, because their funding is from the government, public schools are regarded as state institutions whose performance must be publicly accountable. The mass media are the major non-state agents that pay continuous attention to this issue and, as I observed, some school principals contended that media attention can be intimidating when it comes to the issue of government money or parent contributions. Some principals felt that popular education policies, such as free schooling and electronic budgeting have been politicised. They have put schools under a spotlight that is focussed more on administrative arrangements than on educational achievement.

In November 2012, for example, one leading senior secondary school caused media controversy when its school committee decided to collect voluntary parent contribution for extracurricular activities. The DPRD then held a session to investigate the case and invited representatives from the school and some independent university experts. The school declined to attend the session. There were public debates about the issue but interest in the issue evaporated with time. Referring to this case, a principal from one non-favourite school responded:

> We should be really careful with this issue now … We cannot freely discuss our school plan publicly … The media is very much fond of this. I

[3] The conversion is based on the USD to IDR exchange value rate as of December 2013, USD1 = IDR12,021.

> frequently remind the chief of the school committee to avoid talking about money in parent meetings. When a school is caught discussing money with parents, the media will headline it and politicians will compete for popularity. (Interview, Surabaya School Principal 4, 4 November 2013)

In defending his colleague from that kind of media attack, another principal argued:

> Sometimes the parents themselves take the initiative to give a contribution, for example, for the provision of air conditioning because they were concerned that their kids were studying in very humid and hot classrooms. And it was all organised by the school committee, we [the school] never took part. But, as the information leaked to the media, it was then blown up with a provocative headline charging the school with quoting illegal fees. (Interview, Surabaya School Principal 1, 31 October 2013)

The Return to Bureaucracy and the Myth of the Autonomous Manager

Advocates of managerial reform always claim that the reform is to reduce the role of state bureaucracy and to empower the onsite manager (Exworthy & Halford, 1998; Islam, 1993) and these two ambitions are the intellectual foundations of school-based management: that managers should drive change and progress for their school. The same argument came to the fore in Surabaya's managerial reforms. As a Dinas official noted, the set up of the online, third-party managed and candidate-involved process to recruit school principals is to delegate responsibility to the 'professional manager' and to put an end to the stereotype that principals were always *titipan politik*[4] (Interview, 18 October 2013). During the mayoral election in 2010, for instance, it was reported that the then head of education Dinas mobilised the teachers and principals in a number of political campaigns (Surabaya Pagi, 2010) and some reform did result. The Dinas official said that the institution will protect a principal from any external intervention. He said that his office frequently rejected some

[4] There is no English equivalence for '*titipan politik*' or '*orang titipan*'. The term is best described by Stevens and Smigdall-Tellings (2010) as 'someone put in a certain position because he knows a VIP or an insider, not because he is qualified for the job' (p. 682).

influential figures who wanted to have their relatives admitted or transferred to their desired schools. As with the principals, all of them make the same claim. One principal illustrates this as follows:

> The first time I came here I found one senior teacher who for many years had been doing clerical stuff while neglecting his teaching responsibility. Yet, instead of getting a clerical-staff salary, he retained all his teacher's entitlements … None had him warned because of some connection he had. By the time I arrived, I just did not care about his connection and directly altered his status and entitlements from teacher to administrative staff. (Interview, Surabaya School Principal 5, 6 November 2013)

The teacher performance allowance (TKG) policy was also claimed to empower principals internally. They could assign people for certain position, monitored their performance, and assessed whether these people are entitled to a proper reward. One principal, for instance, praised the TKG policy because it gave him more 'bargaining power' in dealing with teachers (Interview, Surabaya School Principal 2, 31 October 2013). Principals could punish underperforming teachers by simply leaving their self-assessment report unreviewed or giving more critical comments. But another principal contended that such empowerment is on paper only. In practice, he said, TKG caused the principal more pressure because it has removed the principal's control of money. In the past, they could assign teachers for non-routine activities and paid them accordingly. Now, the source for additional income is limited in the TKG scheme (Interview, Surabaya School Principal 5, 6 November 2013). Nevertheless, on this matter, we can argue that even before the reform, the principals' internal authority over their school personnel was never an issue. In Indonesian patrimonial bureaucracy, career rank was enough to define how much cultural and political capital you have in comparison with others. As long as there was no external political intervention, as the most senior government officer in schools, certainly the principal's power was mostly unchallenged. Sometimes teachers respected their principal but also were fearful. A principal can move members of his staff to certain roles and positions with almost no dissent.

However, although external political intervention is no longer an issue, the challenge to the school-based management project in Surabaya is coming from the local government. When they take up their positions as a public school principal, they return to their original employment

status, that is, as a member of the bureaucratic hierarchy. Following March and Olsen (2014), as bureaucrats, these principals are still guided by the 'logic of appropriateness' rather than the more rational 'logic of consequences'. Their activities are bound more strictly by government rules and regulations, rather than by any independent, professional decision. They are trapped in the lowest position in the ranks of bureaucracy. The critical regulatory requirement affecting the implementation of school-based management is the electronic budgeting policy. The policy has an isomorphic effect on schools in the way that schools are now having more standardised programs and activities. The electronic budgeting system ignores the difference in school characteristics that used to be. Schools can only propose budget funding for activities listed on the budget template. Every school used to have its own plans and strategies to achieve their goals. But the strict budgeting system enforces conformity, and schools tend to have similar activities. One principal complained:

> We used to be called a favourite school. Previously, a principal could push students or teachers to become more creative. [You can] propose any activity you want and the school committee will find the money. But now, there is no difference between my school and [so-called] non-favourite school. We all are doing what the Dinas told us to do through their list of activities. (Interview, Surabaya School Principal 2, 31 October 2013)

Because this policy has become routine, it militates against the original purpose of managerial reform: performance effectiveness. Some principals have acknowledged that the standardisation has also caused schools to suffer ineffective planning. In many cases, the strict government budget allows for unneeded goods, but needed ones may not be obtained. For example, a principal of another favourite school commented:

> The only one that makes us different is student numbers. The more students you have, the more you get government funding. But even if you have more money, you won't use it all. We cannot propose activities or goods different from what have been listed on the system. So, every six months I often return around IDR50 million cash to the government. What for? Every time you proposed a new activity, it was always rejected [by the system]! [Also] why bother buying goods you already have? (Interview, Surabaya School Principal 5, 6 November 2013)

However, the most important effect of this performance regime is the central importance of accounting in school performance. Following the budget reform, principals are, by whatever means, forced to master every detail of budgeting: from planning to monitoring. A principal of vocational secondary school added in this regard:

> Formerly, all technicalities of budgeting were delegated to administrative staff. The principal only gave general advice … But it is no longer the case now. We must know every detail … I am the most responsible person here. I have to sign and know where every cent of money is being spent. Otherwise, we risk being put in jail only because of a small accounting mistake made by our staff, whether deliberate or not. This should not be our task, should it? But we cannot escape. (Interview, Surabaya School Principal 1, 28 October 2013)

Hence, the return to hierarchy has ended up with the return of external pressure on school principals, perhaps stronger than previously. The domination by state institutions in this managerial governance has been anticipated should we look at the very basic structure of the managerial governance. That is, the institutionalisation of a managerial state in Surabaya has lacked the support of a strong market institution. This has allowed the domination by state or quasi-state institutions to remain unchallenged.

Managerialisation with(out) Privatisation

Almost all scholars have argued that the birth of the managerial state is supported by the expansion of the market as the leading political and economic institution (Apple, 2005; Ball, 2009; Clarke & Newman, 1997). The discourse of schooling quality across countries has been dominated by the belief that 'private schooling' is better than public (Toma, 1996). Hence, in many cases, the former institution became a reference from which the latter borrowed some institutional models. In Indonesia and particularly Surabaya, this has never been the case. Generally, private education institutions outnumber their government competitors, making the latter more exclusive and competitive. Certainly, there is a growing number of new and more exclusive private schools to cater for upper-middle-class parents, but the government's policy was soon initiated to block their influence (Table 7.3).

Table 7.3 Figures for Public and Private Schools in Surabaya, 2013

School Level	*Public*		*Private*	
	Institutions	*Students*	*Institutions*	*Students*
Primary	463	174,905	416	80,618
Junior Secondary	52	44,643	285	69,303
General Senior Secondary	22	20,137	146	32,727
Vocational Senior Secondary	11	21,202	104	38,987

Source Government of Surabaya, 2013

In the absence of balanced competition within the field, the city government has tended to apply a contrary treatment to the two institutions: that is, privatising the public schools and 'deprivatising' the private schools. The government started to 'privatise' the public schools by introducing business rules to school governance and by establishing more exclusive public schools across the territory. The involvement of a third-party contractor in the selection of principals and in school admission processes, and the expansion of performative policies, such as budget restrictions and teacher performance allowances, represents the introduction of private-sector rules in school management. Private-sector practices have been used with the introduction of the SK program. SK was introduced to maintain the established social division of favourite and non-favourite schools. Using stricter selection criteria, the SK has limited the chances of academic underperformers from gaining admission, pushing them into regular schools. The Dinas official said that the policy is also aimed to bring the government schools up to the standards of the exclusive private schools whose number has increased in parallel with the expansion of the middle-class population in Surabaya. These private schools are run by well-known providers, such as Ciputra, St Louis, Petra, Muhammadiyah, Al-Hikmah and Ta'miriyah. More importantly, the SK policy conforms to the trend of middle-class residential settlement to spread in the city's outskirts. The distribution of élite public schools throughout the city district areas followed the trend of the development of élite housing complexes in the peripheral areas.

On the other hand, however, the local government also launched several 'deprivatisation' campaigns. This is done in such a way that their autonomy is gradually decreased through the introduction of conditional government funding per-pupil and closing underperforming institutions.

In the first instance, similar to public schools, the city government provides all private schools with per-pupil, operational grant entitlements. Having received this funding, however, private schools must comply with the attached conditions, among which are limits on the tuition fees from parents and the adoption of programs for the admission of students from poor families, programs known as *mitra warga*, (people partner). These programs require that all government-funded schools allocate at least 5 per cent of the school places for students who can provide official 'poverty certification', which exempts them from fees (Government of Surabaya, 2012). In July 2014, the city legislative council's education committee found that 14 grant recipient private schools were not complying with the people partner policy. Against the regulation, these schools continued to charge all parents regardless of their socioeconomic background. The government then threatened to retrieve the grant as punishment (Jawa Pos, 2014a; Republika, 2014).

For most average private schools, the grant is huge and essential for their survival. For some élite private schools that have been spoiled by unlimited contributions from parents, the grant is too small to buy their compliance. Therefore, many élite private schools decline the grant. However, as one of these élite private schools acknowledged, the fees limitation and the pro-poor policy are not the most important reasons for rejecting the government grant. Another reason for rejection is the failure to conform to the bureaucratic culture. To be allowed the grant, schools must follow numerous procedures, lodge paperwork and submit to official inspections. An élite private school principal explained:

> We received the BOP grant from 2009 until 2011 … Last year [2012] we decided not to propose any longer … It was tough … too many restrictions and paperwork. Also, the Dinas school inspectors visited very often to inquire about pointless issues … The thing is that on average our students are coming from upper-middle-class families. They are willing to pay … But we also have more than a few poor students. They pay not a single cent. Here we have a cross-subsidy method to cover them … So, with all due respect, we should take our own way. (Interview, Surabaya School Principal 3, 2 November 2013)

The most important tool for the 'deprivatisation' campaign is the school performance audit, the result of which can result in the closure of a school. As discussed before, hundreds of private schools were closed

during Hartono and Rismaharini's tenures. The reasons are many, but all of them refer to the failure to comply with rules, most importantly with regard to the local government's strict permit requirements. The Dinas imposes regular monitoring based on accreditation scores. The higher the score, the less frequently do schools need to apply for a new permit and the converse. Most private schools have the lowest accreditation score or are not accredited at all, which ensures more frequent appraisals.

Having survived disruptive bureaucracies in the past, these private schools are now finding themselves unable to obtain many documents needed in modern education administration. Dozens of these private schools were threatened with closure because they did not meet requirements for certification. The market pressures also contribute to conditions that will bring about shutdown. Many schools proved to be less efficient and uncompetitive. They are not professionally managed because of the lack of resources: the personnel are poorly paid and serve the school on a voluntary basis. In addition, they could not compete successfully for admissions and recruited few students, which therefore affected their income from the government's per-pupil subsidy and parent's contributions. These humble private schools must compete not with élite private schools but rather with regular public schools, which are free.

Conclusion

In Surabaya, the national program of education decentralisation has been adapted into a managerial education reform. The reform owes its legitimacy to the convergence of the national and local institutional environment. Nationally, as well as education programs, numerous regulations to promote general governance reforms have also been promulgated. Local government autonomy has allowed different responses to these programs and regulations, depending on how influential local institutional agents are in supporting or avoiding transformation. Surabaya has been blessed by the presence of managerial figures who benefited the support from the growing popular democracy, which is contrary to the established patrimonial politics. Thus, the managerial discourses on transparency, efficiency and autonomy gain popular support: what have lost favour are practices of the bureaucratic state that would maintain the status quo and are associated with corruption, politicisation and bureaucratisation. With the institutional entrepreneurship of these new managerialist leaders, the

government has successfully launched several reforms in education governance, with the objectives of professional autonomy, transparency and efficiency.

Nevertheless, that managerial reforms owe their legitimation to popular democratic support has led to internal contradictions. The reform becomes highly dependent on political populism, which then leads to the rejuvenation of bureaucratic control and de-legitimation of market institutions. The former strikes back at the very idea of public school autonomy and freedom from external intervention, the latter has legitimated the battle against private schooling. The extensive government funding for schools has to be compensated with intense scrutiny of public schools, not only from state institutions but also from the increasingly vocal non-state actors. If less complex and efficient school management are to be the goals of the managerialist reform, then the reform has just added more complexity. In addition, this managerial reform is built on the weak market structure where the (élite) private schools sell the products but public schools win the customers. Moreover, the government's performative policies have pushed the 'less competitive' private schools away from the market battlefield, while its public schools are more and more improved.

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CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

Introduction

This book seeks to reveal the interaction between global, national and local contexts in preserving the institutional legitimacy of educational decentralisation, using the post-2001 Indonesian education reform as the case study. What makes the Indonesian educational decentralisation reform different from its previous decentralisation trial is not only that it expands the decentralised sector of education to secondary education, but also that the decentralisation extends beyond the educational realm. The reform has not only led to the reorganisation of the central government's education bureaucracy, particularly through the closing of hundreds of local offices of the central government's ministry of education, but also by the restructuring of the whole education governance system, in which the central government appears like no more playing the dominant role. This then creates a new constellation of political legitimacies on the basis of which the state can manage its education sector.

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This book tracks the process of the institutionalisation of educational decentralisation in Indonesia since its adoption, as a result of external and internal pressure, until its implementation nationally and regionally. At the heart of this institutionalisation is the question of legitimacy. This book looks at how the institutional legitimacy of educational decentralisation is obtained, manipulated and contested. This final chapter consists of three parts: the first sums up the empirical findings; the second part discusses the theoretical implications that can be developed as this study's contribution to the sociological neo-institutional theory; and the third part reflects the implications of these findings to the current national policy and offers some measures that the Indonesian and other governments might adopt in dealing with such problems.

Summary of the Findings

There are three questions this book seeks to answer: first, how did the global and local contexts provide the institutional legitimacy for the implementation of the educational decentralisation policy in Indonesia?; second, how did the central government preserve its legitimacy when devolving powers to the local governments, while also retaining significant powers of its own?; and third, how is the institutional legitimacy of the educational decentralisation policy contested at the local district level?

With regard to the first question, this book argues that the reform was adopted as a response to external pressure from powerful global institutions on the one hand, and the internal crisis of state legitimacy emanating from local movements against centralised authorities on the other hand. Chapter 4 has highlighted that the Indonesian government could not resist the pressures of the World Bank and other international funding organisations to save the country from the economic catastrophe that undermined the long-standing centralist government and, in turn, led the country to one of the worst legitimacy crises in its history. Decentralisation also became the magic wand that progressively dampened secessionist aspirations from the regions and eventually restored the legitimacy of the national state. Educational decentralisation was infused into this celebratory moment and implemented as a taken-for-granted consequence, even when its guidelines were yet to be formulated. From the central government's perspective, educational decentralisation reform was more a legitimacy-making project than a technical approach to solve the real educational problems. There was an initiative to systematically revise the

education decentralisation strategy by establishing a special task force, but its recommendations vaporised when the 2001 decentralisation reform started.

In relation to the second question, as Chapter 5 has discussed, this book proposes that the central government used a decoupling strategy to delegitimise the local government's role, and for the central government to retain its control in education. Decoupling is built on two foundations: efficiency and confidence (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The discourse of 'inefficient locals' was prominent among the central government officials, who argued that decentralisation would lead to the politicisation of education personnel. The argument for efficiency was also used to play down local government officials' capacity in handling technical education matters. In 2003, a new education law was introduced to redefine the central government's control and to limit the role of local government in education. The new law adopted decentralisation with the ritual of 'confidence and good faith' (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This meant that decentralisation was subsumed in the new law, but the lawmakers then entrusted the central ministry of education to set the details. The central government made some effort to restore its influence through the creation of a national standardised system of education. The law has inspired hundreds of governments and ministerial regulations that stipulate every detail of how education arrangements should be, from curriculum to classroom size. To support the implementation of these standards, the central government increased education funding and introduced a number of centrally coordinated inspection mechanisms, such as teacher certification, national examinations and school accreditation. Despite its political repercussions, the government reiterated that this standardisation is a professional project, developed by independent professionals and aimed at 'improving professionalism and institutional accountability' (GoI, 2005).

For the third question, this book shows that the decoupling strategy does not always result in efficiency and confidence as the institutional theory claims. It is not always successful in settling the discord between institutional legitimacy and technical efficiency. For local governments, educational decentralisation is simply one part of the greater political decentralisation policy that provides them with more autonomy. In this context, a return of central government control cannot provide technical efficiency because it runs counter to local governments' autonomy. As it turns out, beyond the central government's control, the standardisation

does not result in field structuration, that is, the structural convergence of education arrangements. Rather, it leads to destructuration or the breakdown of hierarchy and coordination. In this sense, local governments complement decentralisation with their respective agendas, which are seen to support their autonomy. The extent to which the national standards of education might be adopted by the local governments as institutional pressure depends on whether they support or legitimate the local government's interests.

For such question, we have conducted two case studies, of Kupang and Surabaya, which represent different styles of local government. Kupang relies for most of its education funding on central government transfers and is supposedly more bound to follow central government directives. On the other hand, Surabaya is a big city that generates its own funding to support most of its education needs, which tends to make it unresponsive to the adoption of the central government's rules. However, the fact is that the central government support does not necessarily influence local government response to the central government rules. Neither Surabaya nor Kupang let themselves be confined by central government standards in organising their local education system. They adopted the national standards eclectically so long as those standards served their purposes. It is the established local sociopolitical environment that continues to guide the local governments' arrangement of education.

In Kupang, the unchanged neo-patrimonial bureaucracy facilitates a highly politicised education governance, centred on the mayor and his political allies. Education resources are seen as political capital to support the ruler's legitimacy. Teachers are drawn into political contestation to win positions in school and government administrations. The local education office employs many teachers in administrative roles: senior positions are filled by teachers who manage to maintain their patrimonial loyalty to the mayor. School policies are subverted by external interests, that is, by parents, bureaucrats and politicians. The student admissions policy, for instance, which should have been the responsibility of school-based management, is highly politicised to accommodate the high demand by parents for their children to be enrolled at favoured schools. Despite most of its education funding coming from the central government, the Kupang local government is not bound by central government regulations. For instance, it allows public primary schools to demand tuition fees despite the central government's prohibition, and the local education

office has never followed the national standards in the appointment of principals.

In Surabaya, the local education system is organised in the managerialist way. The local education office has been given a considerable degree of autonomy to run schooling matters free from mayoral political intervention. The education office is free of officials from school-teaching backgrounds; instead, it has career bureaucrats with management aptitude and skills. Public school principals are recruited through a transparent process developed and operated by a third-party consultant. The education office has launched a number of management reforms to install a performative culture in school governance, such as teacher performance allowances, budget restrictions and school rationalisation. School managements are standardised on the basis of this performative regime. Surabaya may be a case where national standards accordingly apply and are, even more progressively, advanced. In the case of school rationalisation, for instance, the local government refers to the central government's standard of student-per-classroom limits and adds its own criteria to restrict the issuing of school licences. However, the adoption of central government education standards does not necessarily imply that all central government prescriptions are followed. The local governments, for instance, insist on implementing the already prohibited, exclusive, international standard school system (Table 8.1).

Table 8.1 Education Governance in Kupang and Surabaya

Characteristics	*Kupang*	*Surabaya*
Government structure	Neo-patrimonial state	Neo-managerial state
Decision-making authority	Centralised in the office of the mayor	Decentralised to the city education office
Personnel recruitment	Political	Procedural
Control mechanism	Individual loyalty	Performance audit
School management	Politically co-opted	Standardised
Affiliation to national standards	Eclectic but rarely adopting	Eclectic but mostly adopting
Idealised values	Equality and accommodation	Equality and competition

Some Theoretical Implications

The New Institutionalism and the Study of Change

Though used in an array of organisational studies, the theoretical assumptions of the new institutionalism have been continuously criticised. With respect to our discussion on educational reform, some critics have claimed that institutional theory is not viable for analysing organisational change. It is regarded as a theory that could not forecast change. Greenwood and Hinnings (1996) note that, because of its weakness in analysing the internal dynamics of organisational change, 'the theory is silent on why some organisations adopt radical change whereas others do not, despite experiencing the same institutional pressures'. More specifically, Kraatz and Zajac (1996) conducted a particular study to prove the institutional theory's inadequacy in analysing organisational change. They examined some institutional axioms against the change in the behaviour of American liberal arts colleges during the period 1971 to 1986. They found that organisational changes during that period could not be said to result from the process of institutional isomorphism. Instead of becoming similar over time, the liberal arts colleges had been increasingly showing heterogeneity. They also observed that technical environments became an important factor in organisational changes, although they were institutionally illegitimate. And, those technically adaptive changes 'had no negative implications—and often had positive implications—for organisational survival and health' (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996: 831).

Indeed, as Scott et al. (2000) argue, organisations will change radically when they experience a profound institutional change. Otherwise, they only adopt the change ceremonially and keep to the old practices to maintain technical efficiency (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This profound institutional change is conceptualised as deinstitutionalisation (Oliver, 1992) or destructuration (Scott, 2008). Both concepts have much the same meaning, that is, the breakdown and discontinuity of traditional forms of belief systems, patterns of behaviour, governance structure and activities of the organisation. Oliver introduces three antecedents of deinstitutionalisation: functional, social and political (Oliver, 1992), which I found useful in analysing the deinstitutionalisation of the Indonesian New Order's centralist regime that led to the introduction of the new decentralised system. Hence, contrary to the critics, neo-institutional theorists like Scott (2008) and Oliver (1992) believe that deinstitutionalisation provides a strong basis for the institutional analysis of change.

However, I see the problem being deeper than merely the compatibility to analyse change. As this study has suggested, even within a profound institutional change, the resistance to the change remains potential: not only from the actors in favour of the *status quo*, but also from new actors who find their interests unfulfilled as the change ensues. In this case, despite the adoption of decentralisation, the reformist central government formulated a new mechanism to retain its central control because it assumed that local government officials were technically incompetent, which in the future would affect the quality of educational provision. As the reform evolved, the central government's tendency to recentralise the system becomes much stronger. Many, many regulations were produced by the central government and trillions of rupiah were issued to preserve central control. Hence, I argue that what is more important is not whether a theory is feasible to analyse the change, but rather whether it is able to question, criticise, and illuminate the essence of the change itself.

External and Internal Legitimacy

The new institutional theory has been pre-eminent for its concern with external legitimacy. It is said that an organisation's conformity to its external environment is for the sake of gaining institutional legitimacy. This external legitimacy ensures an organisation's survival in a field with many other organisations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The concept of external legitimacy is useful in analysing the institutional effect of education reform in the context of globalisation. Davies and Guppy (1997) propose that the institutional convergence of economic globalisation and global rationalisation has driven the isomorphic characteristics of education reform in Anglo-American nations. Similarly, in his study of Michigan public school reform, Lubienski (2005) highlights the globalisation of marketised environments as the condition for the emergence of competition-oriented reform in the local arena. Other institutional scholars have claimed that educational decentralisation has become a 'world model' (Daun, 2007) or 'global ideology' (Baker, et al., 2005) so that nations across the world predominantly lean to it. In this study, it is also an assumption that the globalising effect of decentralisation reform has touched Indonesia, thanks to the institutional influence of global organisations.

Nevertheless, as this study has also conceived, an external legitimacy is not the only reason Indonesia adopted decentralisation. No less an important factor is the national response to its internal legitimacy, which had also deteriorated. Referring to Habermas (1973), the internal crisis of legitimacy arises from the unredeemed 'generalisable interests of the population', which in the Indonesian context was exhibited in the massive popular distrust of the centralised New Order regime. Not only had centralism effected severe bureaucratisation and inefficiency as the World Bank contended, but, for the local population, centralism was believed to be responsible for having syphoned all the local resources to Jakarta. Therefore, the adoption of decentralisation must also be seen in this context, that is, to maintain 'mass loyalty' (Habermas, 1973).

Not only that—the inclusion of internal legitimacy into institutional analysis is also important in the context of the institutional versus technical environments distinction. Friedland and Alford (1991) have noted that such a distinction has distorted the nature of institutional analysis that should bring everything back to an institutional lens: even technical is institutional. I argue that internal legitimacy would also blur the boundary between institutional and technical environments; when the institutional legitimacy becomes contrary to the technical efficiency, the whole organisational function would be at risk. In the Indonesian case, the central government has an understanding that the consistent application of decentralisation would run counter to the effective provision of education because of the assumptions of local officials' technical incompetence. Therefore, another scheme to ensure central control must be put in place. However, this move is easily spotted by local governments, which already enjoy autonomy. The effect is that local officials are disinclined to follow the central government policies.

Bringing the State Back into the Institutional Analysis of Education

In its earlier development, the institutional analysis was concerned with the nation-state development as the main reason behind the expansion of modern mass education. It was believed that the worldwide expansion of mass education was the outcome of an ideological process of rationalisation and nation-state formation. Education was regarded as the means to produce rational individuals who would legitimate their full membership in the new nation-state (Boli, et al., 1985; Ramirez & Boli, 1987). As the number of new nation-states increased after the Second

World War, so did the need for educated citizens who would be significant for building equal international relations and economic competition. The connectedness among organisations worldwide had driven governance structures in every nation-state to maintain their institutional order and thus to become isomorphic. Educational governance has been part of this isomorphic reality. The similar arrangements of educational organisation ranged from the establishment of ministries of education as the national education authority, the acceptance of schooling as a model of state-sponsored education (Boli, et al., 1985; Meyer, et al., 1992; Ramirez & Boli, 1987), and even the emphasis on similar subjects in school curricula (Benavot et al., 1991). Governments became more active in taking over and controlling educational responsibilities that previously had been accepted by institutions, such as churches and other private entities.

Nevertheless, since the early 2000s there has been some criticism of this kind of state-centred analysis of education. Davies et al. (2006), for instance, contend that the state-centred institutional analysis of education is no longer relevant because the institutional environment has changed. They argue that private education is now growing and there has been much political rhetoric that accuses public schools of being substandard. Therefore, they call for a more market-oriented institutional analysis that puts more emphasis on divergent, rather than isomorphic, change and on recoupling more than decoupling (Davies et al., 2006). Similarly, Rowan (2006) argues that some market-based reforms in American education have forced student performance to be more closely inspected, which allowed the rise of learning support industries, such as testing companies and private tutoring, and increasing the diversity of education actors. In this sense, not only do educational organisations have to respond to external institutional pressures (government rules or social ideals) but now they also have to respond to demands on their internal technical effectiveness (students' test preparedness, competitive curricula, or effective school management). Meanwhile, in her study of the US No Child Left Behind policy, Burch (2010) contends that for-profit firms have replaced the state's role in performing structural isomorphic pressure through selling outdated curriculum. She also claims that the proliferation of private sector educational institutions has led to the structuration of neoliberal ideology and practices in the organisational field of education (Burch, 2010).

However, the Indonesian case provides a different context of environmental change. Here, private schools have proliferated in the field of education since the nation-state's formation, but only one per cent of them are as competitive as, or better, than public schools. There is no 'market' in the field when most schools are using the same national curriculum and the few alternative private schools are too expensive (McGinn & Welsh, 1999: 44). The decentralisation reform does change the institutional environment but it is towards the proliferation of state rather than market institutions. Decentralisation has allowed the central government to invent another way to retain its control over national education governance by regulating the standards. However, this control has never been effective because the decentralisation has created politically more autonomous local governments, which realise full command over their respective education sectors. This then hampered the realisation of the school-based management program because, as part of the local bureaucracy, school personnel are subject to local bureaucratic arrangements. Hence, from the national perspective, rather than promoting an isomorphic change, the proliferation of these decentralised states has led to diverging changes. As we have seen, Kupang and Surabaya have different education arrangements despite being subject to the same national standardisation pressure.

I have used this divergent effect of the proliferation of state institutions to reinterpret Scott's concept of destructuration. Instead of using the concept for simply identifying the breakdown of established institutions (Scott, 2008), for me destructuration is the process whereby the dynamic of institutional pressures fail to produce structural convergence in the field. The dynamic might arise from either the unsuccessful decoupling of the organisation's technical arrangements from its institutional environment, or the conflict between the organisation's external and internal legitimacy. In our case, the destructuration is the result of the conflict between external and internal legitimacy. Because they run counter to the interests of local government autonomy, many local governments ignore the implementation of some national standards, which in many instances accommodate the World Bank's prescription and follow common global practices.

Some Policy Implications

A Standardised Anarchy

The benefits of educational decentralisation have become a worldwide rationalised set of beliefs whose adoption gives the nation-state external legitimacy to run its education management. It has prevented Indonesia from being caught in a global spotlight as international institutions, like the World Bank and UNESCO, critically and regularly inspect its education governance and compare it with the ideal implementation of education management. It also adds to the country's confidence that its education governance has been part of the global trend and aiming at the shared global objective of a more efficient and competitive education management.

However, the pressure of educational decentralisation also came internally from the central regime's crisis of legitimacy that threatened the nation's survival. During the late 1990s, several regional movements demanded more control over their own territory and threatened to secede from the Republic. The adoption of internal pressure has trapped the nation into a more serious game of legitimacy. In 1999, President Habibie enacted new laws to enable local autonomy; educational decentralisation was simply attached as part of this district-based political decentralisation big bang, with no regulatory framework established. The devolution of power to its sub-national territories in 2001 has created new, uncontrolled local 'states'. This gave the nation-state legitimacy to survive but at the same time eroded much of its influence.

Just two years later, in 2003, a set of more technical regulations for decentralisation was introduced, that is, through the promulgation of new national education system law. The law restores the central government's power but in a different form. The central government then started to impose many regulations to standardise the management of education throughout the nation—but it was too late. As a former vice-minister acknowledged, local governments had been overjoyed with their autonomy. The standardising effort faced more challenge because a new local government law was introduced in 2004, which granted local government elites a new source of legitimacy: popular suffrage. Since then, people have voted directly for local leaders. This allows the excuse for local leaders that they are more obliged to attend to their constituents' needs than to those of the central government.

Standardisation implies a legitimate action of governing. It denotes the established relation of power, with the standard maker being the competent and legitimate power holder on the one hand and those upon which the standards are imposed being the incompetent and, might be, illegitimate, on the other hand. Standardisation, then, constitutes a coercive institutional pressure in reference to which all organisations in the field construct their legitimate structure and, therefore, gears the whole field towards structural isomorphism. However, when the standard maker is aware that such an institutional constellation is absent, that the standard maker is not the only legitimate power holder in the field and that its legitimacy to govern can be contested, then what has been standardised is only anarchy.

Based on the degree of the legitimacy problem, the standardised anarchy can be characterised into two general behaviours: the general inconsistency between central and local policies and local resistance to the central policy. The central-local policy-practice inconsistency has a lower degree of legitimacy, and the problem is mostly justified by the differences in resource capacity. The implementation of the national program of free basic education is more successful in Surabaya than Kupang because Surabaya generates sufficient local revenue to enable it to fund its schools; Kupang does not. Yet, from the national perspective this could not be the reason because the central government has allocated school operational grants and some other development funds to all schools, particularly in more needy areas like Kupang. Other cases like the failure to fulfil the standardised student–teacher ratio, size of physical infrastructure and teacher qualification are examples of general inconsistency.

Meanwhile, the local resistance-based standardised anarchy arises exclusively from the problem of legitimacy. The resistance occurs because the local government sees the central regulation as challenging its local political autonomy. The Kupang recruitment system for school principals is an example of this. Rather than adopting the ministerial regulation on the standard for the selection and appointment of principals, the local government uses its own system because the regulation mandates the assignment of an independent committee as the selector. But an independent committee would be counter to the mayor's authority to control appointments as he wishes in his bureaucracy. Surabaya's refusal to dissolve the international standard school system as mandated by the Constitutional Court is another example. Despite the judge's rejection of her (the mayor) interpretation, the mayor insisted that her government

only needs to eliminate the core problem behind the system ban, which is commercialisation, without necessarily dissolving the whole system. The fact is that Kupang and Surabaya both survive despite neither complying with national policies and the central authorities are unable to apply sanctions.

The cases of Kupang and Surabaya have shown that all localities with different social, political, economic and cultural backgrounds can be potential sites where standardised anarchy is upheld. This is to say that the standardised anarchy is not about what happens in localities, but about the institutional arrangement at the national level. It is an ideal of educational decentralisation that the areas to which the power is devolved are managing their education systems differently, based on their own culture and capacity. In this sense, the role of the central government is to assist those that struggle. Standardisation can be an alternative to finding a national balance between different practices. However, in the case where the central government interference tends to be resisted, the standardisation is better not to be introduced through a coercive, regulatory institution, but rather through a cultural-cognitive institutional channel. Independent, non-state organisations such as universities and professional associations can take this role.

Towards the Separation of Normative from Regulative Institutions in the Decentralisation Context of National Standardisation: A Policy Recommendation

Scott (2008) maintains that institutions have three fundamental pillars: regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. Through the regulative pillar, institutions constrain and regularise behaviour by means of coercive rules and sanctions. The state is the manifestation of the regulative institution. Meanwhile, normative institutions comprise values and norms: the former refers to the conception of preferred social behaviour; the latter refers to the appropriate means to achieve such values. Normative institutions are the domain of the professions. In addition, cultural-cognitive is the realm of tradition and cultural belief through which people have a shared understanding and taken-for-granted compliance.

National standards of education are retained through the combination of normative and regulative institutions, in which professionals develop the standards and the state enforces them through coercive instruments: regulations and bureaucracy. This study would suggest that the central

government might retain its national standards in the decentralisation context by separating the normative from the regulative institutions. To some extent, normative institution can establish collaboration with the cultural-cognitive.

By separating the normative from regulative pillars, the national standard would become a rule-like national benchmark where local governments and schools adopt it, not as an obligation but as a suitable choice. The central government would leave the role of promoting the implementation of this national benchmark to the professionals. The central government would hire and distribute these professionals to give advice and assistance to local governments and schools with technical educational problems. The locally based professionals can be recruited from local universities, academia or from reputable school managers. They would be given the autonomy to interpret the national standards and adjust them for the local culture and capacity. These professionals would help the local education policymakers in developing competitive local advantages, so that the variation effect of educational decentralisation would be based on those different advantages. No government or ministerial regulation should be in place to enforce the standards. Rather, the national standards are promoted and campaigned for through professional and cultural forums: academic discourse, religious meetings, mass media and internet-based social networking discussion. As the process continues, these standards would become a legitimate rationalised myth to which local governments and schools refer in an accepted way.

The involvement of non-state actors would also solve the problem of legitimacy because overlap can be avoided. Professionals have their own basis of legitimacy, which is expertise, whereas the states have their basis of legitimacy, which is legality. So, the two institutions would create the relation of constraint within the organisational field of education. The relations of these two institutions in the field would result in structuration rather than destructuration, because each institution could not intervene in the other's domain, otherwise, they will lose their legitimacy. The professionals would not create regulations because they would not have power to enforce. As such, the local governments could not argue against professional advice on technical matters because they lack expertise legitimacy. Indeed, it is possible that the two institutions might come into conflict, particularly when their respective interests are unfulfilled or challenged as the result of the interaction. However, the conflict will affect restructuration rather than destructuration because at worst the system

would force particular professional groups to withdraw their membership in the field and the local government would seek alliances with other professionals to give its policy more expertise legitimacy.

Limitations

Educational decentralisation has been one among other popular topics within the larger subject of educational reform. This topic, education decentralisation, can be examined using many analytical tools with varying degrees of rigour and based on a range of theoretical foundations. This book, however, only plays a minor role on the stage of such a giant universe. Given this, this book has some limitations.

First, this book is analysing the global–national–local relations that describe the context of education decentralisation policy in Indonesia. However, it attends only a little to the global aspect in favour of the national and the local. Ideally, there would be a particular section for a comparative analysis of the effect of globalisation in other countries that shared similar or different characteristics with Indonesia. Instead of doing this, the work provides such analysis as part of the literature review. In awareness of such a limitation in this study, the globalisation factor is seen more as theoretical than the practical implication of the institutional perspective. This work focusses more on the local effects than the global.

Second, although the prime focus of education decentralisation is on the most local level of governance, which is the school level, this study does not base its analysis at this level. Schools are seen as but one among many other members of local organisational fields (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Therefore, although it is implied that the structuration and destructuration of the field can affect school autonomy, the study is not concerned with the analysis of the internal dynamics of schools in exercising autonomy. Further study, however, is recommended to look at this school dynamic so that the essential goal of Indonesia's decentralisation can be assessed.

Third, the study does not seek to reveal the effect of education decentralisation reform in terms of technical educational outputs, such as governance, accountability, enrolments, student performance, dropout rates and so on. Nor does it aim at assessing the policy implementation in terms of effectiveness or suitability for some local governments. Instead,

the study is concerned with the understanding of education decentralisation as a global policy and how this policy is negotiated for the sake of national and local interests.

Suggestions for Future Research

The Global Context

There are three important suggestions I would make for future research projects. First, how might the remaining centralised system cope with the global pressure? In spite of the extensive global movement to decentralisation, not all nations are influenced by the pressure. Even the country where UNESCO, the vanguard of this decentralisation movement is based, France, remains the most centralised nation in its education governance. Other countries, like giant Russia and Turkey; some monarchies in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; and some dictatorial regimes, like Syria and North Korea, are also centralising their education system. If the argument that education decentralisation has become a global rationalised myth, one that leads pressure to legitimate a nation-state's education governance, can be used as a model, it is certainly important to suggest future research on how the duality of global and local pressures have been making those centralised countries what they are. In this sense, the legitimacy of educational decentralisation might be contested earlier at the level of global-national relations where the established national structure is resistant to change and even challenges the external institutional legitimacy.

Second, how would educational decentralisation respond to the challenge from the global expansion of systems of national standardisation? Decentralisation is not the only global institution that provides pressure to the reform of national education governance. There is also another global trend of educational governance that poses a challenge to this movement: standardisation. Decentralisation pushes towards more local control in education, the more it is decentralised means the more the education system is locally controlled. The most decentralised education system means that the more power is given to schools to self-manage. On the contrary, standardisation runs in the opposite direction: the more standardised an education system is, means the more the system complies with the more central regulating standards. The central ministries of education started to standardise their national education or introduce more centrally

controlled education programs to catch up with the global competition. Some decentralised nations have shown the move to this standardisation project, such as the 2001 *Education Standards Act* in New Zealand, the 2002 *(No Child Left Behind) Act* in the USA and the 2003 *Every Child Matters* Green Paper in the UK. The Indonesian experience has shown that this standardisation has posed a problem of legitimacy in the decentralisation context. I would propose another study of how the conceptual tensions of decentralisation and standardisation could be dealt with in those decentralised countries.

Third, future research could also consider the phenomenon of global standardisation versus radical decentralisation. In this era of global competition, the standardisation movement has gone beyond national borders. Educational standards have been even more globalised through the rise of international testing institutions, such as Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS) and the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), as well as the prominent international systems, such as the International Baccalaureate and Cambridge. Many countries have subscribed to such international testing, and millions of local schools in many corners of the world are in the race to affiliate themselves with the standards required by international education systems. Here lies the very paradox of decentralisation: the more decentralised the system, the more are education organisations pressed by the global standardising institutions. Schools in a highly decentralised system have more freedom to affiliate with International Baccalaureate or Cambridge than do those under the less decentralised systems. Future research must be undertaken regarding how a local school's affiliation to the global standards movement influences its affiliation to the local culture; the preservation of which the decentralisation policy was established in the first place.

The Local Context

On 30 September 2014, the Indonesian government enacted a new local government act, which redesigned the country's decentralisation policy, including the education sector. Through this law, the central government took back some responsibilities from district and municipal governments or moved them to provincial governments. In the education sector, the law moved the authority to manage senior secondary schools from the district and municipal governments to the provincial government. The

law took effect after two years, that is, by 1 October 2016. In line with the logic of this study, the promulgation of this law would become a new site for legitimacy contestation.

On the one hand, this shows the central government's constant effort to recuperate its control over education management. Moving the management of education to the provincial government would enable the central government to assert its control more easily. In addition, provincial governments had the least political legitimacy in the district-based decentralisation design, so their compliance with the central mandates can be more assured. On the other hand, the promulgation of this new law would also show the local government reaction to contest their deprivation of power. In late 2015, the district and municipal government association (Apkasi), which represents more than 500 local governments, filed a judicial review with the Constitutional Court in Jakarta demanding the abolition of the law. Two mayors from the cities of Surabaya and Blitar also registered a case with the Court that required, in particular, the invalidation of the provincial takeover of secondary education management. Apkasi has described the promulgation of this law as resurrecting the New Order's centralism and it likens this as 'awakening a hideous zombie' (Apkasi, 2016).

The promulgation of the new law has made the contestation of legitimacy much more evident. Any future research should look at how educational decentralisation runs in this new institutional setting. In this setting, the voice of schools and non-state institutions, like the NGOs and market organisations, should be heard because they might take even more important roles in the battle of legitimacy between central and local 'states'.

Conclusion

This book argues that educational decentralisation is a never-finished project. I would prefer to illustrate the institutionalisation process as a circle as shown by Fig. 8.1. The key to its adoption is the duality of global and local pressures. Despite the strong and constant pressure coming from the nation-state's external environment, the structural change to decentralisation would never have been made unless there was an internal crisis of legitimacy that forced that change. France is the best and an extreme example of how external pressure is not enough to change the established structure of its centralised education governance. Despite much



Fig. 8.1 The (De)institutionalisation Process of Educational Decentralisation (in Indonesia)

pressure coming from its external environment (European Union, OECD and even UNESCO), the French centralised education governance has strong internal social legitimacy because the system satisfies all the expectations socialised in the local culture (Baker, et al., 2005). The Indonesian case itself has shown that the external institution found fertile ground in the regional resistance against the centralised state.

Once the new structure of decentralisation is set, and external and internal legitimacies have been garnered, the national policymakers must start to think how the new structure might work to technically address educational issues. Because of its external nature, the new legitimate structure is not necessarily correlated with what is perceived as a technically efficient strategy. At this stage, the strategy has to make sure that efficiency is achieved while legitimacy is also retained. In Indonesia, despite

adopting the decentralised structure, the central government officials thought that the structure would not promote an efficient educational strategy because they have no trust in the local officials. Therefore, a new mechanism of central control is introduced without necessarily altering the decentralised structure. The central ministry of education issued the national standards of education and hundreds of ministerial regulations are promulgated to limit local administrative flexibility.

Although the decoupling strategy protects the institutionalised structure from external inspection so that external legitimacy is well-preserved, the case is not the same from the internal legitimacy perspective. Local governments know that standardisation is another way of centralisation and they know that the formal structure of decentralisation legitimises them not to be bound by those standards. Thus, rather than gearing the organisational field of education to convergence and shared understanding (structuration), the failed decoupling has led to uncoordinated policies and fragmented governance. Despite the standardisation, local governments keep governing their education differently regardless of the standardised rules. They adopt those rules eclectically as long as they serve their local interests. The effort of standardisation in the decentralisation context has otherwise created an anarchic standardisation.

The destructuration reflects a turning point in the institutionalisation of educational decentralisation. In the ideal structuration, decentralisation creates different but legitimate local practices: they are different as a natural consequence of decentralisation itself and are legitimate because those practices are implemented in the regulatory framework on which the central and local governments have consensus. These ideally different local practices would provide the empirical basis to support the legimacy of the established global or national institutional model. However, in Indonesia this ideal is not the case because decentralisation has created different but illegitimate local practices. They are illegitimate because those practices are not based on the solid consensus of legitimacy between the central and local governments. Thus, rather than becoming the empirical ground to support the legitimacy of the established institutional model, these practices tend to delegitimise such institutions. In the larger picture, the institutionalisation of educational decentralisation has reversed to become a deinstitutionalisation process.

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KEMENTERIAN PENDIDIKAN & KEBUDAYAAN

REPUBLIK INDONESIA

This book seeks to reveal the interaction between global, national and local contexts in preserving the institutional legitimacy of educational decentralisation, using the post-2001 Indonesian education reform as the case study. What makes the Indonesian educational decentralisation reform different from its previous decentralisation trial is not only that it expands the decentralised sector of education to secondary education, but also that the decentralisation extends beyond the educational realm. The reform has not only led to the reorganisation of the central government's education bureaucracy, particularly through the closing of hundreds of local offices of the central government's ministry of education, but also by the restructuring of the whole education governance system, in which the central government appears like no more playing the dominant role. This then creates a new constellation of political legitimacies on the basis of which the state can manage its education sector.

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